Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/12–1548: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, December 15, 1948—noon.
[Received 10:39 p. m.]

2520. We have been puzzled by movements of Fu Tso-yi and conflicting rumors re his campaign plans and ultimate intentions. Earlier reports and conversations with him had indicated that he would always keep back door into Suiyuan open in order supply Tientsin–Peiping corridor with food and provide escape for himself and men back into his own western provinces should pressure from north become unbearable. Recently his movements and troops concentrations have been eastward and movement of families and effects his officers and men westward to Tientsin have been cause of considerable speculation. This and other indications made it appear that he was digging in for serious defense Peiping–Tientsin area considering access to sea, with its implications of US military aid, as more important than his corridor to west China or that he was confident of making deal with Communists for that area in extremity.

Philip Fugh¹⁵ was recently in Peiping on personal business and General Fu came to see him. Their conversation throws considerable light on Fu’s thinking and probable plans if worst happens. General Fu told Fugh he would be loyal until after fall of Nanking but could not if rest of country succumbed. He continued that thus far he had had no negotiations with Lin Piao¹⁶ but he would have to decide soon whether or not to allow him to move south and reinforce Chen Yi and Liu Po-cheng;¹⁷ that he could tacitly permit Lin Piao to pass through his territory somewhere farther west or that he might be forced sacrifice Tientsin including Kailan mine area if Lin Piao chose concentrate his troops in drive [to] coast. Fu explained his present withdrawals from most posts and concentration in smaller area as partly strategic and partly political, latter in order hold solid until American policy and National Government issues could be decided. If National Government disintegrated, General continued, he could form alliance with “five Ma”¹⁸ and Pai Chung-hsi to continue resistance. However, it would be useless for him to struggle on unaided. He is convinced Communist policy is uncompromising and aims at world revolution. Fugh reported General Fu was obviously perplexed and wanted guidance. The former replied he was not competent pass on military strategy but urged Fu to not make any concessions at least until fate of Central Government became clear.

Our source is firmly convinced General will not make deal with Communists unless first double-crossed by National Government and that he will defend Peiping area to the death. Nevertheless when we mentioned increasing evidence Fu might be in mood for accommodation with Communists Fugh contented himself with saying “in that case I should be very unhappy”.

While Fugh [was] convinced General Fu will not make deal with Communists and will defend Peiping–Tientsin area to death, it is our impression that at time of conversation Fu is undecided as to course of action he should adopt. KmtRC circles continue insist they are mediating between Fu and Communists and similar reports have been received from other normally reliable sources. Also within past 24 hours two different sources report Fu has sent representatives to Shichiachuang to consult with Communists there. Finally it is reported that commercial air service Shanghai to Peiping cancelled today. From these indications situation would appear possible Fu may have decided [that to] continue resistance would be fruitless and that his interests would be best served by reaching early accommodation with Communists. If this is true negotiations probably still in bargaining stage. Since Fu retains considerable military potential, his negotiating position fairly strong. He might if pushed too far still elect attempt defend present area under his control or try move to north-west for continued resistance in association with Mohammedan leaders.

Sent Department, repeated Peiping 28, Shanghai 1267.

Stuart

15. Personal secretary to Ambassador Stuart.
16. Commander in Chief of Chinese Communist armies in Manchuria.
17. Commanders of Chinese Communist armies in North and Central China, respectively.
18. Ma Hung-kuei, Governor of Ningsia; Ma Pu-fang, Governor of Tsinghai; Ma Chang-hsiang, leader of Tsinghai Fifth Cavalry Army; Ma Hung-pin, military commander, Tsinghai; Ma Pu-ching, Deputy Commander in Chief, Fortieth Group Army.