125.633/5–548: Telegram

The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State

812. Our original decision on advisability retaining Mukden consular office in face probable Communist occupation of that city was based on desirability of ascertaining if and how Consular office would function in Communist-controlled territory and also on belief that, while Consular office actually functioning in city occupied by Communists might be allowed to remain, chances of reopening office after Communist occupation would probably be slight (reference Deptel 562 [652], April 30.)

Advantages of having consular office able function in normal manner in Communist territory too apparent to require elaboration. Given scope of contacts between our Mukden and North China Consulates and local population even though normal consular functions highly limited Consulate would probably prove invaluable as observation post. Despite such indications as offered by various experiences non-official Americans and others with Communists [and?] conversations Hong Kong Consulate General with Communists on subject of Consulate offices and Communist anti-American propaganda line, we feel that no accurate prediction Communist attitude toward American Consulates in occupied cities is possible and that this attitude can be ascertained only through experiment.

In light these circumstances we feel that it is highly desirable that the experiment be made provided that it is feasible. Factors mitigating against feasibility are possible personal danger to consular [Page 814] staff during period actual occupation of city by Communists, possibility incarceration or limiting of freedom of movement of staff after occupation and possibility of expulsion of staff by Communists. All of these factors are imponderable in sense that no firm prediction their occurrence or non-occurrence is possible and they are essentially part the experiment. However, we feel that personal safety staff would depend mainly on battle conditions in occupation of city and that staff would most probably not be targets hostile acts of invading forces, particularly since invading forces could be apprised of presence of staff in city and warned their responsibility for staff’s safety. Further point for consideration in connection decision have Consular staff remain in Communist-occupied area is character Communist regime. Among numerous possibilities in Manchuria and North China are fully independent government, either completely Communist or coalition in character. In such case value of Consular representation would be high and would form nucleus for development relations with new regime. Under these conditions we would probably, but not certainly, be faced with demand for permission to establish Consulates in US, but demand could be met as required by conditions then prevailing.

Another point for consideration is location of experiment. As we have reported, Communist strategic plans are, on basis present information, completely unpredictable. At present time it is by no means clear that Mukden will fall before North China cities, or even cities in Yangtze Valley, nor is it certain that it will be by-passed by Communists in favor southern drive. For planning purposes, these considerations incline us to belief that Mukden remains as good location for experiment as any other. However, once decision to conduct experiment is reached, plans should be made applicable to first city appearing likely to undergo Communist occupation, and question its application to other cities should be determined by results initial experiment so far as known, subject of course to limitations which would apply if sudden and general Government military collapse over wide area made evacuation Consular personnel impossible.

Also, if experiment made, it is our belief that personnel such Consular staffs as remain in Communist-occupied areas should be reduced below normal requirements for normal times. We have already recommended reduction Mukden staff which we feel should be implemented without further delay.

In final analysis we feel great desirability of ascertaining at earliest possible date character of relations which would obtain between Communist dominated areas and US overriding consideration which makes decision retain at least one Consular position Communist-occupied territory virtually imperative, and we so recommend. This recommendation [Page 815] subject to alteration if subsequent developments indicate personal safety of staff would be unduly endangered.

Sent Department 812; repeated Mukden 83.

Stuart