Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/11–1648

The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)

Peiping, November 16, 1948.
[Received December 2.]

Dear Walt: I received your letter of October 23, 1948⁶ on November 7. It was apparent to me that the letter was written in anticipation of a probable Republican victory at the polls. I hasten to assure you that I was one of those who expected that Dewey⁷ would win—after all, the pollsters and most of the press had been firmly of that opinion and they did influence our judgment of the trend of American public opinion. Despite the circumstance, however, that one of the premises on which you based your letter had presumably been somewhat altered and despite the further circumstance that the political and military situation in China had deteriorated to such a degree that it was hard to see how any American group could come forth with sound reasons for suggesting that any American aid which now could be given would change the course of events, I communicated the substance of your advice to the officers of this Consulate General on November 9. The advice is still sound and of course in the event that something in the nature of an AVG⁸ is brought forward by Chennault⁹ or in the event of an international war involving the U. S. and the Soviet Union, the position of American citizens in Communist-occupied areas would be uncomfortable to say the least.

As matters stand today, there have been evacuated already from Peiping nearly half of the Americans previously resident in this area. Today also I communicated to the concerned members of the staff the essence of the Embassy’s offer to the women clerks and to consular dependents the opportunity to evacuate should they wish in the near future. Before you receive this letter you will have received information indicating that some at least on the consular staff are prepared to avail themselves of the opportunity offered.

You know, even as I write this letter, that there is little enough time to spare for those who may desire to leave Peiping before the Communists come. It is of course true that Fu Tso-yi, by concentrating his troops in this area and putting a large force behind the Peiping Walls, could make this point one which a wary Communist commander would be loathe to attack likely [lightly?]. That, however, is hardly the way things will come, in my estimation. The probable defeat of the Nationalists at Hsuchow and the success of that defeat on the morale and organization of the Nationalists in Nanking and Shanghai and the Yangtze, the weakening of Fu’s position by the loss of Paoting and the (probable) subsequent loss of T’aiyuan will in themselves exert terrific pressure on Fu to try to save something from the wreck. You well know that my opinion is that he will probably choose to retire farther to the West in order that he can keep his armies intact: for him to remain here means ultimately only that he would be chopped to pieces.

It is no time tonight to discuss the matter in detail for there will be many developments occur even before you get this letter which would make my forecasting in good part a waste of breath. I would observe, however, that Chiang Kai-shek has stuck in Nanking so long and is bringing the Nationalist regime down into so complete a collapse about his head that it is apparently now practically impossible for any other Nationalist combine to come forth and save the situation; no combination is now strong enough to stand face to face with the Communists and bargain on an equilateral basis. The best thing that at present apparently is that some of the Nationalist leaders might be permitted to enter into a combination with the Communists—yes, call it coalition—in which combination they would play for a time a semi-independent role of leaders in provinces which the Communists feel themselves unable as yet to take over and therefore would relegate temporarily to the semi-independent provincial leaders. Those leaders existing largely as authorities with limited political power, would of course not be permitted to maintain large military forces which would singly or in combination by hypothesis in due course offer a threat to the Communist power. In such circumstances the main American hope would seem to be one of fostering Titoism,¹⁰ not one continuing to support armed resistance to a military power which now strongly dominates the situation. This is the new situation which faces us. I will give you my ideas in regard to the subject in more detail after the smoke and dust has cleared away a little more.

You may have thought on receipt of Nanking’s telegram of October 22¹¹ that I omitted to take up with Lewis¹² in the course of my visit to Nanking the matter of the prospect for telescoping ECA aid to China for political purposes. I did not in fact omit to discuss that matter with Lewis: as a matter of fact, it was first on my list but I was told by Johnny Jones¹³ in the course of his recent visit to Peiping that the Embassy thought it worthwhile to bring [up the?] matter once again for such consideration as the Department might wish to give. I might as well report at this time that to the best of my knowledge and belief, I took up with Lewis at the same time all the other items that you gave to me for discussion with him. Your letter to the Ambassador (although also discussed with Lewis) I delivered in Peiping where I found the Ambassador himself upon my arrival on October 10. In short, I believe I covered the field that you had staked out for my survey.

I have been rather busy in the past month, as you can imagine getting back into the swing of things again. Granted opportunities for communications, I hope to let you know a little more often any reaction to the current events. I will be writing again. In the meantime, all best wishes to yourself and Virginia for a happy Thanksgiving.

Sincerely yours,

Edmund

6. Not found in Department files.
7. Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York; Republican nominee for President.
8. American Volunteer Group; for correspondence, see vol. viii , “U.S. Military Assistance to China” (Ch. VI).
9. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault.
10. Marshal Josip Broz Tito, head of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Government, broke with the Communist Internationale at Moscow on June 28 and followed a policy independent of the Soviet Union.
11. Telegram No. 1971 from the Ambassador in China, p. 505.
12. Lewis Clark, Minister-Counselor.
13. John Wesley Jones, Counselor of Embassy in China.