893.00/12–3148: Airgram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received january 14, 1949—1:50 p. m.]
A–67. ReEmbtel 2520, December 15 to Department. The following analysis is offered regarding developments leading to the present military position in North China.
North China Bandit Suppression Headquarters Commander Fu Tso-yi at the time of the collapse of the Nationalist position in Manchuria possessed a powerful military organization which had been successful against the Communists in minor battles but was still untried against Communist heavy forces. Indications in Nationalist publicity and private conversations prior to that time were that Fu would endeavor to extend his military base by action outward from [Page 724] points then held and stabilize it by political attack on economic and social problems in order to win popular support. The military and political strategy both looked good and seemed strengthened by Fu’s outward adherence to tactics of mobility and aggressiveness and action taken, however belatedly, to supply him with some American arms and munitions.
Fu’s opportunity to take the initiative obviously arose first when the Communists began to enter the Great Wall in November. He failed to take that initiative and thus rendered valueless the lessons he should have learned from the Communist–Nationalist struggle of the last 3 years, particularly that Communist strategy was invariably based upon destruction of Nationalist communications with consequent isolation of various garrisons leading to their ultimate annihilation. As indicated in the Embassy’s reference telegram, it had been expected that Fu would at least keep a back door open for retreat into Northwest China. An informant indicates that a Communist spokesman in a Yenching University speech on December 19 (Contel 589, December 2494) stated Fu originally had an opportunity to withdraw either westward or from Tientsin southward by sea (this by implication with Communist acquiescence) but failed to take it. Instead when he began to be cut up by the loss of Paoting, Luanhsien and T’angshan he chose to pull back into the main towns of Peiping, Tientsin, Kalgan and T’angku.
It is to be supposed that Communist negotiators contacted Fu shortly after the fall of Manchuria (see Contel 608, December 29). By the time Fu had lost several buttress points he presumably had had other contact. The indication is that he refused to accept Chinese Communist terms, which surely must have been onerous, in anticipation of the probable prior fall of Nanking and in trust of his ability to hold strong points against Communist attack and thus force better terms.
The loss of Kalgan and the debacle which attended Fu’s troops on the Kalgan–Nankow line has reduced to nearly nothing his bargaining power. He presumably still holds on in hope developments in Nanking will occur first and thus save his prestige for history and a semblance of political authority for the present. Thus also he might anticipate that peace terms worked out in Nanking would possibly benefit him if he were able still to present to the Communists a strong front by reason of his continued control of Peiping, Tientsin and T’angku. Indications are, however, that even this hedgehog strategy will be unsuccessful, for the Communists are apparently disputing his authority, in T’angku particularly. The morale and organization of [Page 725] Nationalist forces are such that defense of any point in North China could hardly be expected long to hold before a determined Communist attack. Peiping may have temporary immunity because of Communist reluctance 1) to expend men against a strong point which would later fall of its own weight (see Mukden) and 2) to incur odium of damaging “China’s cultural capital”. However, T’angku particularly lacks such immunity.
Negotiations have now apparently been broken off. The indication in Fu’s camp that he was contemplating issuance of a peace appeal even before agreement with the Communists is an indication of political bankruptcy. The Communists, who have characterized him as a major war criminal, have stated categorically that he could reduce the punishment awaiting him by ordering the surrender and delivery undamaged of political and economic establishments in North China, but he could not thus avoid punishment. The farther Fu goes the harder the bargain will probably become. Rumora yesterday were that Fu was contemplating handing over immediately to Vice Commander Teng Pao-shan and going to Nanking, at the same time making a public statement to the effect he had relinquished his command. Indications today are that he is still vacillating, this presumably by reason of developments in Nanking. A political change in North China must in any event, however, be considered near.
Assessment of Fu’s strategy as outlined above leads one inevitably to the conclusion that though he was a good disciplinarian and tactician in small-scale operations in backwoods of Suiyuan, he nevertheless was out-generaled and outsmarted by the Communists when they really got down to the task of wiping out Nationalist power in North China. To put up at least one good fight and retire, as was generally expected, would have been the least expected of him, but he failed even there, evidently shattered and thus driven to take refuge inside the city walls by the fate that befell his arms in east Hopeh and on the Kalgan front where he lost his personal armies. The unexpectedly low morale of his own troops must have been one factor making for defeat. A contributory factor was undoubtedly the failure of the National Government to provide authority, arms and equipment in sufficient quantity at an early date after his assumption of power in December 1947. The major cause for his failure, however, has undoubtedly been the circumstance that the situation just proved too big for him.
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