Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 22/1

Note by Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

NSC 22/1

[Washington,] August 6, 1948.

Possible Courses of Action for the U. S. With Respect to the Critical Situation in China

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 22 are contained in the enclosed memorandum transmitted to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense.

At its 17th Meeting the National Security Council referred NSC 22 and the comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon to the NSC Staff for the preparation of a report to the Council in conjunction with the Staff’s study of NSC 11, “U. S. Armed Forces at Tsingtao”.⁹⁶

Accordingly, the enclosure is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council and for the use of the NSC Staff pursuant to the above action.

Sidney W. Souers

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)

Washington, 5 August 1948.

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense:

Subject: Possible Courses of Action for the United States with Respect to the Critical Situation in China.

In accordance with your informal request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied NSC 22, a paper entitled “Possible Courses of Action for the United States with Respect to the Critical Situation in China”, and are in general agreement with the analysis therein of the present critical situation in China and with the statement, following the analysis, of the critical questions now facing the United States Government with respect to China.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their earlier views regarding assistance to China, as quoted in paragraphs 2b and 2c of the subject paper, which are reproduced below for ready reference:

“It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, from the military point of view, carefully planned, selective and well-supervised assistance to the National Government, under conditions which will assure that this assistance will not be misused, will definitely contribute to United States security interests. Such assistance should facilitate the military development which appears essential for the unification and stabilization of China. It should enable China more effectively to resist Soviet expansionist efforts in the Far East and will thus contribute to the military security of the United States. In addition, it should be a stabilizing factor throughout the Far East. A firm United States position in this regard, as in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, would serve the cause of peace as well as the other aims of the United Nations.

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that the situation in Greece emphasizes that economic aid has little value unless and until internal conditions of law and order are established to the degree that the economic aid will serve the purpose for which intended. In their opinion, it would be unwise to extend economic aid to China without the military assistance which will provide the National Government some means with which to improve the present situation of internal armed conflict.

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection, from the military point of view, to the conclusion that the United States assistance program in China should be regarded as subordinate to the efforts to stabilize conditions in areas of more strategic importance.”

(It should be noted, in connection with the last paragraph quoted above, that the United States assistance program in China is subordinate to such efforts elsewhere, since aid to China comprises 6.7% of foreign aid appropriations for the fiscal year 1949.)

Additional views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved by them on 9 June 1947 and still applicable from the military viewpoint, are quoted below as an indication of the importance to our national security of continued resistance to communist expansion in China:

• “a. The United States must seek to prevent the growth of any single power or coalition to a position of such strength as to constitute a threat to the Western Hemisphere. A Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western Europe, or both, would constitute a major threat to United States security.
• “b. United States security interests require that China be kept free from Soviet domination; otherwise all of Asia will in all probability pass into the sphere of the USSR.
• “c. It is to United States military interests that the nations of Eurasia oppose Soviet expansion.
• “d. Soviet expansionist aims and long-range objectives are being furthered in China by the military operations of the Chinese communists.
• “e. Soviet expansionist aims in China, furthered by operations of Chinese communists, are clearly incompatible with United States security.
• “f With a disarmed and occupied Japan, the only Asiatic government at present capable of even a show of resistance to communist expansion in Asia is the Chinese National Government.
• “g. Unless the Chinese National Government is given military assistance sufficient to resist effectively communist expansion in China, that government will probably collapse, thus terminating the only single and unified opposition to Soviet expansionist aims in Asia.
• “h. United States commitments to the United Nations, in which China at United States insistence is one of the designated five great powers, require our support of the National Government’s efforts to gain control over Manchuria; otherwise China’s military potential of raw materials essential to her future development into a great power will be lost to her.
• “i. Time works to the advantage of the USSR in China. The continuation of chaos can be expected eventually to result in the fall of the Chinese National Government. United States assistance, including military aid, is necessary at an early date if any degree of stabilization for China is to be attained.”

In light of the paper on which comment is being made and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reproduced above, consideration has been given to the alternative United States courses of action set forth at the end of that paper. Briefly, these courses are:

a. Increase United States aid to the maximum extent feasible;

b. Withdraw United States aid;

c. Continue United States aid on the basis of programs now authorized;

d. Shift United States recognition and aid from the National Government of China to appropriate regional regimes that may arise as a result of the collapse of the present National Government.

While it is clear that the present Chinese National Government may collapse and that it would be out of the question for the United States to provide assistance, both material and military, on the massive scale that would be required for complete and early stabilization of China, it is not correctly a foregone conclusion that it is too late for worthwhile continuation of United States aid on the basis of programs now authorized.

The situation is worse than it was, but it is not, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so bad that any further effort on the part of the United States would be useless. Thus, it is all the more important to continue the present authorized programs, rather than to encourage, if not assure, collapse by withdrawal of aid.

As earlier stated, carefully planned, selective and well-supervised assistance to the Chinese National Government, with safeguards against misuse of such assistance and with inclusion of military equipment assistance, should make the Chinese assistance programs useful and effective.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not predict that this will necessarily turn the tide. They are convinced, however, that it will at least delay and postpone further deterioration and that the importance to our national security of the issues involved justifies, therefore, continuation of authorized assistance programs with special emphasis on the efficient and early implementation of the military aid program.

With regard to financial aspects of military aid, the Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the President has recently requested the Secretary of Defense to take action to facilitate, in connection with the China Aid Act of 1948, the acquisition by the Chinese Government of such military supplies as the Chinese Government may request, either by making available existing stocks of the National Defense Establishment or by arranging for the procurement of such supplies on behalf of that government.

In view of all the preceding discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend, with respect to the first three alternative United States courses of action, that the third alternative, continuation of United States aid on the basis of programs now authorized, continue to be accepted as the United States course of action.

With respect to the fourth alternative, shift of recognition and aid to appropriate regional regimes if the present Chinese National Government collapses, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that decision should properly be made in the light of the existing situation if and when collapse occurs. They believe, however, that at that time favorable consideration should be given to the above fourth alternative, since they are convinced that no matter how unfavorable ultimate developments in China may be, nor how possible it may be that they cannot be indefinitely forestalled, the buying of time by expenditures within reason will constitute, as in the case of the recommended continuation of authorized aid programs, true economy in terms of our national security.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

96. Post, p. 314.