893.00/11–848: Telegram

The Consul General at Canton ( Ludden ) to the Secretary of State

234. T. V. Soong called me to his headquarters this morning to say that he will leave for Nanking November 11 to attend conference of provincial governors called by Gimo. Soong stated nominal reason conference discuss food problems but he fears actual reason is to canvass possibility negotiated settlement with Communists in light deteriorating military position. He asked me if I had any information this connection and I replied in negative.

Soong then stated that as far as he was concerned he would not be party to any compromise solution with Communists; that in his opinion any form coalition would be merely initial step complete Communist take-over China; that there can be no question of compromise and that only alternative to complete capitulation is to continue [Page 551] to fight Communist advance whenever however possible and that he proposed hold out in this area as long as possible. He added he was convinced that governors Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow56 were of like mind (in this connection 238 to Embassy, repeated Department 217, October 25 [24]57).

In reply question whether governors referred to prior paragraph would be willing accept unified leadership, Soong expressed conviction that they would and there was clear implication that he hoped to assume such leadership. He admitted that will to resist among National Government forces at present time practically nonexistent and that people generally are searching for new and dynamic leadership which would offer rallying basis for all non-Communist Chinese. He inveighed against current National leadership and, although Gimo’s name was not specifically mentioned, clear implication was that Gimo and Whampoa command must go. He referred to incompetence of command and false pride as being primarily responsible for current position North China.

He expressed grave concern with regard military position north Nanking and anticipated large-scale Communist incursion lower Yangtze Valley unless Pengpu could be held. With regard to latter, however, he was not sanguine. It is his own personal estimate that he can hold Kwangtung against force of not more than 20,000 to 30,000 regular Communist troops but he does not believe that Communists will be halted for long on Yangtze line and that Communists will attempt rapid penetration South China in force. He considers Hunan to be fairly vulnerable and if Hunan were to fall [to?] major Communist effort, Kwangtung would be lost and that fall of Canton would for all practical purposes mean complete Communist take-over of China.

You will gather from foregoing that Soong is in state of great mental depression with regard to current situation cut [but?] throughout conversation he reiterated his personal determination not be party to any compromise agreement with Communists. In his depressed state of mind Soong seemed to have no concrete ideas as to what action could save the situation at this time but adverted on several occasions to his convictions with regard to the inevitability of a third world war. I will report more fully by courier on November 10.

Governor [of] Kwangsi already Canton and I am seeing him this afternoon.

Sent Nanking 255, repeated Department 234.

Ludden
  1. Cheng Chien, Hu Chia-feng, Huang Hsu-tsu, Lu Han, and Ku Cheng-lun, respectively.
  2. Not printed.