501.BC/7–2149: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State
849. The French position with regard to the veto, particularly with respect to recommendation 2 of the GA’s resolution requires reconsideration of our plans for the meeting of the five permanent members of the SC. The French are under instruction that they may not agree to give up their veto on items 2, 43, 44, 49, and 50 of the IC report. British will agree to give up veto on all items except 49 and 50. Chinese position same as ours.
The main purpose of the four powers in presenting this recommendation to the Assembly and holding the proposed five-power discussions is to isolate the Russian position and thereby put increased pressure on them to make concessions. If the result of the proposed five-power discussions is to disclose that the Russians are not alone but are supported by the French on a number of important items and by the British on two, we would lose most if not all of the advantages we hope to gain by these discussions.
There are two alternatives possible. The first is to accept the French suggestion that we avoid considering recommendation 2 in detail and rely on the expected Russian statement that they are unwilling to change their position to put the whole burden on them. The second is to insist on a detailed discussion as requested by the GA, and attempt to persuade the French to modify their position on certain of the items. We have in mind in this connection that the French might be persuaded to drop their objections to waiving the veto on items 2, 43 and 44, and that in return the US and China might agree to accept the British position that we would waive our veto on all of the items with the exception of Article 37 of the Charter. We find it difficult to see how the French could feel very strongly about retaining their veto on membership questions. With respect to items 43 and 44, it seems somewhat inconsistent for them to insist on the veto in regard to these two items while agreeing to waive it with respect to items 47 and 48.
[Page 319]It is our view that it would be possible to follow the first alternative course without much likelihood of serious embarrassment. This would involve, however, taking the risk that the Russians might force each of the other four permanent members, either in the five-power discussions or in the SC, to state its detailed position on recommendation 2. Even if we succeeded in avoiding a detailed discussion, this course would involve a failure to carry out fully an Assembly recommendation which had been sponsored by four of the five powers. It would mean sacrificing the advantages of indicating that there was agreement between four permanent members on at least 16 out of 21 items referred to in recommendation 2.
We recommend the second course, even if this means postponing the five-power discussions on this matter until September. We think there is a good chance that the French might modify their position as indicated, particularly if we advised them we felt it was necessary in any case to proceed with an examination of the individual items in recommendation 2 regardless of their position.
Advantages of reaching unanimous four-power agreement along lines indicated seem to us substantial and worth further effort.
In view of French and British hesitation on double veto aspects of recommendation 1 of GA resolution, we feel we should avoid any consideration of that recommendation in five-power meeting.