Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Philip C. Jessup of the United States Delegation to the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations 2
In accordance with Gadel 95, November 8, I talked today with Sir Alexander Cadogan3 about the Chinese case presenting the points indicated in that telegram and showing him a copy of our proposed resolution in the form of a rough draft.4 Sir Alexander thought that the resolution was along the right lines but felt that certain changes would need to be made. He pointed out that the paragraph saying “Mindful of the threat to the stability of international relations in the Far East created by civil strife in China” was hardly in accord with realities today. In his opinion the civil war has gone so far that in itself it can hardly be considered such a threat. He thought that paragraph 1 was also somewhat inappropriate, particularly as it follows the paragraph just quoted. The draft I showed him also contained [Page 206] point (c) in paragraph 3 reading “Or from exercising or using rights under existing treaties or agreements to infringe upon the principles set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2”. I told him that this provision, which was written in pencil on the draft, had not been approved and was merely a suggestion we were considering. He thought that its meaning was not clear and doubted its utility. The above comments were all on the understanding that the paper I showed him was a working draft not in final form and that his comments on it were personal. He asked me to let him have a copy of the paper so that he could consult his government in regard to it. I told him I would give him a copy tomorrow.
On the general situation in China and the question of recognition, Sir Alexander said that he had cabled London to postpone recognition at least until after the close of the Assembly. He thought it would present an extremely embarrassing situation if the British Government should recognize the Chinese Communists while the Assembly was going on. He thinks the whole question of seating representatives of Communist China is a very difficult one and he does not see the way to solve the difficulty. He agreed with me that it would be strange to allow Tsiang in the Security Council to veto a resolution seating a Communist representative and that therefore this would probably have to be considered a procedural question but he was by no means satisfied that the matter could be worked out easily if Tsiang tried to hold on to his seat. I explained to Sir Alexander our particular difficulties arising from the Ward case and the other actions of the Communists directed against the United States. He seemed to appreciate this situation. He remarked that it seemed unlikely that there would be any halt in the progress of the Chinese Communists. He expressed a good deal of admiration for the efficiency with which they had been able to move their troops and get control of the country. He recalled that Mao-Tse-Tung and Chou-En-Lai, who had accomplished this, were people who were scorned and had no standing or backing when he was in China.
On the whole, I had the distinct impression that Sir Alexander was rather sympathetic with our point of view on delaying recognition while feeling that it must be extended fairly soon by the United Kingdom Government because of their broad interest in China. I referred to the effect which early recognition would have on South East Asia, to which he replied that this matter was considered at the Singapore Conference and that they felt it would not cause much difficulty. When I questioned him, however, he admitted it would raise serious problems in Burma and Indochina.
- Short title for the master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.↩
- For documentation regarding the composition and organization of the U.S. Delegation and advisory staff to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly, which met at New York, September 20–December 10, 1949, see pp. 12 ff.↩
- Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations.↩
- Post, p. 207.↩