Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

Policy Planning Staff Files, Lot 54D195

Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff

PPS 39/1

[Washington,] November 23, 1948.

U. S. Policy Toward China

The following are the views of the Policy Planning Staff on the assertion, now frequently heard both inside and outside the Government, that we have no policy with relation to the present course of events in China, and that it is urgently necessary that we devise one.

1. There is no requirement either in United States diplomatic tradition, or in the general rules which govern intercourse between states, that a government have “a policy” with respect to internal events in another country. On the contrary, it is a traditional principle of this Government, deeply sanctioned in practice and in public opinion, to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Non-intervention in internal affairs is therefore our normal practice; and we do not consider that we are automatically obliged to take measures to influence decisively the course of internal events in other countries. There are, to be sure, instances in which such intervention has been found to be in the national interest. But these are the exceptions and not the rule. Whoever proposes or urges such intervention should properly bear the burden of proof

(a) that there is sufficiently powerful national interest to justify our departure in the given instance from a rule of international conduct which has been proven sound by centuries of experience and which we would wish others to observe with respect to ourselves, and

(b) that we have the means to conduct such intervention successfully and can afford the cost in terms of the national effort it involves.

2. In the case at hand, there is no question but that it is regrettable, and prejudicial to United States interest, that the recognized Chinese Government should be losing ground rapidly, in civil conflict, to elements largely inspired and dominated by Moscow. On the other hand, whether this process will lead to a complete domination of China by the Communists without at the same time promoting powerful “Tito” tendencies within the Communist movement, is doubtful. There is also little likelihood that the Communists, however much of China they may come to control, could develop and exploit its resources in a manner seriously dangerous to the security interests of this country. Thus, while the growing power of the Chinese Communists represents an important political development and a serious deterioration, from our standpoint, of the general situation in Asia, it is not likely to be catastrophic to United States interests.

3. Although the detriment to United States national interest involved in present developments in China, as mentioned above, would probably be sufficient to warrant intervention on the part of this country, we do not today have the means to intervene successfully in this situation. The successes of the Chinese Communists are due only in small degree to aid extended by Moscow. Of greater importance is Moscow’s moral support and ideological inspiration, but even this is secondary. The main factor in the Communist advances is the inner weakness and decay of the Central Government in China. The relative change in forces which is in progress in that country is in part reflection of deep trends of internal development which themselves have nothing to do either with Russia or with the United States and which can be little altered by anything that either of those two powers may do.

4. It is plain, given the dimensions of the framework in which the civil war in China is proceeding, that in any successful attempt to repulse Communist advances the major effort must be made by the Chinese themselves, and any aid granted them by this country must be marginal to their own effort. However, the weaknesses of the Chinese Government are today so pronounced, and its resultant tendency to lean on outside aid is so overwhelming that it is quite plain that in any serious effort to turn the tide of events in that country and to eliminate the Communists from the control of Chinese territory (including Manchuria) it would be our effort which would have to be the major one and the Chinese effort which would be marginal. We must recognize that in China, as in other countries, but possibly more than anywhere else, there is a compelling tendency to regard United States aid not as a welcome addition to a continuing local effort but as a means of relieving the respective local regime of both responsibility and effort.

5. It must be emphasized that this state of affairs stems not only from national traits of long standing but also and predominantly from a pervasive and organic weakness which no sudden reform measures or personal leadership could overcome. The many and conflicting suggestions advanced for suddenly remedying the deficiencies of the Chinese Government and rendering it able to withstand Communist pressures condemn themselves. Most of them are obviously gross over-simplifications which can stem only from ignorance or naiveté. The evils which limit the military and political effectiveness of the Central Government are ones profoundly rooted in the present stage of development of Chinese society, and many of them will doubtless reappear to limit the effectiveness of any Chinese Communist regime which assumes authority in the central and southern regions of China.

6. In the light of these facts, it is unrealistic and indefensible, in the view of this staff, to assume that we could decisively affect the course of events in China without taking upon ourselves the major responsibility and the major part of the expenditure of energy and funds and goods which that would involve. As far as the Staff is aware, this Government does not have before it any official estimate, from competent quarters, of what it would involve in the way of military effort on our part to assume the major burden of containing and repulsing Communist forces in China. Such estimates as we have seen from outside quarters or from individual opinions of officials in the Government have generally been based on the theory that the Chinese Government was capable of making the major effort necessary for this purpose and only required from this country marginal assistance in shipments of arms and military advice. In the absence of any official estimates on this point, based on a realistic view of the background situation, it would have been, and would be today, frivolous and irresponsible to venture into any program of economic or military aid designed to enable the Chinese Central Government to defeat the Communist forces and reestablish its authority throughout the country.

7. Actually, and particularly in view of the fact that what would be called for from this country would be not only arms and money but a major output in terms of executive and military personnel, it would seem clear even to the casual inquirer that any attempt to assume the major burden of the government’s cause in the Chinese Civil War would be plainly beyond what Congress or the people of this country could realistically be expected to sanction and support at this time.

8. In the light of the above, the Policy Planning Staff strongly doubts that there is a practical possibility of exercising any serious influence on the course of events in China through the extension of further military or economic aid to the Central Government at this time. If this view is correct, then our policy toward China must, in so far as it envisages any intervention in Chinese internal affairs, be based rather on other possible expedients, as for example use of our economic bargaining power to extract specific concessions, aid to local factions or authorities, etc.

9. Since it is also clear that the policy of this country cannot be predicated on the resistance to Communism which the Central Government may put up, it follows that our actions will have to be adjusted to the needs of specific local situations. This will mean that we cannot have “a policy” toward China as a whole, except to favor authorities which take a relatively cooperative view toward United States interests and to disfavor those which do not. Such a policy must be translated into action on a day by day basis in accordance with the changes of the moment. It cannot be explicitly defined on paper in a form which can serve as a guide for months or years ahead. It is outstandingly a matter which calls for operational skill and flexibility.

10. In summary, there is plainly no great difference of opinion as to what we would like to see happen in China. We would wish to see the Communists defeated and replaced, in the territories they now occupy, by other Chinese authorities not inspired or directed by any foreign government, and not animated by any basic hostility to this: country.

On the other hand, our means for influencing directly the course of events in China are extremely limited. It is plain, in particular, that there is little we can do to influence these events through programs of economic aid and military aid to the Central Chinese Government.

This being the case, we must reconcile ourselves to the possibility that there may be further serious deterioration of the situation and that we may be powerless to prevent it.

However, we may hope that eventually static factors of geography, history, tradition, social conditions, etc., will absorb and contain much of the Communist effort. Meanwhile, we should search diligently for opportunities to make our influence usefully felt, if only in local theatres of activity.