Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

501.BB/9–2649

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Rusk ) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret

[ Washington ,] September 26, 1949.

Our General Assembly Delegation is taking the view, under instructions from the Department, that the United States should vote for Yugoslavia for the Security Council if there is substantial support in the Assembly, but should not campaign for Yugoslavia’s candidacy and engage U.S. prestige in Yugoslavia’s success. The primary reasons for this cautious attitude are:

1. Neither the French nor the British appear to favor the Yugoslav candidacy. The UK Delegation has, in fact, indicated that it will probably oppose.

2. A considerable number of delegations are waiting upon the United States for guidance on this point. For us to announce considerably in advance that we expect to vote for Yugoslavia would place us in the position of leading the campaign.

3. On the last occasion on which the U.S. voted against the Soviet bloc candidate for the Eastern European seat on the Security Council, we were roundly defeated and were accused by many delegations of not wishing to carry out the informal understanding reached in 1945¹ about the allocation of seats.

4. The present Eastern European candidate is Czechoslovakia, which can be expected to receive considerable support from Western Europe and the British Commonwealth.

5. If the USSR is able to hold the United States responsible for Yugoslavia’s election, it would further accentuate the increase of bitterness between the USSR and Yugoslavia in a situation which is already dangerous.

6. Some delegations in the Assembly appear to feel that Yugoslavia’s election under strong U.S. sponsorship would greatly reduce the prospect of settlement of some of the issues now before the Assembly involving the Great Powers.

Despite the above considerations, the Department of State believes that we should vote for Yugoslavia rather than any Soviet-bloc candidate, if there is a good prospect for Yugoslavia’s election. We do not wish, however, to have a direct issue made between us and the Soviet Union on this point and have the General Assembly decide for the Soviet Union and against the United States. A further consideration is, of course, that the United States does not wish to refuse to vote for Yugoslavia since it might be interpreted as a weakness following the atomic announcement.²

Under all the circumstances we believe the Delegation should have wide discretion in handling this matter prior to the actual vote.³

Concurrences: EUR—Mr. Thompson.

Dean Rusk

1. To the extent that there was such an “informal understanding” reached between the Five Great Powers, the episode occurred at London at the time of the meeting of the first part of the first session of the General Assembly, and the date should read (January) 1946. For documentation on the London discussions, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, pp. 117 ff.
2. The reference is to President Truman’s statement of September 23 that the United States had evidence of an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1949, p. 487.
3. This paper was handed to President Truman by the Acting Secretary of State (Webb) on September 26, and read and approved by the President as the proper course to follow (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65D238).