893.00/11–848: Telegram
The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 8—7:53 a. m.]
531. Summary events immediately prior to and during early days Communist occupation Mukden. Last 2 weeks October witnessed disintegration Government morale and military strength northeast in all areas except Chinhsi–Hulutao. Unexpected fall Chinchow found Government forces unprepared and so deployed that their fighting strength dissipated in unimportant areas. Following fall Chinchow and collapse Changchun defenses, Government formulated belated plans evacuate northeast. Evacuating troops surrounded by Communists and debacle entailed. Rapidity events, bewilderment [of] leaders, friction and lack coordination high command, and inept leadership completed demoralization remaining Government troops Mukden area and when numerically inferior Communist troops suddenly appeared on outskirts Mukden it became apparent Mukden would not be defended. Disgruntled northeastern leaders left behind by their Kuomintang compatriots seized nominal control city and entered into surrender negotiations with Communists. Agreement reached and Communist troops occupied city early afternoon November 1. Communist entry orderly and systematic. First task consisted occupying strategic points, buildings and factories; second, reducing isolated Government resistance groups and disarming Government soldiers; and third, stop looting led by defeated Government troops. Communist task taking over city made difficult by vengeance bombing Government planes late afternoon and night November 1. Bombing done at high altitudes and majority accomplished at night. Reports indicate military value bombing practically nil. Bombing resulted in wanton destruction property rather than rendering useless important military establishments, which latter should have been effectively destroyed by ground demolition prior evacuation ranking Government officials, and aroused ire even pro-Government elements with its lack of planning, wastage of ammunition and aircraft gasoline and stupidity execution. This feeling resentment present pro-Government group grossly overshadowed by that local populace whose homes, property and lives destroyed. Any benefits Government derived from bombing more than overcome by sudden crystallization [Page 549] hatred of Government symbolized in planes overhead and switching all loyalty to Communists who suddenly appeared as champions masses. Any hatred Communist or lingering loyalty Government seemingly wiped out matter minutes during bombing attacks.
Incoming Communist showed effects careful and comprehensive briefing as to proper conduct towards local populace. Troop discipline resembled decorum small child thoroughly schooled by mother in preparation visit rich uncle. Troops stern but kindly in dealing with populace. Rampant looting stopped within few hours.
Effectiveness Communist underground soon apparent. Location all Kuomintang property known and Communist collection teams led to spot of concealment without delay. Collection all Government owned property systematic and thorough. Pao (units resembling our precinct) chiefs appointed without delay and made responsible discipline and collection property their area control.
Communist troops and later arriving political workers also showed sign scare [sic] but briefing correct attitude toward foreigners. Too early state whether simply for display purposes impress foreigners with effectiveness Communists in contrast with disorganization Government or whether it is forerunner definite Communist attempt woo Western Powers’ sympathy for use by Communists as counter-balance growing Russian influence their policy and control.
Speed displayed in restoration orderliness, organization city, water, mail and telegraphic service to other points in Communist-held territory, very impressive.
Failure Communist political workers immediately follow troops into city en masse as is usually done, fact that no Communist money available local population or even to foreign establishment until one week after occupation, continued closure shops, no central distribution point food starving sections people which is normally one Communists’ first acts, troops occupying city mainly Korean rather than Chinese, indicate Communists did not expect rapidity with which Mukden collapsed.
To date have seen only best of Communists as Communist military alleged more rational than political workers. Also too early assess weight carried with Communists by Russians. Communist pro-Russian and anti-American propaganda in local press has stemmed from high level Communist sources. Small amenities already accorded local Soviet trade representative. On other hand, eagerness with which local trade representative remained in mayor’s office on November 5 after departure foreign consuls might indicate mayor’s ear not so readily available to trade representative as latter may desire and he therefore exploited opportunity at hand.
Department pass Nanking 667.