IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/105

Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 30, 1949, 9:00 a. m.

secret

[Here follows list of names of persons (40) present. The Secretary of State was in attendance at this meeting. A review of developments in committees was begun.]

Mrs. Roosevelt said she believed the Delegation would be interested in the views Mr. Lie had expressed to her last night at dinner. The Secretary-General had told her that Americans did not understand the Russians. She had replied that she thought the Russians were a little difficult for everybody to understand. He had gone on to say that we were doing things which were a direct affront to Stalin who hated the Yugoslavs more than anyone else, the present struggle with Yugoslavia being a fight for the Communist leadership of the world. This struggle was an important matter of personal prestige to Stalin. Therefore, the support of the United States for Yugoslavia’s candidacy for the Security Council, and our action on China were most dangerous. Mr. Lie expressed the fear that they might cause the Soviet Union to leave the United Nations. Mrs. Roosevelt asked whether he feared the Soviets would go to war. He did not, his only fear being their withdrawal from the United Nations. He thought we were moving too fast. He had advised the Yugoslavs to move more slowly and [Page 257] not to take an aggressive attitude. He expressed his sympathy with the Yugoslavs but thought they were moving too fast, and the results frightened him. This was the third of the crises which had frightened him, the first being Berlin, the second when Norway had joined the Atlantic Pact, and now this. Mrs. Roosevelt said she had made no response to these statements. Mr. Lie had added that he felt that Yugoslavia, China and the United States were all to blame for this crisis situation as they had not thought things through.

[Here follows discussion of the “Chinese item”. Secretary Acheson outlined his views in support of some remarks made by Ambassador Jessup.]

The Secretary referred to Mrs. Roosevelt’s report of her conversation with Mr. Lie. He believed his remark as to the intensity of Russian feeling on this matter was entirely true for the Soviets regarded this as an internal matter—heresy from within which it was vital to stamp out. That was one reason why Mr. Lie had the right to be alarmed. He regarded the problem created by Yugoslavia putting itself forward for the Security Council as a difficult one. He personally wished they had not done so, for they had added to the difficulties of the world in doing it. However, once they had put themselves forward we had to make up our mind between candidates. He considered it was very important that Yugoslavia be the preferred candidate, because this would put both Yugoslavia and the Soviets on the Security Council where they should be when discussion of the situation in that area took place.

Mrs. Roosevelt commented that Mr. Lie had told her he believed that there was no danger of war between Yugoslavia and the Soviets because the latter would try to bring about an internal revolution. He hated to see that happen and expressed wonder that Tito had not been killed. The Secretary remarked that one danger in the situation would be that the Greeks might lose their self-control and move into Albania, after which Tito would move in also, as would the Soviets.

[Here follow concluding remarks about China and discussion of Council slates.]