824.248/8–2949: Telegram
The Chargé in Bolivia (Espy) to the Secretary of State
priority
484. I was again called to palace 5:30 p. m. (August 28) and was met by President, Mollinedo, Minister Government, General Rivera, Terrazas, Chief of Staff, and FonMin.
President launched into most urgent plea for immediate military equipment from US in form of ten fighters and ten bombers. General [Page 528] Rivera proposed they be declared surplus from Panama and either they be flown here or Bolivia pilots go Panama, pick them up and bring them back.
After great insistence from President and others agreed to transmit request to Washington. Said, however, in view Department’s instructions to me at beginning June following Bolivian Government’s previous request for military equipment,2 that I must honestly state it was my personal view that little hope could be held out that these planes could be made available Bolivia. I mentioned that there was no law or authority for transfer military equipment to the Governments of friendly countries and that this did not apply Bolivia alone but to all countries in American Hemisphere. Also mentioned there was a law now in Congress that might enable our Government to do so but it had not been enacted.
The insistent tenor of President’s conversation and of his ministers indicated strikingly serious situation here now. It was mentioned only four transport planes now available to Government which they have been using for bombing purposes, having attacked Cochabamba airport at least three times today.
Mollinedo went on to elaborate on President’s statements saying the forces of Bolivia were too small to meet uprisings that were occurring in various parts country and distances too great to move land forces from one place to another. He emphasized that the holding of La Paz was absolutely imperative if this democratic government to-survive and therefore it is not possible divert troops now protecting city area to other places. Only by quick mobility and striking force large planes could government attack rebel groups all over country.
President and all Ministers stressed idea that this revolution had been very well planned and organized and its design was probably to take control of major cities and outlying areas in the rest of Bolivia and the revolutionary forces could converge on capital. At present Santa Cruz and Cochabamba are controlled by MNR. Latter also possibly with cooperation of PIR (latest information at Embassy is that although there is no fighting in Potosi, it is probably held by MNR).
[Page 529]President Urriolagoitia then said to me that “I and my government are convinced that this MNR revolution was aided and supported by Argentine Government and that it was the determination of that government to establish a government friendly to itself through which it could establish an Argentine-Bolivian axis”. President indicated that it was extremely difficult to obtain absolute proof but in his opinion this conclusion was inescapable from money and arms available to MNR rebels, concentration of Bolivian military in Argentina at Bolivian frontier and other bits of information government had picked up. Latter included report that two Argentine officers had come to Bolivia and disappeared and desertion of Bolivian Army officers in various parts of country whom government believed had been suborned by Argentine money and military influence.
In Embassy’s estimation, situation during course of day has definitely worsened. What next moves of revolutionaries will be are unpredictable but if government is not successful in putting down insurrection within next few days, it may become very serious here including great danger to lives and safety of foreigners as result irresponsible action miners and other indigenous elements. Probably tonight and next two days will be critical. Thirty-eight American and other members company staff were brought safely to La Paz at 7:30. Americans in Cochabamba are being concentrated at Cochabamba hotel.
If anything can be done assist present government with military planes I would greatly appreciate being immediately so informed. President has also directed Foreign Minister to cable Bolivian Ambassador in Washington to approach Department.3 Air attaché advises me our modern fighters and bombers not be within capabilities Bolivian pilots to operate successfully and that best airplane for them would be a T–6 loaded with metal link machine gun ammunition.
President did not again raise subject Embtel 481, August 27 and Deptel 218, August 28.4
Sent Department repeated Buenos Aires, Lima and Santiago.
- The telegram was received in the Department of State on August 29, 1949, at 3:23 a. m.↩
- Telegram 103, June 1, to La Paz (not printed), indicated that the Bolivian Ambassador in Washington had asked for assistance in obtaining such specific military equipment as 10 attack bombers, 25 armored cars, 3 radio communications sets, and 5,000 each of uniforms, blankets, pairs of shoes, and sets of individual equipment. The request was made in connection with the outbreak of violence in Bolivia in late May; see the editorial note, p. 525. The Department of State reported that it would inform the Bolivian Ambassador that no legal authority existed permitting the transfer of the requested equipment and that the only source of supply was the commercial market. (824.5045/6–149)↩
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Telegram 228, September 2, to La Paz, informed the Chargé that the Bolivian Ambassador on the previous day had made an urgent plea in the State Department for transport planes, advanced trainers, and certain armament, but he was advised that the U.S. Government was not authorized to sell or give arms or planes and that the material desired might be obtained from commercial sources (824.248/8–3049). Telegram 229, also dated September 2, to La Paz, stated that the Bolivian Ambassador had renewed his request to President Truman at a meeting on that morning; Mr. Truman, however, made no commitments (824.00/9–249).
Also on September 2, Deputy Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed the Chilean Minister Counselor Mario Rodríquez, whose government had endorsed the Bolivian request for U.S. military aid, that no legislative authority existed to meet the request (824.00/9–249).
↩ - See footnote 2, p. 526.↩