Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/1985

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Thomas F. Power, Jr., Deputy Secretary-General of the United States Delegation

secret

[New York,] October 20, 1949.

Participants:	Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations
	Mr. Thomas F. Power, Jr.

Early this afternoon Mr. Lie expressed to me grave concern about the Russian reaction at the election of Yugoslavia to the Security Council.¹ Although he was glad to see the Yugoslavs trying to break away from the Soviets, he thought they were very unwise to pick a fight on the issue of election to the Security Council. He thought the other Members of the Assembly were unwise to support the Yugoslavs. The Russians should have been told that if the Eastern European states could not agree on a candidate, the Assembly would elect someone from outside the area. This would have been less of a challenge to the Russians in the Yugoslav election. He said that although he had been deeply disturbed about this issue he had not discussed it with any other delegations, not even the Scandinavians. He had mentioned his concern only to Mrs. Roosevelt and to Mr. Rusk. He knew that they had informed the delegation but he was deeply concerned at the press leak of his conversation. He said he was able to deny it because it had been reported in a somewhat inaccurate form. He said that for the most part in the above mentioned conversation he had been quoting other delegations rather than giving his opinion. He believes that the leak came from departmental sources.

I reviewed our reasons for supporting Yugoslavia. Mr. Lie said he understood these and he fully realized this and the United States had not pushed the Yugoslav candidacy. However, he still thought we would have been wiser to elect a state from outside Eastern Europe rather than Yugoslavia.

Mr. Lie said he did not understand how the Russians could be such fools as to think they could elect Czechoslovakia while it was in the midst of a new purge. He had sent a message to the Russians on October 19 through Mr. Zinchenko² saying that they were sure to be defeated and had even made a bet with one of the Russians that Yugoslavia would be elected on the first ballot.

In answer to Mr. Lie’s remark that a series of blows to the Russians might drive them out of the UN, I observed that I doubted they would leave the UN, particularly the Security Council, out of anger over the outcome of an election but only as the result of a deliberate purposeful decision. Mr. Lie agreed, but felt that a series of rebuffs like this would have the accumulative effect of persuading Russians that the UN was of less value to them.

Mr. Lie said that he would expect to see the Russian answer to the Yugoslav election in nine months to a year’s time. When he had mentioned to Zinchenko his fear that the Russians would take some hasty step in answer to the election, Zinchenko had remarked that Moscow moved very slowly in important matters. Mr. Lie said he understood that it had taken the Russians nine months to decide to leave the WHO.

While I was in his office Mr. Lie gave orders that a master switch for the public address and simultaneous interpretation system should be installed on the President’s desk to enable him to cut off speakers who were out of order as was Vishinsky in making a statement following the Security Council election this morning.³

1. For the record of elections on October 20 to the Security Council (nonpermanent members), the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council, see GA(IV), Plenary, pp. 102–105.
2. Constantin Zinchenko, installed on October 21 as the new Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs.
3. GA(IV), Plenary, p. 103.