Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.796A/4–1248

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

No. 187

Shanghai, April 12, 1948.
[Received April 27.]

The Ambassador has the honor to refer to the Department’s secret Instruction No. 38 dated March 17, 1948 and to previous correspondence on the subject of the need for a technical mission to assist the Chinese Government in the field of civil aviation.

Events since March 25, 1947 when the Embassy in its secret despatch number 580⁷ recommended the appointment of a military officer—probably a Major General—to advise the Chinese Government on matters concerning civil aviation, lead to the belief that a United States Civil Aeronautics Administration mission, headed by a well-qualified civilian with a staff of competent civilian assistants can effectively discharge its responsibilities under present conditions.

During the past year, there have been indications that the Chinese Air Force is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese CAA⁹ in its endeavors to establish a safe and reliable civil air transport system within the country. Following the Nanking Air-Sea, Search and Rescue and Communications Conference on March 27, 1947, the attitude of the CAF,⁸ vis-à-vis civil air transport changed from one of active militant hostility and obstruction to an attitude of limited cooperation with the Chinese CAA.

During the third quarter of 1947, the CAF gave concrete evidence of its desire to cooperate with the Chinese CAA when it released to the control of the Chinese CAA for civilian purposes, airports in eighteen districts. Further proof that relations between the Chinese CAA and the CAF were measurably improving was manifested when the CAF, in response to a request of the Chinese CAA, agreed to furnish weather information to the Chinese CAA weather communication system which was passed on to the Central Weather Bureau and disseminated at a central point in Shanghai.

As an indication of the fact that the Chinese CAA is receiving the active support of higher levels in the Government, it may be observed that in January 1947, the Chinese CAA submitted to the Executive Yuan for its approval, a revision of the form of application used in connection with requests for clearance for foreign aircraft. This form which was admittedly repetitious and redundant had been characterized as “silly” by Government officials. While this was a minor matter, the CAF, however, at that time, countered this move on the part of the Chinese CAA before the Executive Yuan, with a demand that the control of all civil aircraft operating over the territory of China be vested in it. The Chinese CAA because of its then weak position in the Government was unwilling to challenge the CAF before the Executive Yuan on this issue, and withdrew this request. It is significant to observe that in December, 1947, the Chinese CAA was able to promulgate, without difficulty, this new regulation.

The largely Government-owned civil airlines have made a substantial contribution to the military forces in the movement of military personnel and supplies into battle areas. They have also assisted other agencies of the Government in the evacuation of Government personnel, their families and effects from besieged areas. The foregoing has, of course, strengthened the Band of the Chinese CAA as well as the airlines and increased the bargaining power of those in control of civil aviation, both with the Government generally and with the CAF. While complete divorce of civil and military aviation has hot as yet occurred, those elements of the Government in control of civil aviation have made considerable progress. Present indications are that progress will be accelerated with any substantial improvement in economic conditions. The Commanding General of the Chinese Air Force, Chou Chih-jou, on the occasion of the Chinese CAA’s first anniversary conference in Nanking on January 20, 1948, publicly pledged the support of the CAF to the Chinese CAA.

The importance of the civil air transport industry, not only to the general economic life of the country as a whole—especially in view of the lack of alternative modes of transport—but also as an important adjunct to the military forces has finally been recognized. When Mukden was besieged by the Communists, the Nationalist General in command of the area called upon executives of the Civil Air Transport (CAT) to undertake the evacuation of seven thousand Chinese nationals from the area. CAT, China National Aviation Corporation and Central Air Transport Corporation, in close cooperation, effectively and successfully accomplished this task.

As a result of the contributions which the civil aviation industry has made to the improvement of economic conditions and to the civil war effort, Col. Tai, the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, has been able to (1) remove CAF objections to many important aspects of the Chinese CAA program: (2) introduce limited private flying which in the forepart of 1947 the CAF vigorously opposed: (3) establish an independent Chinese CAA training school at Hungjao Airport, Shanghai; (4) formally establish the Chinese CAA as the agency in complete control of the airports released for civilian use: (5) establish civilian air traffic control stations in certain areas without objection: (6) initiate action with a view to the unification and coordination of air navigation, communication and weather facilities which it is believed will be accepted by the CAF: (7) promulgate and to a limited degree enforce regulations governing civil aviation.

While the frequent disputes and jealousies which characterized the relations between the Ministry of Communications and the Chinese Air Force (Embassy’s secret despatch number 580 March 25, 1947) have been mollified to a considerable extent, disputes and jealousies have developed in the relations between the Chinese CAA and the largely Government-owned airlines, CNAC and CATC. This is particularly true of the CCAA’s relations with CNAC. As the Department and the US CAA are aware, CNAC and CATC each operate their own communications, navigation and weather systems in China. Col. Tai, due to a lack of sufficient funds, has been unable to implement stated Chinese Government policy that all communications and navigational services should be in the control of and rendered by the Government on a nonprofit basis.

CNAC has vigorously and stubbornly resisted all attempts of the CCAA to take over and operate facilities of this type. CNAC has based its objections to CCAA control on the fact that the CCAA does not have available to it competent personnel to effectively man and operate this equipment. Col. Tai has frequently indicated that the CCAA is in a position to force the airlines to comply with CCAA’s demands, but he has not as yet taken steps along this line. The ability of airlines and particularly CNAC to resist thus far so successfully CCAA efforts to implement certain of its proposals raises the interesting question of whether the airlines, due to their control of practically all the competent personnel available, might, in the long run, actually prove stronger than the CCAA.

The CCAA has an imposing array of approximately five hundred employees of whom only about twenty can be classed as competent in their particular fields. The majority of these competent officers are people who were trained at Kansas City, under the supervision of TWA and with the cooperation of the US CAA and CAB. It thus becomes apparent that one of the most important functions of a US CAA mission will be the instruction and supervision of training of Government personnel.

Due to the fact that Government salaries average approximately one-fifth of the salaries paid by the largely Government-controlled airlines to competent personnel, the CCAA is unable to attract to Government service the few competent people available. Due to the small remuneration for Government service it is quite likely that the CCAA, even though it offers education and “on-the-job-training” in various aeronautical pursuits, will be unable to attract the few Chinese capable of development along these lines. English-speaking Chinese attract premium wages, measured by Chinese standards, from the various industrial concerns. Should, therefore, a US CAA mission come to China, it would seem that the CCAA would have to recruit candidates for instruction in the aeronautical pursuits at the high school level, and endeavor to draw upon those students who have had basic training in English. It would, therefore, appear that a US Civil Aeronautics Administration mission would have to be prepared to accept minimum practical operating results in the first one to two years of its efforts here.

In view of the general acceptance of the CCAA both within the Government and by the Chinese public and of the record of its accomplishments since it was formally organized on January 20, 1947—limited as they have been under the present chaotic economic conditions and the small appropriations which have been made available to it—it may be said that the influence which the CAF has, in the past, been able to exert on civil aviation has considerably diminished. It has diminished to such a point that the Embassy now believes that a civilian chief of a US CAA mission and his civilian associates would receive sufficient cooperation both from the Chinese Government generally and from the CAF to insure the success of the mission’s operations here. The Embassy believes that this trend in China toward civilian control of civil aviation can and should be encouraged by sending a civilian mission. The Embassy, therefore, recommends the assignment of such a civilian mission to China.

The Embassy observes that, in the draft of the fourteen standard points which have been used as a basis of negotiation for such missions in other countries, point numbered 9 provides that the foreign Government shall bear the cost of the acquisition of materials, equipment and facilities necessary to the conduct of the mission. The CCAA presently has in its control and possession the following equipment:

1. International Radio Station XQH7 at Shanghai. 2. Fourteen domestic weather and point to point communications stations. (The CCAA has no air to ground communication facilities as yet.) 3. Five navigational aids. 4. One tower at Kiukiang Airport. 5. Three light planes (2 Piper Cubs and 1 Super Cruiser). 6. One Movietone set with miscellaneous training films. The CAA does not have visual training aids, or training literature.

The Chinese CAA has had CN$240,000,000,000 made available to it since its inception Jan. 20, 1947. (It is not possible to convert this sum to US dollars.) Approximately 70% of these funds has been spent in airport improvement, principally at Lunghwa Airport, Shanghai, 5% on training and 25% in the improvement of communication facilities.

As upwards of 80% of the national budget is now appropriated for military purposes, it is unlikely that the CCAA can expect that more than a bare minimum of pecuniary assistance will be made available to it while the civil war continues. The Department and the US CAA will, therefore, wish to consider that if the US civil aviation mission will require extensive equipment to facilitate its operations here, it will likely have to be provided by the United States. This requirement could be met, of course, if the Chinese Government “earmarked” a small portion of any loan or grant which might be allocated for civil aviation purposes out of the China Aid Program. It is, therefore, suggested that the U. S. may wish to obtain an undertaking to the effect that the Chinese Government will make available to the CCAA funds sufficient for the purchase of equipment required for the successful conduct of a US CAA civil aviation mission.

The subject of the appointment of the CAA mission was informally but lengthily discussed with Col. Tai, the Civil Aeronautics Administrator by the Civil Air Attaché. Col. Tai then informally pursued the matter with Dr. Li, Director of the Dept, of Civil Aviation and Navigation of the Ministry of Communications and with Minister of Communications Yu Ta-wei, who both said that China would welcome such a mission. Col. Tai, personally, of course, was most enthusiastic. However, Col. Tai said that the Chinese Government was in no position to reimburse the U. S. toward the expenses involved in salaries, living allowance, etc., which would be incurred in connection with the assignment of such a mission. He also made it quite clear that the Chinese Government could not furnish housing. Col. Tai stated, however, that the Chinese Government would endeavor to provide domestic transportation, bi-lingual secretarial assistance and office space to facilitate the discharge of the mission’s duties.

The Embassy suggests that in view of the changed Chinese Government attitude and particularly the attitude of the CAF vis-à-vis civil aviation that the objectives of a US CAA mission here can be assured under present conditions through the negotiation of the usual agreement under which such a technical assistance mission would come to China, with the Chinese Government. This agreement could incorporate practically all of the 14 standard points contained in the enclosure to the Department’s despatch under reference. Point number 6 would, with the Department’s approval, have to be modified to the extent that the Chinese Government shall be required to reimburse the US Government only in the event of a substantial improvement in general economic conditions in China.

The Embassy will await further instructions from the Department on this subject.

7. Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vii, p. 1012.
9. Chinese Air Force.
8. Civil Aeronautics Administration.