Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/11–1748: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)³¹

Washington, November 19, 1948—noon.

Telmar 177. For Secy. RefDelga 791 Nov 17. Following Nanking tel 2221 Nov 15 on same subject:

[Here follows text of telegram No. 2221, November 15, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, page 570.]

ChiGovt plans for appeal to UN re Soviet aid to Chi Comms seem to fit in general pattern recent developments, characterized by ChiGovt effort involve US Govt in responsibility for its predicament and obtain public commitment implying US support beyond that authorized by present China aid program for which ChiAmb has just publicly appealed over head US Govt direct to American public opinion. As indicated para 2 Nanking tel 2221, Gimo finds little to be lost at this stage by bringing Soviet Union through UN openly onto China scene.

With respect three point basis for appeal to UN, ChiGovt should be able present good case for Soviet hindrances entry ChiGovt troops in Manchuria but would have taken cognizance its request that Soviets delay originally planned withdrawal of Soviet forces from that area. On other hand, there is no doubt that Chi authorities in Manchuria on more than one occasion violated or circumvented joint railway control provisions of Sino-Sov Treaty after they came into Manchuria. (You will recall that USSR withdrew certain of its railway personnel in mid 1946 as result alleged intimidation by Chinese.)

Question Soviet mil aid to Chi Comms presents serious problem. While we have always recognized as fact that USSR directly or indirectly during Sovt occupation Manchuria made possible Chi Comms acquisition surrendered Jap arms equipment in Manchuria and while we have assumed that Soviets have probably furnished additional mil matériel to Chi Comms since Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria, US Govt has no direct proof of detailed transactions on either count. Although we have reed numerous reports alleging that Soviets have been and continue supplying Chi Comms with mil aid, such reports from alien sources and usually carry rating of F–3 (reliability source cannot be judged; content “possibly true”). Moreover, continued efforts our mil and naval attachés and Dept personnel in China to obtain incontrovertible proof such reports have produced no adequate and satisfactory evidence. This connection, following Mayor K. C. Wu’s³² statement in June 1947³³ to visiting American publishers that “China now has conclusive proof that Chi Comms using several divisions of Korean troops trained in North Korea and six divisions of Comm forces trained by Russians in Russia” and other similar categoric statements made by Chinese officials, Vice Minister FonOff George Yeh expressed personal and confidential opinion to Butterworth that such statements should never have been made. Yeh indicated he was in process sifting evidence presented by Min Natl Defense but that he was having difficult time selecting the real from the bogus and that he was concerned lest ChiGovt make public statement which, upon inspection, would prove to be insufficient. It is probable therefore that whereas ChiGovt could turn up with mass of data it would have difficulty presenting incontrovertible evidence Soviet aid to Comms through supplies and mil advisers except possibly in case Jap surrendered arms prior to Soviet withdrawal.

Re impairment independence Outer Mongolia, its status as Soviet satellite or complete puppet state well known but what legal evidence ChiGovt could produce and how well it could substantiate such charge are not equally clear. However this point seems of minor importance in comparison with first two points.

In event Chi appeal to UN, it is likely USSR would seize opportunity enlarge upon its oft-repeated theme that US rather than USSR was intervening in China and would, as indicated in Nanking tel 2221, endeavor portray USSR as champion “democratic forces struggling liberate China from reactionary Kmt and US imperialism”. Failure ChiGovt to prove its case before UN would result not only in Chinese and US defeat, if we supported charges and thus identified ourselves therewith, but also constitute a Soviet victory with even greater damage to US prestige than now exists by virtue ChiGovt failure to maintain itself. If UN action were likely halt present trend disintegration in China and prove advantageous US from standpoint our own natl interests, it would be one thing. However fact is that appeal to UN will not change present trends in China and in event ChiGovt unable present convincing case before UN, appeal will boomerang to Soviet advantage.

In light foregoing, we believe question whether US Govt should commit itself in advance to support ChiGovt appeal to UN should be parried pending discussion subject bet[ween] you and President on your return US. Determination nature case Chi in position to lay before UN would appear pertinent to final decision. Based on our present knowledge, we are inclined to doubt that ChiGovt could present satisfactory and indisputable evidence sufficient Soviet mil aid to Chi Comms to make convincing case which would stand up in court. Matter might in that event resolve itself into vote along East vs. West lines, proving nothing clearly and providing USSR with excellent propaganda material to advantage its cause in Far East. Although decision is one for ChiGovt, it should be noted that Chi now probably consider they have nothing to lose in placing matter before UN.

Lovett

31. Text beginning with second paragraph repeated to the Ambassador in China in telegram No. 1808, December 10, 8 p. m.
32. Mayor of Shanghai.
33. See telegram No. 1412, June 27, 1947, 6 p. m., from the Ambassador in China, Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vii, p. 204.