893.00/12–1648: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 16—6:46 a. m.]
2532. Chang Chun, acting as Generalissimo’s emissary, sent for me morning December 13. He said that Generalissimo was hearing on all sides that he should withdraw from active control of Government and that this view was shared by Americans; that Generalissimo would like my opinion and advice on such step. We talked about 2 hours and in true Chinese fashion he did not come to point until near end, but that was burden of his mission. He emphasized report that it was Americans who felt Generalissimo should withdraw. I finally replied that it was certainly impression of most of Americans that I had talked to that great mass of Chinese people felt that Generalissimo, as principal obstacle to termination of hostilities, should step down from his position of authority; that what people of China thought and wanted was dominant factor in our policy formation. Chang Chun continued that according to Generalissimo’s reports Americans did not believe there was any close connection between Chinese Communists and USSR, nor that USSR was backing CCP. I replied that in my experience Americans were sure there was close connection between aims and methods of CCP and USSR, and that [Page 652] former represented faithfully policy of USSR in China. This did not mean, I added, that in American opinion Soviet soldiers and technicians were actually participating in civil war on Communist side. I continued that what American Government and people wanted were establishment and general application of human liberties and preservation of independence of China. I said that the present Government should make these objectives theirs and should make them known to people of China as its program; that the Kuomintang should stand on these declared principles in any negotiations with other side, and if it were able to inspire people of China with significance of these principles and reenlist their support in sacrifice and suffering and exile against the threat of totalitarian dominion, the National Government could be sure of active sympathy and support of Government of US wherever in free China it might have to move to continue fight. I said that if peace in China could be achieved on basis of human liberties and national independence, well and good, but that there should be no compromise with principles and that if they required continued resistance the Nationalists would have the support and sympathy of entire non-Communist world.
In response to suggestions for outside help on mediation in present stage, I emphasized over and over that present decisions must come from Chinese, that it must be Chinese initiative which either makes peace on honorable terms or inspires people of China to further resistance of totalitarian aggression. I said that we were interested in what Chinese people wanted and were willing to support; that issues must be clarified and confidence of people secured by Chinese leaders themselves and their policies. I continued that these policies should no longer be on a partisan basis of for or against Chiang Kai-shek or his party or his Government, but that they should be lifted to higher non-partisan plane of individual human rights and national independence.
Chang Chun said he thought he understood and would think very seriously about what I had said. I said that he would have to do more than think about it; that he and other Chinese leaders in and out of Government would have to do something constructive and do it fast.