893.00/1–3048: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 31—3:08 p. m.]
187. From Lewis Clark. In compliance with Deptel 99 January 21, 7 p. m., I called today on Foreign Minister14 and gave eyewitness account of events Canton, stressing that once passions have been aroused thru distorted reports of events and mob has gathered it is impossible control situation or prevent, as in this case, what started out to be anti-British agitation from developing into indiscriminate general anti-foreignism. I remarked that such methods might by some have been considered appropriate so long as the extra-territoriality regime existed but under present conditions it could only result in discredit to China which had become a great nation and should act as such. I remarked that on Shameen, had the wind been blowing another direction, much property other than British would have been destroyed, and that in the [any] event it was only the heroic action of Capt. Maloy and Lieut. Leutz, who were piloting plane which had brought me to Canton, that had prevented fire from spreading to buildings occupied by our Assistant Military Attaché and his family. (Maloy had in fact taken gun away from Chinese soldier, shot out lock of adjoining apartment and extinguished fire then starting.) I said we did not take any side in dispute over Kowloon but were deeply worried over this return to methods of diplomatic pressure which had proved disastrous in past, had proven ineffective in this case, and could only do harm in the future. I said we hoped earnestly that Chinese Government having come of age could take measures to prevent recurrence of such incident.
Dr. Wang thanked me for my eye-witness statement and with obvious emotion recounted Chinese side of Kowloon incident, accusing [Page 67] British of breaking an informal understanding “to let sleeping dogs lie” and went on to say that after a meeting of Kmt Party leaders in Nanking January 18, strict instructions had been sent thru Central News Agency that all party organs should play down incident and under no circumstances would Party permit creation of a situation such as that which had resulted in Boxer uprising.
Dr. Wang said that he felt deeply that Anglo-Chinese friendship was essential in the broader world international picture and he was determined insofar as he was able to prevent question of retrocession of Hong Kong from jeopardizing Anglo-Chinese relations. He could not, of course, prevent clamor for retrocession of Plong Kong but he hoped to keep it within bounds which would not unduly disturb China’s relations with Britain. One day Hong Kong would of course have to return to Chinese sovereignty but this was not the time to press issue.
Dr. Wang went on to say that the Kmt was comprised of various shades of opinion and its various elements could not always be expected to pull in same direction at same time. (To me a tacit admission that in his mind elements of Kmt were responsible for Shameen incident.) Nevertheless he said he hoped that some method would be found to curb student activities and prevent a recurrence of inflammatory conditions such as those which surrounded Shameen incident. Students were unhappy over situation in China, over their own economic outlook and over general world picture. They could not keep their minds on their books and were therefore doubly difficult to control. He left me with impression, however, that he realized serious implications of what had happened and of necessity to prevent further similar situations from arising.
My talks on this subject with T. V. Soong, Governor Grantham15 of Hong Kong, Foreign Minister Wang and Vice Minister Yeh16 and others lead me to following conclusions in respect Kowloon incident and its repercussions:
In itself issue was unimportant and should have been settled through normal diplomatic procedures. All concerned agreed “to let sleeping dogs lie” and thought there had been agreement to that end. British sincerely desired to clean what they felt to be an unsanitary situation. Chinese were willing for them to clean it up. The Pao An magistrate instigated by Nationalists (British say left Kmt elements) stepped into picture, proclaimed Chinese sovereignty over area and told squatters to rebuild their shacks or be deprived of relief rice. With typical British colonial arrogance in respect of Asiatic peoples, Hong Kong authorities took offense and acted with remarkable lack of vision and [Page 68] used force to evict squatters. “Blood having flowed”, Chinese felt British were morally in wrong and hoped to keep them in that position. Nevertheless a Nationalistic press got out of control, painted lurid pictures of blood flowing in streets of Kowloon and aroused passions of people to such extent it was necessary to permit some outlet their emotions. No Chinese official dared take strong position in opposition contemplated demonstrations for fear of being accused of being unpatriotic and pro-British. Result was demonstrations, which in origin, as Department points out, were aimed to obtain diplomatic ends, got out of hand. On Shameen demonstration was peaceful until arrival upon scene of high school students in uniform and hoodlums in civilian dress when destruction of British property took course which had obviously been systematically planned. In Shanghai of course what began as anti-British demonstration wound up as anti-American as well. In each case I feel confident original purpose of organizers was merely to demonstrate against what was considered arbitrary British action. In each case, however, opportunists took advantage of a golden opportunity to serve their own purposes. In Canton there was no evidence of Communist implication, but what seemed to be an obvious desire on part of someone (I believe CC clique) to embarrass T. V. Soong. In Shanghai, of course, it was Communists following the party line.
As I see matter, question of retrocession of Hong Kong will continue to remain an obstacle to Anglo-Chinese amity until Hong Kong is once more under Chinese sovereignty. As mentioned above, Chinese Foreign Minister is determined insofar as possible to prevent status of Hong Kong from jeopardizing Anglo-Chinese amity. It seems to me inevitable, nevertheless, that British Government would wish to take into consideration fact that some day at some stage in relations between Britain and China it will be necessary to retrocede Hong Kong and that possibly recognition of that fact at this stage might have beneficial effect on relations of Britain and China. [Lewis Clark.]