893.00/12–1648: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 17—10:30 a. m.]
2544. In 15 December interview with Astalusna,37 Assistant Military Attaché and officer of Embassy, Kan Chieh-hou37a stated Li Tsung-jen currently negotiating with Communists in effort secure their recognition present Government under leadership Vice President, when and if Gimo leaves office. In preliminary talks with “low level Communist leaders Shanghai” Li’s emissary was told Communists would not recognize present Government with or without Gimo but would form new coalition government in which Li could participate. Li then sent emissary to Soviet Embassy here request intercede with Communists. Soviet officer stated his Embassy had no influence with Communists and reiterated stand Shanghai Communist leader. On second visit to Soviet, Li emissary told him that Li greatly fears prolongation civil war because of information recently obtained from one Li’s followers in course interview General Wedemeyer that US will arm mercenary Japanese army for service in China and will arm South China war lords if Communists cross Yangtze. Soviet reputedly evinced great interest this report. On third visit Soviet expressed opinion Sino Communists would not recognize continuation present Government under Li but would perhaps recognize “temporary provisional government” under his leadership. Soviet officer said he could not facilitate contact with Communists and advised Li make own contact to negotiate recognition. On 13 December Li’s representative went Hong Kong with Shanghai Communist leader carry out negotiations with Hong Kong Communists. These maneuvers all designed clarify regularize Li’s position with Communists before Gimo leaves office.
Li recognizes time element favors Communists and time probably insufficient finish present negotiations before Communists cross river.
Thus Li’s second course action is attempt persuade or force Gimo from office soonest possible and immediately thereafter offer peace to Communists as chief temporary government. This course “very dangerous” since Gimo still controls local garrison police and secret police. [Page 656] Also there has been no consultation between Li and other political and military leaders who wish see Gimo go, and each fears be first attempt persuade Gimo to do so.
Third course is attempt remain behind in Nanking or vicinity to negotiate when Gimo leaves in flight. This course considered impractical since Gimo will force Li accompany him. There exists, as forlorn hope, plan to flee by junk to unspecified point on north bank river.
In course interview it was clearly apparent that Vice President has no adequate plans safeguard his interests in present emergency, that there is great confusion in his mind as to most suitable course action and that he apparently lacks courage either confront Gimo with demand or request for withdrawal or make open break with him. It was also apparent that Li is not included in the consultations between Government leaders over question of disposal of Gimo. Li’s quiescence and unilateral action present time will detract seriously from his capability come forward as chief of state should Gimo withdraw.
Also Kan expressed belief Soviets reluctant see Communists cross Yangtze if such move would bring on American intervention in South China. Also said he is convinced Mao Tse-tung equally unwilling. Said Mao rivalry Lin Piao and Li Li-san38 groups acute. Communist military penetration south of river and formation government for that area would be Mao’s responsibility with responsibility North China and Manchuria going to Lin and Li Li-san, thus placing areas with richest resources under their control. While we have no firm information support these statements, aside from repeated rumors Mao-Lin rift, we perceive certain logic these arguments.
Attachés reporting above separately.
Sent Department 2544, pouched Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong.