893.002/12–848
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Acting Secretary of State
The recent appointment of Sun Fo as President of the Executive Yuan (or “Premier”, as the post is popularly termed) will not, it is believed, have the effect of strengthening the flagging public confidence in the National Government. Nor is it likely to result in the adoption of overdue reforms or the curing of any of the Government’s chronic ills. Despite the magic of his heritage and the opinion of foreign observers during the war that he was “growing in stature” and might eventually provide the needed leadership of the liberal third party groups, Sun Fo has, according to the Embassy, lost face with his countrymen and been discredited with the Chinese Government because of his “foolish behavior” during the past year …
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While in Formosa in March 1948, Sun caused the U. S. Government considerable embarrassment by stating to the press that false stories regarding the situation in Formosa had been spread through the reports of the USIS officer stationed in Taiwan, whereas in reality things were going smoothly. Sun indicated that the American officer had been deluded by Communist propaganda and added that “the Chinese would not tolerate any foreigners coming in to stir up unrest”.
In the field of foreign policy, Sun has been inconsistent and vacillating. [Page 634] In the period prior to the war Sun was the foremost spokesman within the Chinese Government for the pro-Russian group which sympathies he continued during the first years of the war. In January 1942 he expressed doubt as to the wisdom of China’s continuing the fight against Japan if the U. S. and England were to follow a policy of “Hitler First”. But in June 1947 he blamed the USSR as responsible for China’s civil war and stated that the Soviets were actively intervening on behalf of the Communists and had openly violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty. In September 1947, however, he implied that, if the Wedemeyer report4 did not call for increased aid for China, it might be more advantageous for China to side with Russia. Two months later Sun described the proposed $300 million aid to China as “drops on a hot stone” and added that he had “always had a hidden suspicion that American friendship was not dependable”. Since his appointment as Premier, Sun has once again assumed the pro-American façade proposing (1) that U. S. ships be permitted to navigate on China’s inland waters, (2) that JUSMAG’s recommendations be more respected by the Chinese Government and its powers increased, and (3) that foreign business interests be given a “new deal” in China. Sun also stated that he saw no objection to U. S. warships operating on the Yangtze as a “patrol group”.
Perhaps the principal significance of the Sun Fo appointment lies in the circumstance that he was probably the only person who (a) would accept the job and (b) would be acceptable to the Legislative Yuan.
- Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, President Truman’s Personal Representative on a special mission in China, July–August 1947; for his report of September 19, 1947, on China, see United States Relations With China, pp. 764–814.↩