893.001 Chiang Kai-shek/12–148
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 10.]
Sir: I have the honor to describe the behavior of President Chiang during these last tumultuous weeks. He has conducted affairs as usual. All his associates take orders from him as hitherto and he issues these expecting unquestioning obedience. He told me after the loss of Tsinan that he would act on my suggestion and have a General Staff of the best available men plan operations and, after securing his own approval, conduct them. He actually sent for General Ho Ying-ch’in83 that same evening and instructed him to this effect. Yet [Page 626] shortly after this he went to Peiping, without even informing General Ho of his intentions, and directed single-handed the Manchuria campaign. This incident is typical. Outwardly, therefore, nothing has changed. But the attitude of almost all of those around him has been one of increasing dissatisfaction with his autocratic control and a strong desire that he retire from active direction of affairs. They have even tried to intimate this to him but, as he smilingly remarked last evening, they do not come out openly and say so.
The real interest centers in his own state of mind and the effect of this on the course of events. It is scarcely overstating it to assert that the war is being carried on by the indomitable will of one man. He himself explains his determination as a clear sense of duty. Communism is an evil thing and a menace to national independence. Therefore he must fight it to the end, regardless of all consequences. He says that he would be disloyal to his highest convictions and would be rightly dishonored in history if he acted otherwise. He derives assurance for this decision from his daily prayers. He is also a follower of Sun Yat-sen and his Christian guidance is reinforced by the teaching of the Three Principles. There is a self-assurance and a serenity in his manner, almost an exaltation of spirit, which is very baffling to visitors. Mr. Bullitt84 after spending an evening with him alone asked me in amazement what was the explanation for this unruffled calm and the confidence that he would win despite all the hard facts of military defeats, fiscal disaster and growing unpopularity.
This fearless determination is magnificent but it is proving very disturbing to his associates and disastrous to the nation. Even military resistance would perhaps have been more effective recently if he had entrusted this to the Ministry of National Defense. He said last evening that he would make a stand at the Huai River as long as possible, then at Nanking and after that carry on from Canton or elsewhere until his death.
He has been counting on immediate American military aid and the imminence of the Third World War when China would join with her anti-Soviet allies. I had hoped that President Truman’s reply85 to his appeal would finally disabuse his mind of the former hope. But apparently he still clings to this. When I said that I had been tempted to advise Madame Chiang against making her trip and would have done so had she consulted me he said he also wished she had and that he had been quite dubious about it. But my latest effort to explain that any aid of the kind he hopes for and in time to be [Page 627] decisive is extremely unlikely will probably be no more successful than my previous ones.
Whether when the Communists actually break through at the Huai River he will still be obdurate, or whether his associates will at last have the courage to defy him, may have become known before this reaches you. In any case he has lost his leadership and will depend on their loyalty based on past association rather than on their present agreement with his views. Quite possible there will then be a truce and a resumption of peace negotiations. There is an unconfirmed report that the Soviet Ambassador86 will then renew his offer to mediate on the basis of the Kmt control of the area south of the Yangtze, the Chinese Communists north of it, and the recognition by the United States of special Russian rights in Manchuria.
Respectfully yours,
- Chinese Minister of National Defense.↩
- William C. Bullitt, Consultant to the Congressional Joint Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation, left for China November 9, and returned to Washington December 20.↩
- See telegram No. 1608, November 12, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in China, vol. viii , “U.S. Military Assistance to China” (Ch. II).↩
- N. V. Roschin.↩