Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.00/11–1148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[Washington,] November 11, 1948.

Participants:	Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
	The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett
	Mr. W. W. Butterworth, Director for Far Eastern Affairs

At his request, the Chinese Ambassador called upon me this morning and he sought to obtain, in advance of the reply by the President, an indication of its possible nature or, at any rate, of the attitude which I might take in offering advice to the President as to the content of his reply to the Generalissimo’s message.⁵⁰ The Chinese Ambassador probed away for the better part of an hour but beyond informing him of the reply which Ambassador Stuart had been authorized to make to the Chinese Foreign Minister (Deptel to Nanking no. 1577, November 9) apropos of the questions which the Foreign Minister had asked be transmitted to the Secretary and the questions which Mr. T. F. Tsiang had, also under instructions, put to the Secretary, I refused to prejudge the nature of the communication the President would make in due course.

Dr. Koo having argued strongly in the early part of the conversation as to the decisive effect which a statement of policy by the President would have in China and the importance of the sending of a high-ranking American officer accompanied, as he indicated, by a full staff, in the latter part of the conversation, in praising the efforts of Fu Tso-yi he reflected by comparison adversely on the manner in which many other Chinese military leaders had failed to consider the importance of the welfare and support of the local people. Dr. Koo mentioned Fu Tso-yi by way of illustrating that the Chinese Government would be agreeable to our ensuring that supplies reach such local commanders. In this connection, I pointed to Mr. Hoffman’s⁵¹ recent statements regarding ECA policy and the conscientious manner in which we had acted, rendering support to strengthening the authority of the National Government and correspondingly refraining from any actions which might be misinterpreted as weakening it. Pressed as to whether he was proffering this suggestion under instructions from his Government, Dr. Koo backtracked and ended by emphasizing that what he meant was that his Government would give great weight to any suggestions for supplying local commanders such as Fu Tso-yi but would, of course, expect consultation and its concurrence.

As a sidelight on how the Chinese Ambassador’s mind was working, when Mr. Butterworth accompanied him to the elevator Dr. Koo asked about the news we were receiving from Mukden and whether the Communists were governing the city in a reasonable and orderly fashion.⁵²

The Chinese Ambassador in the course of his visit also inquired, in effect, whether the United States proposed to remain in Tsingtao and defend its position. I replied to Dr. Koo by calling his attention to the fact that the U. S. Government was in Tsingtao in connection with the program of training Chinese to man the ships that his Government had transferred to it and was there at the request of his Government. It had always been clearly understood by all concerned that the responsibility for the defense of Tsingtao remained with the Chinese Government and that, therefore, the tenability of the position of the United States Navy in Tsingtao depended upon Chinese Government action.⁵³

50. For latter, see telegram No. Telmar 155, November 12, 8 p.m., to the Secretary of State, at Paris, p. 201.
51. Paul Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration.
52. For further correspondence regarding the Consulate at Mukden, see vol. vii, pp. 809 ff.
53. For further correspondence regarding U. S. policy on Tsingtao, see pp. 307 ff.