Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VIII
Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 6
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
The Position of the United States Regarding Short-Term Assistance to China
In accordance with a request of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State is preparing, for consideration by the National Security Council, a report on the position of the United States with respect to China.
Pending the completion of the above-mentioned report, the National Security Council Staff has prepared an interim report on the position of the United States regarding short-term assistance to China, which is enclosed herewith. The enclosure has been prepared with the assistance of representatives of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the National Security Resources Board and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Attention is invited to the divergent views, regarding paragraphs 8–c, 8–d and 9, of the representatives of the Department of State and the National Security Resources Board, and of the representatives of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
The enclosed report is submitted for consideration by the National Security Council at its next meeting, tentatively scheduled for 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 1, 1948. It is proposed that this report, in the form adopted by the Council, be subsequently submitted to the President for consideration.
Draft Report of the National Security Council on the Position of the United States Regarding Short-Term Assistance to China
Problem
1. To assess and appraise the position of the United States regarding short-term assistance to China, taking into account the security interests of the United States.
[Page 45]Analysis
2. The basic long-range objective of the United States in China is the furtherance of a stable, representative government over an independent and unified China which is friendly to the United States and capable of becoming an effective barrier to possible Soviet aggression in the Far East. In view of the chaos in China, however, the most important objective which it is practicable to pursue in the short run is the prevention of complete communist control of China.
3. China is primarily an agricultural country. It has relatively flight industrial plant capacity and is only modestly endowed with the natural resources necessary for heavy industry, in comparison with the U. S., USSR or Western Europe. China’s demographic pattern indicates that its enormous population is likely to continue breeding to the limits of subsistence. For the foreseeable future, therefore, China is likely to be poverty-stricken and technologically backward. For the United States and USSR, it possesses politico-military significance because of its (a) geographical position and (b) tremendous manpower. China’s propinquity to Southeast Asia means that if the Chinese Communists take over all China, they would in time probably strengthen communist movements in Indochina, Burma, and areas further south.
4. China is torn internally by civil war between the National Government and the Chinese Communists, and is menaced on the north by Russian imperialism. The present trend in China is toward increasing instability and the extension of Communist military and political influence. Without external assistance, for which the United States is the obvious source, the National Government has little prospect of reversing or arresting this trend, because of its declining military strength, the maladministration and corruption prevailing throughout its civil and military structure, its inability to cope with economic deterioration, and its lack of popular support. The principal factor operating in favor of the National Government is the prospect of United States assistance. Any improvement in the position of the Chinese National Government, therefore, requires both substantial internal reforms and foreign assistance.
[Page 46]5. If unchecked, present trends will lead to disintegration of the National Government’s authority, decisive military successes for the Chinese Communists, the spread of warlordisms, and the acceleration of tendencies toward separatism and rebellion. Such disintegration would in all probability result in the eventual domination of China by the Communist party. As a last-resort alternative to disintegration the National Government might seek a compromise settlement of its conflict with the Communists. But it is inconceivable that the communists would agree to such a settlement except on terms giving them a dominating position in the government. However, in the case of either disintegration or compromise, it is probable that the acute political and economic disorganization which would result would retard the development of a Communist China as an effective instrument of Soviet policy for some years.
6. Deteriorating economic conditions are steadily weakening the political position of the National Government. In the absence of foreign aid, inflation may quickly lead to a virtually complete collapse of the national currency, thereby producing a political crisis and depriving the National Government of the means of supporting its military forces.
7. In the Chinese civil war the USSR continues to recognize the National Government, and thus far has refrained from giving overt material assistance to the Chinese Communists. It is apparent nevertheless that Soviet sympathies lie with the Chinese Communists, who are in effect an instrument for the extension of Soviet influence. So long as conditions in China continue to deteriorate according to the present pattern, which is favorable to the Chinese Communists, the USSR probably will refrain from open intervention. On the other hand to the extent that US aid tended to reverse the present course of the civil war, the USSR would probably counter by strengthening and encouraging the Chinese Communists.
8. In these circumstances the following possible courses of action are open to the United States:
a. To refrain from furnishing further economic and military assistance.
The adoption of this course would be based upon an assumption that communist expansion in China can be reversed, if at all, only [Page 47] at a cost greater than the United States can afford to bear. Such a course would in all probability lead to a prompt collapse of the National Government. It is not clear whether such a collapse would mean a slower communist consolidation of power. The advantage of this course is that it would make available aid for areas of greater strategic significance. On the other hand, refusal of further aid would be a reversal of past US policy and contrary to the sentiment in the United States in favor of “helping China”.
b. To furnish extensive military and economic assistance in an effort to assist the National Government to defeat the Chinese Communists.
This course of action might eventually make possible a unified non-Communist China as a potential ally of the United States. The military manpower and resources of China would not be opposed to the United States in the event of war, bomber overflight of China would be free from interference by locally based aircraft, a vast area would be provided for escape and evasion tactics, and potential sites would be available for advanced airbases if desired. The announcement of firm support of the National Government by the United States would have a psychological effect which would probably be beneficial to the National Government. On the other hand, the United States would be committed to a policy involving the absorption of its resources to an unpredictable extent, once it assumed such direct responsibility for the Nationalist side of the civil war and for the Chinese economy. In view of the strong position of the Chinese Communists, the United States, in order to make this course of action effective, would have to be prepared virtually to take over the Chinese government and administer its economic, political and governmental affairs. It would be impossible to estimate the final cost of a course of action of this magnitude, which would be a continuing commitment from which it would be practically impossible to withdraw. Moreover, large-scale US assistance to the National Government would probably result in large-scale Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists. In the resultant mounting spiral of support and counter-support, the advantage would be with the USSR, because of its favorable geographical position and the vitality of the Chinese Communist movement. Such a development might lead to a Spanish-type revolution or to general hostilities.
[Page 48]c. To furnish limited aid to China in the form of both military and economic assistance.
| State Dept. Member of the NSC Staff, concurred in by the National Security Resources Board Member of the NSC Staff | Army, Navy, and Air Force Members of the NSC Staff |
| This course of action would be in the nature of buying time in China. It would not insure the defeat of the Communists nor is it likely, in the absence of resolute self-help on the part of the National Government, even to reverse the present trend of communist advance. But it might retard communist progress, enabling the National Army to continue the fight for some time to come and thereby provide the National Government with a new opportunity to attempt a stabilization of the internal situation. It would restrict the initial drain on US resources. But as it became evident that such aid was inadequate to check the communists, the limited military aid given could be represented as an obligation necessitating further military, as well as economic, commitments to China. This process could continue indefinitely and lead to deeper and deeper involvement of our national strength in an area of, at best, secondary strategic importance to us. At this critical juncture the United States Government cannot afford thus to compromise its freedom of decision and action based upon considerations of its own vital interests. | This course of action would be in the nature of buying time in China. Without immediate military assistance it is estimated that the Communists can completely consolidate their hold on Manchuria and extend their operations south of the Great Wall. Limited military aid would not insure the defeat of the Communists but would enable the National Army to continue the fight for some time thereby providing the National Government with a further opportunity to stabilize the internal situation. It might enable the National Army progressively to consolidate the control of the National Government over areas south of the Great Wall. The funds devoted to economic aid would be a much, better investment in the advancement of China’s economic stability if expended under reasonably stable military conditions. Such a course of action would limit the drain on United States resources, would avoid a complete underwriting of the National Government, and would not irrevocably commit the United States to further assistance. |
d. To furnish limited economic assistance to China.
| State Dept. Member of the NSC Staff, Concurred in by the National Security Resources Board Member of the NSC Staff | Army, Navy, and Air Force Members of the NSC Staff |
| Under this course of action, US military and naval missions would remain in China, but the United States Government would not directly provide military supplies. This course, in common with c above, would limit the drain on US resources and avoid a complete underwriting of the National Government. In addition, it would avoid a reaffirmation of US obligations to supply military equipment leading to renewed demands for still more military aid. This policy, nevertheless, would make it possible for the Chinese Government to acquire military equipment from US surplus and through commercial channels in the US and other countries, but in smaller quantities than under c above. The military responsibility for the survival of the National Government would be clearly placed upon Chinese shoulders. | Under this course of action, US military and naval missions would remain in China, but the United States Government would not directly provide military supplies. However, the effectiveness of the US military and naval missions would be at a minimum. This course, in common with c above, would limit the drain on US resources and avoid a complete underwriting of the National Government. In addition, it would avoid a reaffirmation of US obligations to supply more military aid. Theoretically, this policy would make it possible for the Chinese Government to acquire military equipment from the US surplus and through commercial channels in the United States and other countries in smaller quantities than under c above and after much greater delay. The military responsibility for the survival of the National Government would be clearly placed upon Chinese shoulders. It is questionable that the National Government is capable of adequately discharging its responsibilities to supply its armies. The danger in such a course is the increased possibility that the Nationalist armies might be driven from the field. Such an event leading toward communist control of China would be highly unfavorable to US prestige and interests. |
Conclusions
| State Dept. Member of the NSC Staff, Concurred in by the National Security Resources Board Member of the NSC Staff | Army, Navy, and Air Force Members of the NSC Staff |
| 9. The United States should furnish only limited economic assistance to the National Government of China on a scale designed to (a) retard economic deterioration, and (b) provide that Government with an opportunity to acquire limited military supplies with its own resources. | 9. The United States should furnish limited economic and military assistance to the National Government of China on a scale sufficient to retard economic and military deterioration and provide that Government with an opportunity to stabilize its internal political and military situation. |
10. The United States assistance program in China should be regarded as subordinate to the efforts to stabilize conditions in areas of more strategic importance.