IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/131

Minutes of the Thirty-seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, December 6, 1949, 9:00 a. m.

secret

[Here follows list of persons (43) present and discussion of the first agenda item.]

2. China (A/C.1/551, 552 and 553)1

Mr. Yost, summarizing the general status of the Chinese case, indicated that our joint resolution2 had obtained wide general support and would undoubtedly be adopted. There were still certain difficulties regarding the disposition of the Chinese resolution, however. Many delegations showed considerable reluctance to vote against the Chinese resolution without offering any concessions to China. As a result of this feeling, a new resolution had been introduced the preceding day by Cuba, Ecuador, and Peru.3 Under this resolution, the Chinese charges against the Soviet Union would be referred to the Interim Committee for continuous examination and study, and for report to [Page 230] the next Assembly session. The introduction of this resolution had come as a complete surprise. It immediately received considerable support, although the United States had stated that it could not support the resolution because it would charge the Interim Committee with a definite and clear duty of acting on the Chinese case and would keep the matter before the Assembly. We had begun to consider possible revisions of this new resolution which would refer to the joint resolution and would authorize the Interim Committee, if it should decide such action would promote the stability of conditions in the Far East, to examine any violation of the principles contained in our joint resolution.4 Two of the three co-sponsors had agreed to this change, and it was likely that a resolution revised along these lines could be adopted. In answer to a question from Ambassador Austin, Mr. Yost indicated that this procedure would not interfere with action on our own joint resolution, which would undoubtedly be passed by a sweeping majority. The Interim Committee reference, however, would provide a means for dealing with the Chinese resolution.

Ambassador Jessup emphasized the ‘attitudes of the members of the Committee. There was a general reluctance to vote on the Chinese resolution because members did not wish to vote against it. Many would simply like to make a gesture of support for Tsiang, whom they liked personally. Turning to the matter of referring the Chinese case to the Interim Committee, Ambassador Jessup explained that the Department had felt it important for the Delegation to hold its present line and to keep faith with the co-sponsors of our own resolution. After a long discussion with the co-sponsors, three of them had agreed to support our suggested revision of the Interim Committee resolution,5 while Australia would either abstain or vote against the new resolution. In his view, the trouble with the new resolution referring the matter to the Interim Committee was that several delegates believed it was designed to tie the hands of all members of the Assembly until next year with respect to any question of recognition or aid to the Communists. This would cause future difficulties and would present the Interim Committee with a very unsatisfactory kind of case. Moreover, it would keep the Chinese matter in constant turmoil during the ensuing year. Under our proposed redraft, however, the Chinese could come to the Interim Committee and present their specific case at any time. Even in this frame of reference, however, he felt we should require a preliminary decision by the Interim Committee [Page 231] to the effect that its consideration of the Chinese charges would promote the stability of international relations in the Far East.

Mr. Tate asked whether, under the revised resolution, the Interim Committee would study past or future violations of the Sino-Soviet treaties. Ambassador Jessup thought the resolution looked as if it were intended to cover prospective violations, but conceded that it could be interpreted to include past violations. Mr. Fahy considered that the Interim Committee resolution constituted an improvement over the situation which would result if only the United States joint resolution were adopted. He expressed the hope that the United States could support the new resolution. Senator Cooper asked whether it was believed the Chinese would actually present the case to the Interim Committee. Ambassador Jessup thought this was hard to say. The Chinese had hinted they might not press their case in the Interim Committee. They also wished to avoid having their own resolution voted down. Moreover, it was possible that events in China might move so rapidly that it might not be appropriate for them to go to the Interim Committee. Senator Cooper agreed with Mr. Fahy’s general comments and said he favored adoption of both resolutions.

Mr. Cohen said he had been greatly impressed by Mr. Tate’s remarks to the effect that the Interim Committee could deal with past violations. In his opinion, to refer this matter to a political body was really to make more difficult the working out of a consistent, constructive policy in the Far East for the future. Trying to protect ourselves from this effect by the provision that Interim Committee consideration was to be undertaken only after a decision that such action would promote stability in the Far East was only provoking a discussion, which would create as many difficulties as actual substantive discussion of the Chinese case. Obviously we were in a very difficult position, but reference to the Interim Committee was not certain to bring fruitful results or to contribute to a constructive policy in the future. Mrs. Roosevelt wondered whether the Interim Committee reference was not going to increase the bitterness of the Soviet Union, which was already bitter about the Chinese situation. Reference to the Committee might make it more difficult to get any meeting of minds, or any action in the future in which the Soviet Union would concur.

Mr. Yost explained that it was for these reasons that we had not been happy about the Interim Committee resolution, but he emphasized that there was a strong possibility because of opinions in the Committee that the three power resolution would have been adopted both by the Committee and the Plenary, so that it was vital for us to attempt to get the resolution into a less objectionable form. Mr. Cohen was concerned that the Interim Committee, in considering the China [Page 232] case, would embarrass the over-all work which Ambassador Jessup was about to undertake in the Far East. Mr. Tate agreed that the resolution might result in undesirable agitation of past events in China.

Ambassador Jessup commented that the China case had been giving us trouble and would continue to do so. The Interim Committee would create more trouble. We felt it was undesirable to keep the Chinese Situation agitated, but we had been convinced yesterday that the Interim Committee resolution was certain of adoption. He warned that the Delegation should be conscious of the public relations problem involved. Most delegates simply interpreted the role of the Interim Committee as a means for further study of the problem. Taking all these facts into consideration, Ambassador Jessup explained that the course just described appeared to be the best way to deal with the actual voting situation in the Committee.

Ambassador Austin stated that there were no objections to the policy already taken by the United States in the First Committee, although he noted that some skepticism as to how it would work had been expressed by members of the Delegation.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

  1. These UN documents contained the texts of the three draft resolutions on China, submitted by China, the five states, and the three American Republics, respectively.
  2. That is, Doc. A/C.1/552.
  3. Doc A/C.1/553.
  4. This was in the form of an amendment to the Latin American resolution, submitted by the Philippines (Doc. A/C.1/554).
  5. The “Interim Committee resolution” was the Latin American resolution (Doc. A/C.1/553); “our suggested revision” was the Philippines amendment to the Latin American resolution (Doc. A/C.1/554).