893.00/11–2448: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 25—2:29 a. m.]
2312. Thinking in Chinese political circles along lines of formation of War Cabinet with emergency powers and all-out effort to contain Communists north of Yangtze is developing. (See Embtels 2097, November 5 and 2242, November 17.) In brief, such a plan envisages acceptance by Generalissimo of nominal status of President in European republican tradition with his physical withdrawal to Kuling or some similar place outside the capital; the formation of a War Cabinet within the Executive Yuan with full emergency powers under premiership of some national figure such as Hu Shih; the abandonment [Page 605] of North China (or at least leaving defense of that area to Fu Tso-yi); the establishment of a national defense line along the Yangtze River, using the full force of Navy and Air Corps to protect that line and prevent Communists crossing, and concentration of National Government’s efforts economically, militarily and politically in South and West China.
The success of any such plan at this late date would admittedly depend upon removal of Generalissimo from effective control of Chinese military, political and economic affairs and substitution therefor of a more representative and vital leadership with capacity to inspire confidence and rally support of people of remainder of China to resist further Communist encroachment.
From purely military standpoint it seems doubtful that even with most favorable combination of circumstances outlined above any regrouping of national forces could contain Communists north of the Yangtze if latter brought their full military force to bear. It may well be that Communists would feel compelled to eradicate by force any government south of river which was potential vehicle for future American support. Our military advisors are of opinion that Communists will have capabilities free military movement without meeting significant organized resistance once they have completed destruction of Government armies presently deployed north bank Yangtze between Nanking and Hsuchou. Admitting that initiative always rests with Communists at this stage, it is possible, however, that prospect of meeting further and determined resistance at Yangtze would tip scales in favor of remaining north of river and consolidating their present enormous gains. Resulting stalemate, even though it lasted only through winter, would give new national government much needed breather to reorganize its own politico-economic affairs and military defenses. It would present stabilized picture, temporarily at least, for new US Congress to use as basis for consideration of further China aid.
We are not sanguine that Chinese political leadership is sufficiently energetic or organized to pull itself together and make effective effort to implement drastic course of action described. However, that is line of present thinking among best elements of Kuomintang and as such is of interest. There is once again a growing feeling that if Government can hold on until US-Soviet war, its problems will be solved for it. Bullitt’s visit has played its part in this.