894A.00/12–1748: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 18—2:55 a. m.]
2545. We have given careful consideration to Shanghai telegrams 2449, November 17 to Department, repeated Nanking 1855, and 2585 of December 1 to Department, repeated Nanking 1951, and have following comments re their implication with respect American policy toward Taiwan. Reports from Consulate General, Taipei, discount influence Formosan leader referred to in Shanghai’s 2449 and suggest little prospect for success of any rebellion under such leadership (see Taipei’s 79 [89] December 245 repeated Nanking 172).
It must be admitted, however, that Chinese activities in Taiwan, since liberation from Japs, have tended to dissipate enthusiasm with which Taiwanese anticipated return to Chinese sovereignty. In present national crisis CAF and Navy are already in process transferring their major installations to Taiwan. Large numbers well-to-do Chinese have already established themselves on island and others, who have means to do so, and can secure transportation, will doubtless do likewise. It is possible that other sections Chinese Government itself will evacuate to island. This process would undoubtedly create growing discontent among native elements and it may result in small abortive uprisings. Downfall Nationalist Government might be signal for even wider spread insurrection. We assume, however, that Chinese possess necessary force on island to suppress any such activities.
As Department is aware, CAF has already requested American assistance to move its heavy equipment from Shanghai to Formosa. (See Deptel 2082, December 2 to Shanghai, repeated Nanking 1759, and Embtel 2443, December 7, repeated Shanghai 122746). It is obviously in our interest to keep this equipment from falling into [Page 662] Communist hands. This raises problem of degree we are prepared to go in assisting Chinese movement to Taiwan. This is related to larger problem of American assistance to Nationalist Government remnants in peripheral areas such as Taiwan, Canton area, Yunnan, Szechuan and northwest should Yangtze valley, as appears likely, fall under Communist domination.
Problem of Taiwan presents, however, certain differences from other peripheral areas. Inhabitants, after more than generation of Japanese rule and their geographic detachment from the mainland, have developed political sense of autonomy which, if anything, has been strengthened since war by Chinese maladministration. Despite commitment of Cairo declaration,47 Taiwan is still legally part of Japanese empire and occupied territory. It could therefore be given somewhat different treatment from peripheral areas on mainland. Further, it is more directly related to American security and strategic plans. In event of political and military developments on Chinese mainland involving establishment of regime hostile to it, it is probable we should be loath to see island remain under authority new Chinese Government. Proper course would probably lie in holding Taiwan in trust for people of China under UN with US as administering trustee until ratification Japanese peace treaty. If, as we assume, Taiwan is directly related to American defense plans, then preservation of the considerable good will which we now have among Taiwanese is an important consideration and should be taken into account in any decision we make. Our support of migrating Chinese elements and central authority will lose us much of this sympathy.
While it is obvious that we can do nothing to halt this migratory trend, we may well be called upon from time to time to assist (as in case of movement of air force equipment out of Shanghai) in transport of official equipment or personnel from mainland to Taiwan in accordance with Nationalist Government’s present or future plans to transfer part of its administration there. We feel that, in view of delicate relationship between Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalist Government, US Government should avoid, through action of any of its agencies in China, giving appearance of assisting transfer of authority of Nationalist Government to Taiwan. Views of Department on this particular aspect of Chinese policy would be useful since requests for our facilities to transport fuel, etc., may again arise as military situation deteriorates and Taiwan becomes an increasingly attractive safe haven for Chinese officialdom.48 Repeated Shanghai 1282, Taipei 97.
- Not printed.↩
- Both telegrams are printed in vol. viii , “U.S. Military Assistance to China” (Ch. IV).↩
- Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448; or United States Relations With China, p. 519.↩
- See telegram No. 1810, December 11, to the Ambassador in China, vol. viii , “U. S. Military Assistance to China” (Ch. IV).↩