837.61351: Airgram
The Ambassador in Cuba (Butler) to the Secretary of State
A–501. Reference Department’s telegram 159, April 8, Embassy’s A–493, April 13, and telegram 113 of April 14, 1949.1
[Page 628]Cubans’ alleged impression United States would buy 1.2 million tons of sugar believed based on (1) wishful thinking; (2) premeditated campaign (influenced by speculators and politicians) to force United States into “bailing out” Cubans and (3) President Prío’s inexperience in having interpreted general expressions of United States’ good will and desire to help Cuba economically (which he and Hevia received from officials in Washington and Habana) precisely to mean COC sugar purchase about same size as that of last year.
Manas2 confidentially told Embassy April 13 alleged impression that: (1) United States would buy 1.2 million originated entirely in high Cuban political circles; (2) Sugar Commission gave Myers impression of large purchase only upon express orders of Gans; (3) Prío had always been optimistic over certainty large purchase; but that (4) he (Mañas) had never heard Prío or anyone else name any United States official as source of impression, or any purportedly authoritative purchase figure Prior to recent visit to Washington.
First public local utterance on big United States commitment apparently made by Casanova3 to local papers February 8 (Embassy despatch 97)4 saying, “we must wage the battle to have the United States Government very soon assure us that it will purchase the extra million tons which it has promised to do.…5 To limit the said purchase to 500,000 tons would be absolutely inadmissable.… But besides being in the right, we must know how to ask for our rights.…” Queried on this alleged commitment in mid-February, Mañas confidentially said “it was made up out of whole cloth”. This allegation of Casanova that United States promised to buy one million tons is doubly interesting considering his recent castigation of speculator Francisco Blanco for conducting newspaper campaign of false rumors (Embassy’s A–493).
Second known public utterance as to large purchase appeared in Información March 31 (Embassy’s A–4214) in which following interview with Minister of Agriculture Perez and Santiesteban,6 reporter stated: “… it had been learned that negotiations will begin in Washington … for sale … 1.2 million tons.…” Información reportedly is on speculators’ payroll. Aside from inferences, source of this alleged information cannot be verified. [Page 629] Fact that Cubans have alleged they received this impression recalls article Casanova published on January 3 (Embassy despatch 7, January 57), in which he referred to friend of his who “… so often told a lie that he was led to believe that what he was saying was the truth”.
As for Cubans’ allegation that “they are fearful of repercussions among labor, particularly Communist elements”, it is true that: (1) wages for present harvesting season are frozen legally at peak 1947 level unless and until actual average price of 1949-crop sugar falls below final average price for 1948 crop (Embassy despatch 256, December 16, 19487); (2) a substantial sale to United States at less than 4 cents under present world market conditions would probably weaken prices and hasten decline of average 1949 price to level below that of 1948; (3) in this event, wage-freezing decree could be interpreted to call for wage reduction during grinding season; and (4) such a reduction might provide political ammunition for anti-Administration forces, Communist or otherwise.
It is also true, however, that: (1) this particular wage-freezing decree is so loosely worded as to give Government good “legal” excuse for any failure to go through with harvesting season wage reduction, with or without a United States purchase; (2) decree calls for tieing back of wages to price of sugar after June 30, anyway, and (3) Cuban Government sooner or later must face necessity of demonstrating more realistic leadership regarding reasonable reductions in wages (especially since it is publicly taking credit for alleged 25 percent reduction in cost of living of Cuban labor) and must also facilitate reduction in production costs, in order to permit Cuban products to compete in domestic and export markets. As matter of fact, membership certain non-sugar labor unions has indicated willingness to negotiate wage compromises with employers, which labor leaders and Government have obstructed.
Embassy is inclined to feel that while Communists would not fail to make political capital out of wage reduction, importance of threat from that quarter is likely to be unduly magnified.
- Airgram 493 and telegram 113 are not printed.↩
- Arturo M. Mañas, Secretary of the Cuban Sugar Mill Owners Association, was a member of the delegation of the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute in the recent bilateral sugar talks.↩
- Senator José M. Casanova had also been a member of the delegation of the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute in the recent sugar talks.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The indicators signifying omissions appear in the source text.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Teodoro Santiesteban had been a member of the delegation of the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute in the recent sugar talks.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩