893.00/2–748: Telegram
The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 7—4:53 p.m.]
253. Subject is … message from Mukden34 … with regard to ammunition supply problem Mukden area repeated to … Washington via Shanghai 7 February and received by me by officer messenger same date.
Upon receipt this message I called interested members of my staff and General Barr together and, after much discussion, I called on [Page 12] Generalissimo who, in answer to my questions, stated categorically and forcefully that he was determined to hold Mukden, Changchun and Kirin at all costs, that he was completely without ammunition to do so; that the ammunition made available in the Marianas could not arrive in time to be of use, and when available will be entirely inadequate to meet requirements. With pipeline almost empty, he feels desperate need for ammunition for Manchuria immediately.
We desire point out that the United States is entirely without firm information on ammunition situation Chinese Government armies. However, we feel shortage ammunition Manchuria very possibly as General Wei36 and Generalissimo report. Also we feel continued Government hold Manchuria not entirely matter of ammunition since Government forces there are over-extended and have lost initiative and by own admission Government is incapable opening land communication to Mukden area, so that all supply there through predictable future must be air lifted.
Furthermore as we have commented before any further serious military losses by Government in Manchuria will have severe military and political repercussions elsewhere. If Communist armies now operating Manchuria can be shifted south of Great Wall, it is difficult to see how Government can retain any hold north of Yellow River. In other words, Government loss Manchuria may possibly be factor precipitating general military collapse. In addition it would seem to us, and General Barr concurs in this, that it would be far cheaper for us to support Generalissimo now in an attempt to maintain at least a foothold in Manchuria than to support possible later attempt on his part to regain this foothold.
We realize the reluctance in the Department to become involved in the military situation in China. As we have pointed out on numerous occasions in the past, however, we are already considered involved in the Government’s defeats and our prestige is already suffering. In the particular situation obtaining in Manchuria, our prestige is further involved in that the principal Government forces consist of 5 American trained and equipped divisions. Any aid we give to China, whether foodstuffs or assistance in rehabilitating the economy, is, in effect, indirectly assisting the military phases of the Government’s activities. That aid will be wasted if the military position of the Government deteriorates to a point where its very existence is endangered. This will be the case unless we soon provide military assistance to meet the immediate practical situation confronting the Government in Manchuria.
[Page 13]I wish to reiterate that the situation really seems critical and I should appreciate being informed of the Department’s reaction.