IO Files: US/A/12722

Preliminary Position Paper Prepared by the Staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly 3

secret

Suggested U.S. Position in the Event that the Soviets Attempt To Censure the Atlantic Pact 4 in the General Assembly or Pave the Way for a Propaganda “Peace Offensive”

the problem

There are indications that the USSR may launch a propaganda attack against the Atlantic Pact at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, seeking to make it appear that the Pact is in conflict with the Charter and is an expression of an aggressive and provocative policy by the United States,5 Such a course might be intended [Page 73] in order to intimidate various members of the United Nations, particularly certain parties to the proposed Atlantic Pact, and to create an atmosphere in which a further Soviet “peace offensive” might obtain for the USSR further political or strategic advantages.

The problem is to determine what position the United States should take with respect to such & maneuver by the USSR;

recommendations

1.
The Delegation should not oppose the placing of such an item on the agenda of the General Assembly, but should endeavor to prevent any Soviet attempt to use the General Committee for substantive discussion of this issue. The matter, if placed on the agenda, should be referred to Committee 1 without prior extensive discussion in a plenary, although a limited general debate may prove unavoidable.
2.
The first major statement on such a subject should be made by the U.S. representative at an early stage of Committee 1 proceedings on the issue; it might, however, be necessary for a U.S. representative to make a brief counter-statement in an early plenary meeting if Soviet tactics force a limited general debate.
3.
The Delegation should, unless the Soviets resort to extraordinarily abusive and reckless language or open up wider issues, content itself with a moderate and straightforward exposition in general terms of the true meaning of the Pact within the framework of the Charter.
4.
The Delegation should let the European parties to the Pact take the lead in any direct reference to the dangers of Soviet aggression.
5.
In the event that the Soviets insistently press issues beyond that of the relationship of the Pact to the United Nations and engage in extreme charges against the United States, the Delegation should vigorously refute such additional charges, drawing concise and mildly sarcastic contrasts between American policies and Soviet-Communist practices.
6.
The Delegation should act in concert with the delegations of other governments who are parties to the Pact in devising appropriate means of quashing or, if necessary, countering any Soviet resolution condemnatory of the Pact or of regional defense arrangements generally.

discussion

1.
The U.S. has consistently favored the right of full and free discussion by the General Assembly even when items proposed are, in this Government’s opinion, tendentious or lacking in a sound basis. It is true that our position is to discourage the addition to the forthcoming GA agenda of items beyond those whose handling was not [Page 74] completed at Paris; nevertheless, a Soviet move of the type envisaged would raise extremely important issues for the international community, and it would be undesirable either to block the free expression of the views of the Members on this issue or to have it appear that the U.S. was unwilling or unable to answer the charges made against it. We are assuming that, as a continuation of the Third regular session, the forthcoming meetings do not justify a full-scale general debate. If the Soviets bring up the item under discussion, they may try to turn the early plenaries into a wide open general debate or utilize General Committee procedures to gain an initial propaganda advantage. Any such moves should be limited so as not unduly to delay efficient handling of the Assembly’s business. It may prove necessary for the U.S. representative, possibly the Secretary if circumstances permit, to make a short statement on the Pact at an early plenary meeting.
2.
On the assumption that there will not be a full-scale general debate and that the General Committee would not discuss the matter substantively, the main statement by the U.S. delegate would be made in Committee 1 and at a very early stage, presumably right after the opening statement which the Soviets could be expected to make in explanation of the item which they had proposed. It may, however, be necessary for the U.S. to make a preliminary reply in an opening plenary if the Soviets manage first to develop their argument at that stage. Such a preliminary United States reply should be brief, pointing out that this Government prefers not to delay the Assembly’s getting down to business and that it will make a full statement in Committee 1 at the proper time.
3.
It is desired, insofar as possible, to keep discussion of such an item within the bounds of United Nations aspects and considerations. Our reply should be measured and calm, explaining what the Pact is, why it was negotiated, and how it fits into the framework of the United Nations. The President’s message to the Senate,6 the Secretary’s report to the President,7 and the Secretary’s radio address of March 188 on the Pact should be a guide to such a presentation. In addition, the Delegation can emphasize the publication of the treaty text before signature and the free discussion of the issues involved which such advance publication permits by parliamentary bodies and the public in the democratic countries expected to adhere. Appropriate [Page 75] mention should also be made of the fact that the Pact will be duly registered with the United Nations.
4.
The European countries involved can take the lead in any direct references to the dangers of Soviet aggression more fittingly than we because it is they who are more immediately exposed to such dangers. It would be desirable for their presentations to complement ours in this fashion so far as circumstances may require.
5.

It is recognized that if the Soviet propaganda attack is exceptionally severe and on a broader front, the Delegation may have to broaden and stiffen its own presentation. In that event it may become necessary to:

(a)
Emphasize how the Security Council has been paralyzed by the arbitrary use of the veto by the Soviet Union;
(b)
Dwell on the Soviet alliance system with the satellites as an instrument of Soviet domination;
(c)
Contrast the efforts of the democratic western countries to work together for reconstruction and increased security with Soviet-Communist efforts to delay recovery outside their sphere and to sow disorder;
(d)
Expose how Communist propaganda distorts the aims and policies of the free countries and plays upon the desire of the world’s people for peace in order to spread disunity and fear.

The range of issues which the Delegation may cite will be suggested largely by the scope and intensity of the Soviet charges. It is suggested that United States counter-statements of this type, if needed, should embody a series of concise, sharp comparisons on topics raised between American (or western) policies and Soviet-Communist practices in the same fields. Among such topics, the questions of disarmament, treaty observance, and respect for human rights and freedoms may be referred to.

6.
In the event that the Soviets present a draft resolution condemnatory of the Pact or of regional defense arrangements, appropriate means of dealing with it can best be devised by the Delegation acting in concert with the delegations of other Pact participants and possibly with the representatives of leading Latin American states. The simplest solution would be merely to secure the defeat of such a resolution. However, if the course of the discussions on this subject are such as may be likely to cloud the atmosphere and produce uncertainty in world public opinion, it may be necessary for the Delegation to consider some counter proposal along constructive lines. The nature of any such counter proposal would have to be determined in the light of circumstances which may develop, and in consultation with the other interested delegations and the Department.
  1. Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.
  2. The second part of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly met in (New York from April 5 to May 18, 1949, completing action on those agenda items not disposed of during the first part of the Third Session, held in Paris, September–December 1948.
  3. For documentation concerning the North Atlantic Treaty, see volume iv .
  4. Telegram 701 from Moscow, March 19, suggested the possibility of the introduction by the Soviet Union of a spectacular proposal for the outlawing of regional military pacts (711.61/3–1949). Chargé Foy D. Kohler further stated, in telegram 728, March 22, “It being reasonable assumption primary Soviet foreign policy objective at moment is disruption or at least as long as possible delay in ratification this Pact by signatory countries, and considering emphasis and space devoted peace propaganda since warmongering and disarmament issues first injected in GA, it would seem unlikely Soviets would pass up opportunity use UN forum wage battle spectacular issue NA Pact.” (501.BB/3–2249)

    Documentation on developments within the Soviet Union of concern to relations with the United States and other nations is scheduled for publication in volume v.

  5. For text of President Truman’s message transmitting the North Atlantic Treaty to the Senate, April 12, 1949, see Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1949, p. 599.
  6. For text of the Secretary of State’s report to the President on the North Atlantic Treaty, April 7, 1949, see ibid., April 24, 1949, p. 532.
  7. For text, see ibid., p. 884.