Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 22 folder
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of the Army regarding Possible Courses of Action for the United States with respect to China
The attached report to the National Security Council from the Secretary of the Army (NSC 22, July 26, 1948)88 represents the policy of the United States toward China as unchanged from that expressed in the President’s statement of December 194589 on this subject. This, in effect, is as out-dated as was the Presidential directive of February 25, 194690 authorizing the establishment of the U. S. Military Advisory Group in China, which was the subject of recent comment in connection with the new directive for the U. S. Military Advisory Group. In its analysis of the situation in China, the report includes in its description of the broad objectives of current U. S. policy toward China the following statements: “China should eliminate by political agreement, conflict of armed forces within her territories”; China should “broaden the base of the National Government to make it truly representative of the Chinese people in achieving the goal of a united and democratic China”; and “the United States Government desires to assist China as she moves toward peace, unity and genuinely democratic government”. This description of U. S. policy objectives in China carries the implication that the U. S. Government favors a coalition government in China, that it envisages the formation of a genuinely democratic government and that the U. S. will aid China only as the latter achieves peace, a united China with Communist participation in the Government and democracy. That China might arrive at these solutions of its problems is one thing, but to state that these are current U. S. policy objectives is to overlook the aid the U. S. is and has been extending to China and the complete absence of any indication since the end of 1946 that this Government favors a coalition government in China. This was expressed publicly by both you and the President in March of this year.91
The answers are obvious to such questions as “What should be the attitude of the U. S. toward forestalling collapse of the present Chinese National Government?” and those regarding the courses of action open to the U. S—such as U. S. aid might be increased to the [Page 128] maximum extent feasible and U. S. aid might be withdrawn. The U. S. is trying to prevent the collapse of the Chinese Government. Since the Congress recently reduced the amount of aid for China originally proposed by the Department and since it would not be possible to increase the amount of aid without Congressional action, which would not be expected to take effect prior to the end of the present aid program on April 3, 1949, it is difficult to see how U. S. aid to China might be increased at this juncture. It is, of course, unthinkable that IT. S. aid would be withdrawn in the light of our avowed support to the Chinese National Government. The report’s suggestion that U. S. aid should be continued on the basis of programs now authorized is naturally the only course open to the U. S. at this time.
The final course of action open to the U. S. described in the report is that which may arise in the event of the collapse of the present National Government. The report states: “Under this course decision would have to be made as to whether to affiliate with certain separatist movements or remain aloof until such time as they might of their own accord arise out of the collapse of the present Government. The process of encouraging separatist movements would be contrary to the expressed policy of the U. S.” The report does not make clear what it means by “affiliate” with separatist movements, but the U. S. Government does not, so far as is known, “affiliate” with movements in opposition to a legally recognized foreign government. It is true, however, that this course of action is one which may confront the U. S. Government, given a continuation of the present rate of deterioration in China. It was the possibility of such a development that prompted my memorandum of July 27, 1948,92 in which it was recommended that the question of United States policy toward China, including these possible developments, be referred to the National Security Council.
A further question which arises in this connection is that regarding the attitude of the U. S. toward furnishing, either directly or through the National Government, military equipment to Government commanders such as General Fu Tso-yi. The latter has been the most successful of the Government commanders against the Communists but is said to be receiving little or no military matériel from Nanking. Both the Ambassador and Admiral Badger have recommended that the U. S. Government exert pressure on the Generalissimo to ensure that General Fu receive a share of the military supplies acquired by the National Government under the $125 million grants. To furnish General Fu military aid without reference to the National Government would be to encourage regionalism, but to withhold military equipment from [Page 129] him because of the Generalissimo’s reluctance to have his position strengthened might be to contribute to Communist successes in north China, where there are already signs of considerable dissatisfaction with Nanking because of its neglect of that area. This problem should, therefore, also be one for reference to the National Security Council, for it will no doubt require instruction to General Barr for representations to the Generalissimo.
Attached is a copy of a memorandum, dated June 11, 1948,93 of your conversation with Secretary Royall and officers of the Department of the Army (Tab B), which indicates the view of those present that the U. S. must not become directly involved in the civil war in China.
- see ante, p. 118.↩
- December 15, 1945, United States Relations with China, p. 607.↩
- Directive to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. x, p. 823.↩
- Statements to the press by the Secretary of State on March 10 and by President Truman on March 11, vol. vii, pp. 138 and 141, respectively.↩
- Vol. vii, p. 379.↩
- Ante, p. 90.↩