393.1115/12–1048
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Sullivan)10
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to your letter, dated December 2, 1948 to Secretary Marshall in which are set forth certain proposals by Vice Admiral Badger, Commander-in-chief of the U. S. Naval Forces in the Western Pacific relating to the limitations on his authority in connection with the use of armed components to provide protection for American citizens and property and concerning the use of U. S. Marine units to assume partial control and operation of the Kiangwan airfield at Shanghai.
Certain of the questions raised in your letter have been dealt with in a letter, under date of December 4, 1948 from Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director for Far Eastern Affairs, to Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. In this connection, it was the intent of the Department in this letter to indicate its concurrence with the proposal that comparable U. S. Marine Forces would be substituted for the JUSMAG Military Police Battalion scheduled to be withdrawn from China with the Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group.
These proposals raise the larger problem of United States policy toward China and the question of possible American involvement in the [Page 930] Chinese civil war. It has been the consistent policy of this country that the United States must not become involved in the Chinese civil war and that the United States will not intervene militarily in China. Under present conditions the problems confronting the United States become largely political and not military problems and our actions must be guided by the larger policy considerations rather than by local military considerations. It is not believed desirable, therefore, that the decision with respect to the utilization of U. S. armed forces for the protection of U. S. lives and property in China should be left to Vice Admiral Badger or to local commanders under his control except in the most urgent circumstances involving serious danger to American lives from mob action when time and circumstances would not permit communication with the United States Ambassador or with the ranking U. S. consular officer on the spot. This principle is set forth in Section 3, 1, of Annex C of ComNavWesPac Operation Plan No. 103 of April 10, 1948.11
This Department envisages the employment of U. S. armed forces solely for the protection of U. S. lives and perhaps certain U. S. Government property, during the interregnum between the collapse of the National Government’s authority in any given locality and the establishment of control by a successor regime. It is not contemplated or desired that U. S. forces assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in any Chinese city except in small areas being used for the concentration of U. S. citizens in connection with their evacuation to points of safety and then only as an emergency measure. It is not contemplated or desired that U. S. armed forces landed at any Chinese city should remain ashore beyond that interregnum when they would provide protection for U. S. lives, and perhaps certain U. S. Government property, and such forces should be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment consistent with the safety of U. S. citizens, if possible prior to the entry of Communist forces into the city in order to minimize the possibility of conflict with such Communist forces.
In this connection, it should be noted that the British Ambassador12 has opposed the landing of British troops to preserve law and order at Shanghai or the administration of Shanghai by a foreign committee. The Department has likewise informed the Consul General at Shanghai that it does not approve a suggested plan for the mobilization of an international police force at Shanghai which would include U. S. armed forces. It has pointed out that such action would involve the related problems of food supplies, and, in large degree, of the whole machinery for administration of the city, both certain to be intensified by the influx of Chinese refugees into any area under foreign police [Page 931] control. The possibility of incidents created by the Chinese Communists or by elements of the National Government desiring to embroil U. S. forces with the Communists cannot be overlooked.
The proposal to utilize U. S. Marine units for joint operation, with the Chinese Air Force, of the Kiangwan airfield at Shanghai in connection with evacuation and protection plans appears to entail very serious danger of conflict with Communist forces. This airfield is a Chinese Government military airfield and, in the event of hostilities spreading to the Shanghai area, would be a logical target for Communist attack, either by direct assault or by infiltration tactics. It is believed, therefore, that U. S. Marine units should not be stationed at the Kiangwan airfield and that no U. S. armed services personnel should engage in joint operation of this airfield after the withdrawal of the JUSMAG Air Force personnel. If it is considered necessary to have the continued use of an airfield in the Shanghai area in connection with evacuation plans subsequent to the withdrawal of the JUSMAG Air Force personnel, this Department believes that arrangements should be made with the Chinese Government for landing privileges at the Lunghua civil airfield and that use of these facilities should be discontinued at any time that Shanghai and its environs come under threat of Communist attack. In this connection, it should be noted that under similar circumstances of civil war and disturbances in China in previous years, the evacuation of U. S. citizens has always been carried out by ship without resort to the use of aircraft and that the U. S. Navy now has at Shanghai sufficient shipping for emergency embarkation of the entire American community.
Sincerely yours,