501.BC/5–449

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

confidential

SOA is in complete agreement with the contents of Mr. John Ross’ memorandum of April 25 to Mr. Dean Rusk and strongly endorses serious favorable consideration of United States support for India to occupy the non-permanent membership on the Security Council being vacated by Canada.

In addition to the reasons which Mr. Ross enumerated of India’s ability to contribute, the strengthening of the principle of equitable geographic distribution, the probable weakness of China as a representative [Page 236] of Asia, the rapidly clarifying orientation of India to the West, and the progress being made toward solution of the Kashmir problem, there are several other factors which seem pertinent. India has the largest population under any one stable government of any country in the world. Its government is in the process of educating these hundreds of millions not only in the three R’s but, perhaps even more importantly, to the concept of multi-national collaboration through the United Nations. India has made the support of the United Nations the cornerstone of its entire foreign policy and in its actions has shown as high a respect for and support of the various agencies of the United Nations as has perhaps any other country which has gone to the United Nations to find solutions to its problems.

India has played an active and progressively more constructive part in the UN. Embarrassed by a shortage of top-flight personnel it has yet consistently sent outstanding and high-level delegations to UN meetings.

At the time that SOA requested the support of NEA for India to replace Syria on the Security Council last year the following reasons were advanced which I believe to be equally applicable today, rendered even more valid by the passing of another year without India being a member of the one instrument of the United Nations on which it has always been anxious to serve:

1.
The United States supported India in 1947 against the Russian-supported Ukraine.1 Although this support evoked a strong favorable reaction in India and contiguous countries at the time, there were elements in India, less friendly to the United States, which contended that the United States was not supporting India out of sympathy for India but as a result of power politics and opposition to a Russian satellite. To fail to support an actively-campaigning India this year could not but revive these charges and instigate a series of attacks on the United States in the Indian press.
2.
The Government of India has repeatedly solicited the support of the United States for India’s membership in the Security Council. It is apparent that India is not only anxious to become a member of the Security Council but that failure on our part to support its candidacy would be detrimental to Indo-US relations.
3.
From every standpoint of geographic location, population, resources, and physical size, India is preeminently qualified to be a member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Thus, it would certainly not be inappropriate for India to be elected to one of the non-permanent seats at this time—or for the United States to be one of the great powers supporting India. In this connection, although it is early to predict, it would seem probable that China and the UK will be favorably inclined to India’s candidacy.
4.
Should the United States support any nation other than India for this position when India will quite obviously be staging an active campaign, and should that other nation be elected, damaging weight would be added to the charge throughout the South Asian area that neither the United States nor the United Nations has a realistic appreciation of the importance of South Asia or of the worthiness of its claim to play a meaningful role in international organizations.

In addition to all of the foregoing it is my opinion that American support of India for the Security Council would be one more effective action in the achievement of the fundamental United States political objective with regard to India toward “the orientation of the Government and peoples of India toward the United States and other Western democracies and away from the USSR … and the progressive development of responsible democratic political institutions.”

  1. For documentation concerning the 1947 elections to the Security Council, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. i, pp. 100 ff.