832.51/5–149: Telegram
The Ambassador in Brazil (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
321. RefDeptels 228, April 18, 7 p. m., 858 December 30, 6 p. m. and mytels 296, April 22, 7 p. m. and 320, April 30.1
During the past month particularly, as the time for President Dutra’s official visit to the United States approaches,2 an increasing number of prominent Brazilians including responsible members of both Houses of Congress have mentioned to me high degree of importance attached by public opinion in Brazil to President Dutra’s visit. They have all emphasized importance from Brazilian point of view and particularly from that of President Dutra, of the visit resulting in some concrete agreement which can be fairly attributed by the public to the President’s visit to US. Judging from correspondence between Department and Embassy, it is apparent that main Brazilian desires as well as general trend of Brazilian discontent are fully known in Washington.
I have discussed with Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes the points and considerations brought to a head in Deptel 858, December 30, 6 p. m., this telegram being culminating paper of an exchange between Embassy and Department covering last few months of 1948.
Dr. Fernandes informed me a few days ago that during President Dutra’s visit neither President nor members of his official entourage would take any initiative regarding financial or other agreements with US; that, as far as Brazilians are concerned, they will act in a manner consonant with being formal visitors and guests of state in the US. However, Foreign Minister added that if US did not take some measures along these lines results would be bad on public opinion in Brazil. Dry Fernandes, although he understands perfectly well fundamentals of situation, nevertheless often expresses himself with greater vehemency and finality than would seem justified. His apparent bitterness, however, is to a certain degree real and undoubtedly reflects a genuine [Page 566] feeling in responsible circles here. This feeling is shared by some of best Brazilian friends of US, who are also men of force and influence in this country. If President Dutra returns empty handed, with nothing but oral reiteration of our ancient friendship, he will be the object of bitter political criticism. Embassy is aware of efforts now being made by Department to lay foundation for some useful agreement. In this connection reference is made to a memorandum of April 8 addressed to Assistant Secretary Thorp by Mr. Knapp of Office of Financial Development.3 This memorandum points out most pressing problem facing Brazil at moment. I strongly recommend that every effort be made to reach an effective decision as to what can and will be done in the US in the near future on this question.
It is difficult to express without apparent exaggeration, feeling I have, which is shared not only by responsible officers of Embassy but by responsible and representative members of American community, that amity which has characteristically prevailed in American-Brazilian relationship is in some degree of jeopardy at present time. Relations with US are sharply focused in public eye by force of postwar events and Brazil’s present economic crisis. This focus of attention is now receiving additional emphasis through President Dutra’s visit to US. The visit will be conducted in a blaze of publicity in Brazil and results will be closely scrutinized. However impracticable realization of extreme Brazilian desires may be, it nevertheless would seem to me to be wise policy for Department to make every practicable effort to meet Brazilian hopes and aspirations based on this visit. If President Dutra returns to Brazil without any understanding or agreement, or action from US other than warm and friendly words, disillusionment will be great and American interests, both political and otherwise, will be damaged. Situation is not one which can be solved entirely on a rationalized basis. It is useless to refuse everything Brazilians want and rationalize our refusal to them; a more important factor from political point view is what Brazilians think we ought to do.
- None printed. The substance of telegram 858 was summarized in instruction 39, February 11, 1949, to Rio de Janeiro, p. 549; the other messages dealt with the question of possible United States financial aid to Brazil for use on Brazil’s backlog of commercial dollar debts, for further information on which see the memorandum by Mr. O’Toole to Mr. Clark, December 8, 1949, p. 585.↩
- See the memorandum by Acting Secretary of State Webb to President Truman, May 18, 1949, p. 572.↩
- Not printed; the substance of this memorandum was summarized in the memorandum by Mr. O’Toole to Mr. Clark, December 8, p. 585.↩