501.A Summaries/11–3049: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1382.
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Chinese Case
In conversation with USGADel, Tsiang (China) urged US support for parts of his resolution on the Chinese case, feeling it was not inconsistent with the joint proposal. He urged, in particular, a favorable vote on the military and economic aid para.
Commenting on the possibility of Titoism developing in Communist China, Tsiang stated that the Russians were no longer trusting to anything short of strong material guarantees. He believed that Soviet control of Manchuria, from which the Communists must draw most of their foodstuffs, provided Moscow with this type of material guarantee.
In reply to Jessup’s query, Tsiang stated that the best way to increase the dissatisfaction of the Chinese people with the Communist regime would be to withhold economic resources. The reputation of [Page 224] the Communists would depend on whether there would be good or bad harvests. While the Communists would have nothing to do with either of these results, they would be judged by them and the resulting effect on the individual ricebowl, he said.
Jayanama (Thailand) said he planned to abstain on the Chinese resolution and to support the joint proposal. He said other representatives with whom he had discussed the question planned to follow a similar line. He mentioned specifically Liberia.
Spokesmen for Norway, Denmark and Luxembourg disclosed that they could support the joint resolution. Jordaan (South Africa) thought he would be able to support it although he did not have final instructions. While somewhat critical of the US speech, Berendsen (New Zealand) indicated he would probably be able to support the joint resolution.
Laskey (UK) expressed concern about the Chinese resolution. The UK, he said, had Meade out canvassing the LA delegations to be sure that there would be support for the joint resolution and that there was not wide sentiment for the Chinese proposal. His theory was that Cadogan (UK) should try to dissuade Tsiang from insisting on a vote.
In the opinion of Carter (Canada), his delegation would have no trouble in voting against the Chinese resolution.
The UK, Laskey said, was very much concerned and embarrassed over the thought that after it had recognized the Communist regime and perhaps 18 other states had followed its example, the Russians might present the Communist claim for a SC seat. Presumably, he added, the US and perhaps France would not have recognized the Communist government. That would place the UK in the unfortunate position of joining forces with the USSR. In order to avoid this, the UK had been thinking in terms of a unified recognition policy for the UN. It had occurred to the UK, he explained, that the SYG might canvass the UN membership and that there might be some sort of understanding that until a majority, or perhaps 30 members, were in favor of seating the Chinese Communists, the present delegation should continue to sit.
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