IO Files: US/A/C.1/1806
United States Delegation Position Paper 1
Suggested Position on Chinese Communist Request To Be Heard in China Case
the problem
What should be the position of the U.S. Delegation toward a request that Chinese Communist representatives be heard in the GA in connection with the Nationalist charge of Soviet aid to the Communists in the Chinese case?
recommendations
1. If, as is likely, the request is made for the Communists to be heard in the capacity of representatives of “the Government of China”, this would provide adequate grounds for denial, and the US should oppose the request.
2. If the request should be made that the Communists be heard in some other capacity, the U.S. position would have to be determined, in consultation with the Department, particularly in the light of the following factors:
- (a)
- Whether there are questions of fact before the Committee, determination of which is essential to enable it to act on pending proposals [Page 288] and regarding which the Communists could lay claim to special knowledge,
- (b)
- Whether appreciable sentiment exists among the other delegations in favor of granting a hearing.
3. In any event, if it should develop that Communist representatives are to be heard, every effort should be made to restrict their appearance to a Subcommittee or, failing that, to the Committee, to make a statement regarding facts peculiarly within their knowledge; to hold themselves available for questioning; but to take no part in the debate.
discussion
1. Two opposing sets of considerations have a bearing upon the U.S. position regarding any request that the Communists be heard. In the first place, the U.S. has in general upheld the principle that as “a forum in which the international public interest can be fully expressed”, the UN should follow a liberal policy in granting hearings to groups exercising de facto authority over a territory and having vital interest in the subject and, concomitantly, that the UN is entitled to have before it all relevant information from the most direct sources on which to base its decisions in a given case. Although these principles have not always prevailed in practice, they have consistently been professed and the occasions for their contravention are generally explainable on special grounds.
On the other hand, in the present circumstances there is doubt as to whether constructive purpose would be served by hearing the Chinese Communists; their presence might prove embarrassing to the U.S. and to other countries and they would probably seek to use the GA as a sounding board to enhance their international standing, further to weaken the Nationalist position and to attack the U.S. and other western powers.
2. It seems probable that a request in the present case would be to grant a hearing to the Chinese Communists as representatives of “the Government of China”. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union which has recognized the Communist regime2 would in presenting or supporting the request permit it to be made on any other basis. Thus the request would be tantamount to a Chinese Communist claim to replace the Nationalists as China’s representatives to the UN, and should be opposed on the ground that China is already represented by a duly accredited delegation. So long as the UK and other countries adhere to their present intention not to grant recognition to the Communist [Page 289] regime during the GA, there would undoubtedly be little support for granting a request to be heard on this basis. Denial of the request would be in accordance with the position taken in denying representatives of the Markos “government” the right to be heard in the Greek case.
3. In the less likely event that the Communists should request to be heard in some other capacity to present information on pertinent issues peculiarly within their knowledge, grounds for denial of the request are more difficult and the possibility of some support from other delegations is increased. Furthermore, certain precedents in the Indonesian, Czechoslovak and Palestine cases might be adduced in support of a hearing. If the request should be put on such a basis, the exact position of the U.S. will necessarily depend upon a number of circumstances, some of which are referred to in the second recommendation. The question on which the Communists would be most likely to claim special knowledge is their receipt of Soviet aid. If at the time the request is made the proposed U.S. resolution has been presented and no Chinese resolution has been presented to the Committee, opposition to hearing them might be placed on the ground that proof of the charge of Soviet aid is not essential to the proposed action and that the Committee has adequate information on which to base its resolution.
If appreciable sentiment should be manifest by other delegations in favor of granting a hearing, continued U.S. opposition might on the other hand appear unwise but it might be possible nevertheless to suggest as an alternative that the Communists be permitted to submit written statements and evidence rather than oral testimony.
4. If nevertheless the General Assembly should decide to hear Communist representatives, the U.S. should make every effort to establish the limitations upon their hearing set forth in recommendation 3. These are fully in accord with the established practice of the General Assembly in limiting the participation of outside groups and individuals.
- This paper was prepared by the Advisory Staff of the U.S. Delegation to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The General Assembly met in New York from September 20 to December 10, 1949. For documentation regarding the composition and organization of the U.S. Delegation and its Advisory Staff, see pp. 12 ff.↩
- On September 21, 1949, the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference met at Peiping and proclaimed the (Communist) People’s Republic of China. On October 1, the (Communist) Central People’s Government of China was formally inaugurated at Peiping. General Chou En-lai was named Premier and Foreign Minister.↩