893.00/12–2948: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:02 p. m.]
2651. I believe it only fair to report that my views of future aid policy toward China as expressed in my Top Secret telegram 2598 of December 21 are not shared by senior members of my staff. A differing view which they hold with sincere conviction may be expressed as follows.
Given present military position, any coalition government, which might be formed, would inevitably be dominated by Communists. Even apart from our experience in Europe with Communists or Communist-dominated coalition governments, there is evidence to support belief that Chinese Communists are not basically different from Communists in any other country. Such evidence includes Mao Tse-tung’s readiness in 1943 to give allied invasion of Europe priority over Pacific [Page 696] war; recent CCP pronouncements of unity with USSR and hostility toward US made by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi (reEmbtel 2273, November 21 and Embassy’s airgram 293, December 6); and most recently, CCP blockade communications of American, British and French Consuls General in Mukden.
Accordingly it would seem reasonable assumption that a Communist-dominated government in China would be hostile to US interests and in consequence should not be assisted by American moral or material support. On contrary, US policy should be adoption corrected nonbenevolent attitude. This attitude would not prevent our moral encouragement to truly democratic elements and resistance leaders in China, nor would it prevent continued private business interchange of nonstrategic materials and the vigorous protection of American business, educational and spiritual investments in China.
It can be argued that present China aid program, or at least rice; and wheat, should be continued on grounds that such aid would benefit Chinese people and reassure them as to our basic sympathy for them. Such continued assistance, however, would seem to be contrary to expressed purpose of China Aid Act79 which is declared in title IV to be “…80 to encourage the Republic of China in its efforts to maintain genuine independence and administrative integrity of China and to sustain and strengthen principles of individual liberty and free, institutions in China …”
Moreover, we must not overlook fact that aid to the people is likewise aid to government in power. We learned during 4 years of war futility of trying to help Russian people as distinct from Soviet Government. In early post-war period we have learned lesson that aid designed to benefit peoples of Poland, Yugoslavia and other satellites, in fact strengthened authority of Communist or Communist-dominated coalition governments. The CCP in China in its state organization, party organization, press controls, nationalization program, and foreign trade monopoly follows familiar Soviet and Central Europe pattern. There is no objective reason to believe that economic aid from US would help the people more and strengthen Communist. Government less in China than it has in the USSR and its satellites. Moreover, such aid, if given, comes not from US surplus but must be allocated at expense of our major economic effort to retain Western Europe industry and skilled labor force in democratic camp. Continuation of any such aid program on purely humanitarian grounds should, if considered at all, be responsibility of nongovernmental relief organization such as Red Cross.
We must be prepared for blandishments and skillful propaganda [Page 697] from a fake condition or Communist government, all designed to secure from US economic assistance which USSR cannot provide. We should stand firm, maintaining correct relations, protecting our existing interests and keeping a free hand to encourage liberal elements while awaiting the unpredictable which may permit more positive action on our part.