Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

839.00/7–1249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative to the Organization of American States ( Daniels )

confidential

[ Washington ,] July 12, 1949.

Participants:	Ambassador Joaquín Salazar, Representative of the Dominican Republic on the COAS.
	Señor Dr. Félix W. Bernardino, Secretary of the Dominican Delegation to the COAS.
	Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, U.S. Representative on the COAS.

Ambassador Salazar and Dr. Bernardino called at my office by appointment made at their initiative. After some preliminary conversation on general matters, Ambassador Salazar adverted to what was obviously the main purpose of his visit, i.e., to discuss the attempted invasion of the Dominican Republic on June 19, 1949 near Luperón.¹

Ambassador Salazar pointed out the widespread ramifications of this revolutionary movement from other countries directed against the Dominican Republic; referred to the complicity of other Governments; stressed the dangerous effects that this situation could have on inter-American harmony and solidarity; declared that the Dominican Government, with the support of the majority of the people, was determined to resist any aggression from outside; and said that in a dangerous situation of this character, in which other foreign governments were involved, there was the even greater danger of a possible international war. He said this problem was a matter of grave preoccupation to his Government, which did not consider that the crisis had passed with the Luperón incident, but rather that there would be further continuing efforts on the part of revolutionaries to cause trouble and, if possible, overthrow the Dominican Government. In this connection Ambassador Salazar pointed out that most of the persons connected with the invasion attempt were foreigners, i.e., not Dominicans, and wondered where they got all their money. In the light of the foregoing, Ambassador Salazar said that the Dominican Government was giving serious consideration to the possibility of presenting the whole case, with ample documented information, to the Council of the Organization of American States, in the hope that the Council could take effective action to eradicate this sore spot in the Caribbean.

I said that I would not presume to advise Ambassador Salazar or the Dominican Government as to the course of action it should pursue in this matter. At the same time, I said I would be glad to make certain observations bearing on the problem in the hope that, by a full and frank exchange of views, misunderstandings could be avoided. Ambassador Salazar said he would welcome any observations I saw fit to make.

In summary, I expressed the following views:

1) That the unsettled situation in the Caribbean had been a source of continued preoccupation to me for nearly two years, particularly since the unsuccessful Cayo Confites expedition of 1947.

2) That, at least until recently, I had felt that marked improvement had taken place in this unstable and explosive situation over the past year and a half, mentioning in this connection the changed attitude of the Costa Rican Government; the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican friendship pact; and more recently the successful arrangement of the differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

3) That I recognized the broad inter-American character of the problem, in view of the international ramifications and the danger it represented to inter-American peace and solidarity; and that, accordingly, the problem was not solely a Dominican one, but likewise a justified source of concern to the other American republics.

4) That I understood that the attitude of Haiti during the Luperón affair had been correct, which was a source of satisfaction to me, as well as to the Dominican Government; that I had received no good evidence of any official connivance or support on the parts of the Governments of Costa Rica, Cuba and Mexico; but that I felt insufficient information had yet been received with regard to the attitude of the Guatemalan Government.

5) That with reference to possible action by the COAS, I could see some danger of lengthy debate rather than speedy action in this case because (a) the immediate crisis had passed and there might be difficulty in obtaining a quorum at this time sufficient to take action under the Rio Treaty; (b) the question of the applicability of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, having in mind the recent Haitian experience, as well as other “situations” in the Americas (i.e., Bolivian fears regarding Argentina and Peru); (c) the necessity of convoking a meeting of Foreign Ministers, even though the Council might act as Provisional Organ of Consultation, with the difficulties this might present in several Foreign Offices; and (d) uncertainty as to the precise form any resolution or action by the Council might take in this problem, following study and consideration by the Organ of Consultation.

6) That the five members of the Inter-American Peace Committee were more readily available, and could not, in my opinion, refuse to consider the problem if it were presented to it.

I then inquired of Ambassador Salazar why his Government seemed to prefer submission of the case to the COAS under the Rio Treaty rather than to the Inter-American Peace Committee.

Ambassador Salazar replied that, while he had no definite instructions in the matter, he believed that his Government felt the matter was of such transcendental importance in the Hemisphere, as well as to his country, that the COAS, as the top organ of the Inter-American community, might properly give its serious attention to the matter.

I repeated that I would not presume to advise the Dominican Government as to the course it should follow, but made it quite clear that I felt the Dominican Government should give careful attention to the Inter-American Peace Committee, at least as an initial approach, if it contemplated taking any action at all. I also recommended that the Dominican Government follow a policy of serenity and patience, and not, in seeking to defend itself, run any risk of going to extremes which outside opinion might consider of an aggressive character.

Before Ambassador Salazar and Dr. Bernardino left, I said that, in any event, I assumed they would be discussing this problem with other colleagues on the COAS, as I intended to do, and that I would welcome the opportunity of a further conversation with them after a few days.

1. On that date, a PBY aircraft tried to land men and munitions at the town of Luperón on the northern coast of the Dominican Republic, apparently as part of a larger plan to overthrow the Trujillo Government. The attempt was thwarted by Dominican forces who destroyed the PBY and killed or captured all 15 occupants, including three Americans killed. (810.00/7–1249)