Office of the Historian

893.24/12–2347

Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt)

[Washington,] January 2, 1948.

Reference: Memoranda dated November 4, 1947, and December 23, 1947, from the Chinese Embassy,2 enclosing lists of military supplies said to be urgently needed by the Chinese armed forces; letter dated November 8, 1947, from the Chinese Minister,3 in regard to the Chinese request for M .50 cartridges.

Dr. Tan4 called at 11:30 today by appointment. He said that he had just received from his Government word to the effect that the field representative5 of FLC6 at Shanghai had been authorized to sell to China surplus ammunition and explosives in the Marianas at one percent of procurement cost. He requested that I supply him with such details as were in my possession for the information of his Ambassador.

In reply I gave Dr. Tan the substance of the information contained in the first paragraph of the Department’s telegram no. 1585, of December 30, to Nanking,7 and added that the Chinese Government might wish to act quickly to obtain this ammunition, which it was hoped would meet in part their urgent needs as outlined in the Chinese Embassy’s memoranda of November 4 and December 23. I stated that, in my opinion, it would be inadvisable to consider this ammunition as substituting for any ammunition for which the Chinese Government had placed an order with Olin Industries, firstly, because of the nominal price to be charged, and secondly, because this ammunition may have suffered some deterioration in storage in the Marianas.

With further reference to the Chinese Embassy’s two memoranda [Page 2] already mentioned, I informed Dr. Tan that we had sent copies thereof to the Department of the Army, inquiring to what extent these requirements could be met from surplus. I said that we had also asked the Department of the Army to what extent other types of war material similar to that supplied to the 39 Division Program could be declared surplus for transfer to China. I promised to keep him informed of developments. (Reference: Department’s letter of December 31, 1947 to the Department of the Army.8)

With respect to negotiations now in progress for the purchase of surpluses in the Zone of the Interior applicable to the 8⅓ Group Program, I said that it was my understanding that the Department of the Army was becoming somewhat impatient over what it felt to be an unreasonable insistence on the part of the Chinese negotiators that a careful check be made of all material declared surplus with a view to obtaining only the most desirable items and discarding everything else. I said that it was my impression that the Department of the Army objected to this stand from several viewpoints:

(1)
It would be a very expensive and time-consuming program if each lot were to be opened and inspected, as such an undertaking would require up to three or four months and the Army did not have the personnel to make such inspection.
(2)
The price at which this material was offered was based on an overall consideration. Many of the items are in short supply in this country and are sold on the local market at prices up to 75 percent of procurement cost. It would, therefore, be manifestly impracticable to agree to any such arrangements as recommended by the Chinese.
(3)
The United States Air Force is now expanding and material already declared surplus is now needed in connection with this expansion. It has been suggested that if no progress is made in the near future, some of the material which has been declared surplus for the 8⅓ Program, especially C–46 spare parts, will be recalled. Part of the Air Force expansion involves the utilization of C–46 aircraft at stations overseas, spare parts for which are in short supply.

I said that I did not wish to give the impression of exerting pressure on the Chinese but I did wish to point out that it seemed to me highly desirable that the Chinese delay no longer in acquiring the material allocated, especially the aircraft engine overhaul plant and the spare parts at Wright Field.

Dr. Tan said that his Embassy was doing its best to persuade General Mow9 to expedite the completion of the negotiations. He confirmed my understanding that General Mow had finally been [Page 3] authorized to pay cash for the Zone of the Interior portion of the Program.

A[rthur] E. R[ingwalt]
  1. Ibid., pp. 913 and 934, respectively.↩
  2. Ibid., p. 916.↩
  3. Shao-Hwa Tan, Chinese Minister.↩
  4. S. N. Ferris Luboshez.↩
  5. Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.↩
  6. Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vii, p. 936.↩
  7. Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vii, p. 938.↩
  8. Lt. Gen. P. T. Mow, Deputy Commanding General, Chinese Air Force, temporarily in the United States regarding purchase of supplies and equipment.↩