IO Files: US/A/C.5/122
Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly 2
Report of the Committee on Contributions
the problem
What position should the United States Delegation take as to the Report of the Committee on Contributions? (A/954, August 23, 1949)3
recommendation
1. The Delegation should, after the usual complimentary reference to the work of the Committee on Contributions, note that the report of the Committee recommends a reduction in the contribution from the United States of America of 1/10 of 1% representing “a first step in implementing the decision of the General Assembly of 1948 and the instructions given by the Assembly to the Committee on Contributions”. (238 (III), B, November 18, 1948) The Delegation should note with favor that there has been a first step but should strongly state its view that the Committee on Contributions has not adequately taken into consideration in its deliberations the general economic improvement which has occurred in the world and which has been reflected in the press and other publications. The Delegation should recognize the difficulties undoubtedly encountered by the Committee in obtaining adequate information from certain countries about economic conditions and should urge that members increase their cooperation with the Committee in providing information and access to public documents.
2. The Delegation should reserve its position on the report of the Committee on Contributions (if possible making a statement such as the one above as part of the opening statement of the U.S. Representative on Committee 5) and should actively explore with all Delegations [Page 332] the possibility of revising in the General Assembly the scale of contributions proposed by the Contributions Committee for 1950 in order to take into account in greater degree the ultimate ceiling of 33⅓% and to adjust upward contributions of member states which are at present underassessed. If it seems unlikely that such a provision will obtain majority support, the U.S. Delegation should attempt to obtain the adoption of a resolution giving clear instructions to the Contributions Committee that it is (a) to prepare a comprehensive revision of the contributions scale next year; (b) to give special consideration to the economic situation of those countries in which considerable improvements have occurred since the war; and (c) to take into full account previous instructions received from the General Assembly.
3. The United States should be fully aware of the problem faced by states with a high per capita assessment, and in private conversations should point out to these states that they have a common interest with the United States in urging substantial adjustments in the allocations scale. If, however, these states should attempt to argue that they alone are entitled to reductions until such time as their per capita assessments are brought into line, the United States Delegation should take the position that the 1948 Assembly resolution intended that adjustments arising from per capita considerations should occur concurrently with significant adjustments made in recognition of the ceiling principle.
4. If the Israeli Delegation should seek a reduction in the assessment of twelve one-hundredths of one per cent (.12%) recommended for Israel by the Contributions Committee, the United States Delegation should vote against such reduction but should not itself engage in the debate.
background
Since 1946, the United States has sought recognition in the United Nations for the principle that, in normal times, no one Member state should pay a preponderant share of the costs of the organization. The United States has made plain its conviction that its initial assessment of 39.89% could be justified only by the extraordinary circumstances of the immediate post-war economic situation.
At the time of the Preparatory Commission,4 the United States supported the concept of relative capacity to pay as a basic criterion for assessing Member quotas. Neither the United States nor other Members anticipated that this criterion might result in a maximum assessment of more than perhaps 30%. However, the Committee on Contributions, operating under instructions to recommend apportionments [Page 333] “broadly according to capacity to pay”, reported to the Second Part of the First Assembly a relative capacity for the United States of 49.89%. Through negotiation in Committee 5, this figure was reduced to 39.89 % when the 1946 scale was agreed upon.
The initial instructions of the Contributions Committee in 1946 did not direct the Committee to impose a ceiling for the largest contributor, but did state that “if a ceiling is imposed on contributions, the ceiling should not be such as seriously to obscure the relation between a nation’s contributions and its capacity to pay. The Committee should be given discretion to consider all data relevant to capacity to pay and all other pertinent factors in arriving at its recommendations.”
Since 1946, the United States has contended that the most important “other pertinent factor” is the concept of the sovereign equality of Members. The United States has argued that the largest contribution should be limited to a percentage of the total that will not be so large as seriously to jeopardize the equality of obligation and of opportunity which should govern the affairs of the Organization. From the time that the first scale of assessments was established, United States delegations commonly used the figure of 33⅓% to represent our concept of a practicable maximum figure for normal times.
Once the United States assessment had been set at 39.89% by the General Assembly, the Contributions Committee felt itself without authority to recommend changes in this figure. In its report to the Third Session in 1948, the Committee drew attention again to the uncertainty in which it found itself in this connection. “It is asked,” the Committee said, “to review a scale of contributions previously fixed by the Assembly partly on considerations other than capacity to pay but the Committee itself was not clearly authorized to make changes on any criterion other than the capacity to pay.”
At the Third Session, the U.S. Delegation formalized, by submitting a definite proposal, its contention which it had already stated in 1946 and again in 1947, that in normal times there should be a ceiling of 33⅓% on the largest contribution. The resolution, as ultimately approved by the Third Assembly, fell short of the full U.S. position, but it was an accomplishment of a sort since in its preamble it recognized the principle of a 33⅓% ceiling for normal times.
The 1948 resolution also recognized in its preamble that “in normal times the per capita contribution of any Member should not exceed the per capita contribution of the Member which bears the highest assessment”. This was a concession to those few states of relatively high living standards who pay a higher per capita contribution than the United States under the present allocation scale (Iceland, Sweden and New Zealand), and those additional states which would find themselves [Page 334] in this position in case the United States’ quota should be reduced to 33⅓% (Australia, Canada and United Kingdom).
The instructions under which the Contributions Committee was to operate in formulating the present report are contained in this same resolution of 1948. The Assembly instructed the Committee, “to recommend how additional contributions from (a) admission of new Members, and (b) increases in relative capacity of Members to pay, can be used to remove existing maladjustments in the present scale or otherwise used to reduce the rates of contributions of present Members”.
In its report to the present Session of the Assembly, the Committee states that although there has been an improvement in some branches of economic activity, certain factors make it difficult for the Committee to suggest an appreciable change in the present scale. These factors include (a) the continued need in some states to devote a large share of their resources to the repair of war damage; (b) increased difficulty of some states to secure foreign exchange; (c) the inconclusiveness of the available statistics as to the extent of real improvement for some states; and (d) the uncertainty in the external trade and balance of payments position of some states.
The Committee recommends that Israel should be assessed twelve one-hundredths of one per cent (0.12%), and that two states, Sweden and the United States, should be granted reductions totalling to this same amount, Sweden’s reduction being two one-hundredths of one per cent (0.02%) and the reduction for the United States being one-tenth of one per cent (0.10%). The decision to allow further relief to Sweden was made, the Committee states, in the light of information presented as to Sweden’s situation and the discussions in the Working Group of Committee Five, which considered Sweden’s application for reduction in the First Part of the Third Assembly. The proposed reduction for the United States, in the words of the Committee’s report, “represents a first step in implementing the decision of the General Assembly last year and the instructions given by the Assembly”.
The Committee makes certain additional recommendations, as to Israel’s assessment for 1949 and as to Swiss contributions to the International Court of Justice, which raised no important issues.
discussion
Evidence is accumulating that a number of Member states have reached a stage of economic recovery that renders out of date the United Nations contribution scale developed immediately after the War. It seems fairly obvious that certain states are now under-assessed on a basis of comparative national income. The most important case is that of Soviet Russia, but there are other cases as well. If the quotas of these states were raised, it would be possible to make at least a substantial [Page 335] beginning in bringing down the United States quota toward the goal of 33⅓% and to reduce the quotas of those states with per capita contributions above the per capita contributions of the United States.
The only other source of adjustment for the United States is from the adherence of additional members to the United Nations. This year Israel provides the fraction of one per cent which the Contributions Committee proposes for reassignment to Sweden and the United States. However, from this point onwards we cannot expect the admission of a large number of states.
The reduction in the United States assessment proposed by this report is very small when seen in the light of the disparity between the present U.S. rate and the ultimate ceiling figure of 33⅓ per cent. The United States Government has made it clear in the General Assembly that it does not expect radical or immediate achievement of the 33⅓% ceiling, but it can hardly be expected to be satisfied with a rate of reduction which would require approximately sixty-five years to reach the agreed goal.
It is evident that the Contributions Committee will act only when heavy pressure is exerted upon it from Committee 5. It is evident as well that the United States must assert strong leadership in Committee 5 if such pressure is to be brought.
The concern of this government to achieve a substantial reduction in its UN assessment without delay arises not only from our policy toward the UN itself but from our concern to stabilize at reasonable levels our rates of contribution to the Specialized Agencies. Assessments in UNESCO were originally based on the UN scale, and because UNESCO had a smaller membership the United States paid 44.03% in 1947, and 41.88% in 1948. As a result of special efforts on the part of the United States in 1948, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted a resolution accepting 33⅓% as the ceiling for normal times, and the United States contribution for 1949 was reduced approximately a third of the distance to that goal, being set at 38.47% for 1949. This action was taken just after the UN had accepted the principle of a ceiling. At the UNESCO General Conference this fall, the United States Delegation will seek to achieve a second installment of the reduction of the United States quota toward 33⅓%. The failure of the UN to grant the United States more than a token reduction will directly affect our chances of accomplishing a further reduction in UNESCO.
In the case of WHO, the original fate was also based on the UN scale with the United States paying 38.47% in 1948 and 38.36% in 1949. For 1950, the United States has been able to secure a reduction to 36%. It will press for further reductions.
[Page 336]It has been the view of the United States that, in the case of the Specialized Agencies, whose budgets are only a fraction of the size of the UN’s budget and where other considerations apply, 33⅓% is too high a ceiling and that a figure of 25% would be more appropriate. Among those major Specialized Agencies in which the United States contribution has been at or below 25% (FAO 25%; ICAO 18.66%; ILO 22%) there is intense pressure on the United States to increase its proportion. We cannot expect to stabilize our rate in these latter organizations in the neighborhood of 25% unless we can demonstrate that our rate is coming down in those Specialized Agencies where it is now substantially above this figure.
If other states conclude that the United States is without hope of achieving an early reduction of its assessment in the UN, they will be more reluctant than ever to agree with the United States view as to the proper level for its assessments in the other agencies. It is essential that the matter be put before the General Assembly in its proper perspective and that the United States Delegation take the lead in urging further study of the degree of economic revival since 1946 in those states whose production and trade were dislocated by the War, so as to determine the extent to which those states are able to assume an increased share of UN costs.
A special problem may be presented by the Member states with high per capita assessments. These states may be critical of the fact that the Contributions Committee in its report singles out Sweden and the United States as the only two states whose assessments warrant reduction. Preferably in private conversations with the delegations of the countries with high per capita assessments, the United States should make it clear that this Government recognizes that a number of states face the problem of overassessment and that the United States favors equitable adjustment in due course for all. It should be pointed out in such conversations, however, that there will be little adjustment for any state if the Assembly fails to approve substantial increases in the assessments of the states now underassessed.
If the Israeli Delegation should press for a reduction of twelve one-hundredths of one percent (.12%) recommended for Israel by the Contributions Committee, the United States Delegation should oppose such a reduction. A quota of .12% is only three times the minimum quota of .04%. If Israel should plead her inability to pay on account of the troubled conditions of the area, it should be pointed out that her neighbors pay the following proportions:
| Syria | .12% |
| Lebanon | .06% |
| Iraq | .17% |
| Egypt | .79% |
For a country of Israel’s population and resources, a quota of only .12% is moderate and should be approved.
- Drafted in the Office of United Nations Affairs. For documentation regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation to this session of the General Assembly, see pp. 12 ff. The General Assembly convened at Flushing Meadow, New York, on September 20.↩
- United Nations documents are to be found in depository libraries of the United Nations.↩
- For documentation regarding the work of the UN Preparatory Commission, August–December 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i, pp. 1433 ff.↩