Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

824.00/10–1249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

secret

[Washington,] October 12, 1949.

Participants:	Sr. Don Ricardo Martinez Vargas, Ambassador of Bolivia.
	Sr. Don Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, Ambassador of Bolivia to Chile and Member Bolivian UNGA Delegation.
	Assistant Secretary Miller
	Mr. King, NWC1

Ambassador Martinez Vargas said he had called to present Ambassador Alberto Ostria Gutierrez who, while en route from his post in Santiago to New York for the United Nations General Assembly meeting, had spent several days in La Paz where he had received special instructions from President Urriolagoitia, including a letter² to be presented to President Truman. It was therefore in the capacity of Ambassador on special mission that he introduced his colleague. I expressed my pleasure at the opportunity to meet the Ambassador whose name was well-known to me.

Ambassador Ostria Gutierrez then launched into an exposition of the recent revolutionary attempt in Bolivia which he characterized as an effort to do away with democracy in that country.³ He viewed this effort as only a part of a larger plot, directed from Argentina, which was determined to end democracy in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay and establish military dictatorships of the Perón type such as exist in Venezuela and Peru which would throw those countries into the Argentine political and economic orbits. He said the reaction of Bolivia’s populace, especially the youth of the country, had been magnificent. However, the Bolivian Army was woefully under-equipped and only its steadfast loyalty enabled the democratic government to withstand the assault. He said he and other Bolivians, including President Urriolagoitia, were positive that they had won a battle but not the war—that further attacks would be made. He explained that his country was without the equipment and funds needed to ward off the blows against democracy—not only democracy in Bolivia but in the entire continent. He emphasized that Bolivia needs US help to prepare for the next round or it will perforce succumb.

Ambassador Ostria then said that during the recent rebellion the democratic people and government of Chile were solidly behind the democratic government of Bolivia. President Gonzalez Videla sent numerous messages of encouragement to Bolivia. However, and he said he would speak frankly, unfortunately there had developed a feeling in Bolivia that the US had let them down in their hour of trial. When they needed the moral and material aid of the US nothing arrived.

I interrupted to inform the Ambassador that we in the Department had done everything within our legal authorization to support the Bolivian Government and explained that this country is a Constitutional democracy where we must observe the laws of Congress. I said I had explained our position repeatedly to Ambassador Martinez Vargas, who always had been welcome and whose pleas had always fallen on sympathetic ears. I said I was disturbed by a memorandum I had just received quoting Ambassador Costa du Rels, Bolivian Delegate to the UN, as having said that Bolivia would not cooperate with the US if we did not cooperate with Bolivia. I said we in the Department had never failed to do everything possible for Bolivia and that we had not been derelict in our duty. Ambassador Martinez Vargas interposed that he appreciated the efforts made in Bolivia’s behalf and understood fully the legal limitations under which the Department operated. He said he knew Mr. King had worked tirelessly to obtain the military equipment he had requested.

Ambassador Ostria resumed, explaining that he too realized the Department’s limitations but that he was attempting to indicate the feelings and reactions of the Bolivian public, uninformed as it is and able to judge only in the light of accomplishments and material things. They saw not one airplane nor piece of equipment from the US all during the revolt and they were somewhat disillusioned.

He went on to say that Bolivia needs moral and material aid. Moral aid might be in the form of US pressure on the Argentine Government to control Bolivian exiles and desist in its aid and cooperation to Bolivian revolutionaries as exemplified by the virtual invasion of Bolivia from Argentina during the last rebellion. I again broke in to inform him that our Chargé in Buenos Aires had called on General Perón and had made our position on intervention very clear. Furthermore, the Secretary, in his address of September 19,⁴ made the US position most clear on this subject. The Ambassador said he knew of the Chargés interview with Perón but asked if this took place before or after the revolution. I said it took place during the trouble and, in view of his skepticism, asked if he believed differently. He merely said that it occurred after the invasion of Bolivia had taken place and therefore did nothing to help.

He said everyone in Bolivia was convinced of the pro-MNR sentiments of Perón and Argentine officialdom. The MNR, a Nazi-Fascist organization which would bring back tyranny, oppression and bloodshed to Bolivia, obviously received funds from Argentina in addition to other aid. The Trotskyite-Communist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), whose chief is Juan Lechin, joined Paz Estenssoro and the MNR as, in the end, the doctrines of both groups are similar. I asked what Lechin had done during the revolt. The Ambassador said Lechin, a Syrian, had received funds from the Syrian colony in Chile gathered by Juan Yarur and taken to Bolivia by Chilean Deputy Salum. The funds were provided because of a common origin and in anticipation of benefits to come their way from an MNR administration in Bolivia.

Ambassador Ostria Gutierrez went on to say that another way the US could give moral aid to the democratic cause in Latin America would be to make it clear that a revolutionary government would not be recognized. I said the Secretary, on September 19, had made our recognition policy most clear.

He then brought up the subject of arms and the need of the Bolivian Army and Air Force for tanks, guns, communications equipment, airplanes and individual equipment. I said our hands had been tied on the question of arms but that we now had new legislation which would allow South American countries to purchase military equipment for cash.⁵ Ambassador Martinez Vargas said he had in his hands a copy of the law just handed him by Mr. King and he thought it to be a great step forward. Ambassador Ostria was disturbed at the mention of “cash” and asked if there were no provisions for credits. Receiving a negative reply, he launched into a description of the poverty of his country, the inability of the people to combat the threats to democracy and the dangers of fascism, naziism and communism, all of which he abhors. However, Ambassador Martinez said he thought they could find the money. Ambassador Ostria then said his country had paid a high price for its loyalty, having refused to buy Czech arms and then being denied US arms during the recent crisis even though it had the money to pay cash. Mr. King said the Munitions Board had today written the Department of the Air Force approving the sale of the fifty-seven machine guns requested by Bolivia and advised the Ambassador to have the Military Attaché resume his negotiations tomorrow.

Ambassador Ostria then summarized his earlier remarks, saying that one of his objectives was to prepare me for my visit to Bolivia. He asked if there were anything he could tell his government in reply to his questions concerning pressure on Argentina and the non-recognition of revolutionary governments. I said there seemed to be nothing to say and provided him with copies of the Secretary’s speech on September 19 which explained US policy on these points.⁶

1. Spencer M. King, of the Office of North and West Coast Affairs.
2. Not printed.
3. Airgram 397, September 19, from La Paz (not printed) reported that the revolt in Bolivia had ended within the past few days with the victory of the government forces. The Department, on September 16, had already instructed the Chargé to convey informally to the Foreign Minister congratulations on the termination of civil strife, which Mr. Espy did on September 21 (824.00/9–1949, 9–1549, 9–2349).
4. Reference is to Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s address on September 19 before the Pan American Society of the United States in New York, the text of which is in Department of State Bulletin, September 26, 1949, p. 462.
5. Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, approved October 6, 1949 (63 Stat. 714).
6. According to a memorandum, dated October 31, from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Willard F. Barber to Secretary of State Acheson, the two Bolivian Ambassadors met on October 28 with President Truman and informed him of the “continued [external] threats to Bolivian democracy” and the “precarious condition of the Bolivian economy”. An attached background memorandum for Secretary Acheson expressed the belief that perhaps the latter threat to Bolivia’s democratic Government out-weighed the former. (824.00/10–3149)