893.00/10–2848
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 8.]
Sir: I have the honor once more to supplement our cabled reports by a few more general comments on the rapidly worsening outlook for the National Government.
The Embassy has urged in substance that in view of this outlook American policy should be decided upon as early as current issues in the two, countries permit, and that this policy be positive and thoroughgoing as being one of the most important factors in shaping the course of events in China. The Embassy also suggested in effect that American policy might conceivably take one of three forms: (1) Outright military aid to the Chiang Government with the combat advice and other features this would involve; (2) Tentative acceptance of a predominantly Communist Coalition in the hope that our influence would help to reduce or modify the Communist element; (3) Withdrawal of all official activities in China except the customary diplomatic ones, with the awareness that this would react unfavorably on all types of private American interests. My telegram no. 2003 of October 26, 8 p. m., was on the assumption that (1) being regarded as no longer practicable by our military experts (2) is better than (3) and by no means hopeless.
Before, however, finally rejecting (1) I should like to call attention to certain favoring circumstances if it should come up for further consideration. Whether at this stage it would still be technically feasible, what the financial and other costs would be, and how it would commend itself to the incoming administration are questions which I am not competent to answer.
Attempting to interpret the desires of the more or less patriotic, liberal and socially-minded leaders of the Government one constantly has a feeling that in the way they usually talk they are not doing themselves justice. It sounds as though they are supinely waiting [Page 526] for us to come and rescue them from the mess into which they have gotten themselves, and that they are trying to frighten us with the bogey of Russia. This is partially correct. But there is much more to it than that. They are fully aware of the dangerous predicament of their country and of their own helplessness to do much about it. However much we may blame the Chinese generally for this state of things, it is unfortunately true. Their pride of race and their fear of criticism from compatriots inhibits them from bluntly admitting it. I am convinced, however, that in their hearts they would be willing to have our advisory control penetrate deep into administrative as well as military affairs. As to the masses they want peace and food and care little as to what agency provides these, but are prepared to welcome American assistance and, in so far as this proved successful, would be genuinely grateful. The same would ultimately be true of the politically conscious elements although we must expect a great deal of genuine misunderstanding and unrestrained vituperation at the outset. These intellectuals are already in a critically anti-American mood because of the extent to which we have at least seemed to them to be responsible for enabling their unpopular Government to continue an inconclusive civil war with all the economic and other hardships this is causing to their country and themselves. Any further military aid by us would seem to them to be merely perpetuating this state of things. Basically, however, they know that our intentions are good and many of them have benefited personally by American relationships. Apart from the more pressing economic distress, they fear that our aid would tend to maintain in power a feudalist, incompetent and venal regime, leaving little to choose between its evils and those of the more intolerant but efficient Communist Party.
President Chiang would undoubtedly welcome such a decision by us and would approve of our active participation in internal administrative affairs, provided only that it did not seem to infringe on national sovereignty. He himself would remain a problem because of his loss of popular prestige and his inability to modernize his habits more rapidly. The responsible leaders of the Central Government and many of the provincial officials and field commanders could be counted on to share his views though they would be more cautious about saying so publicly.
President Chiang has been staying on in Peiping for some time and doubtless intends to continue the personal direction of military operations in the crucial Manchuria–Hopei border region. It can almost be claimed that the Government is holding on because of the determined will of one man. And this in turn is because he hopes that by doing so there will be increased American aid under the incoming administration. He is at least beginning to show signs of [Page 527] the terrific strain upon him in increased irritability and more recently in somewhat more serious nervous symptoms. Yet he is in constant action. He has just flown to Ch’eng-te where he spent four hours riding around in a jeep with the local commander. He is fully conscious of what is at stake in the present decisive conflict and it would be futile to expect him to make any radical change in his Government’s policy until the outcome of this battle will have become apparent. Nor can the other leaders do anything until then but wait and worry.
The latest indications are that the proposed Coalition will announce itself about New Year, and that before or after that date it will open a vigorous political offensive in the hope of detaching Kmt members from their present allegiance.
Respectfully yours,