893.00/10–2648: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 11
[Received October 27—9:58 a. m.]
2003. Supplementing my 1971, October 22, may I give you below my more personal thoughts on China situation:
If it is to be assumed that we shall not withdraw entirely from other than purely diplomatic activities in China and that outright military aid seems to be impracticable or inadvisable, then we should be prepared to deal with any form of coalition on terms largely determined by US. For our position in world today, and especially our commitments in China, are such that our attitude will have a very considerable influence in shaping course of events in this country.
Any direct military aid to resistance groups on theory that we are fighting communism all over the world would seem to me unwise. It could only delay their ultimate liquidation and would meanwhile arouse increased anti-American sentiment and expose our nationals in coalition territory to danger. Transportation and other difficulties in reaching these resistance leaders and ensuring proper use of our supplies would be enormous. But chief objection would perhaps be that this is one of negative or vacillating courses which we should at all costs avoid.
It would seem to me no less undesirable to make any premature [Page 519] announcements as to our intentions or our general opinion of communism that would endanger our existing national interests in China or embarrass us in future. Whatever influence we may want to exert will be increased if our attitude toward new regime is undefined and flexible. It is pertinent to remind ourselves that President Truman’s statement of December 15, 194512 was drafted by present Secretary of State as were in large part the PCC resolutions which will probably be basis for new coalition and that reversal of our policy is due to events since then outside of China rather than within. We should prevent as far as possible any accusations of inconsistency.
As we grapple with main issue we should try not only to rid ourselves of prejudices and fears which cluster around word “communism” but determine on a hopefully constructive and positive approach in our own thinking. After all there is a great deal that is praiseworthy and beneficial to their fellow-countrymen in Chinese Communist movement just as there is much that we must deplore and condemn in Kmt. If better features of each could be blended and in the process freed from more objectionable ones, it would be a fine combination. Long experience with Kmt makes me dubious of any such improvement without some such very potent infusion from without and nonpartisan liberals have not yet demonstrated any capacity to supply this.
What we really object to in communism is not its admittedly socialized reforms but its intolerance, its insidious reliance on Fifth Column and similar secretive methods, its ruthless suppression of all thought or action that does not conform, its denial of individual human rights, its unscrupulous reliance on lying propaganda and any other immoral means to attain its ends, its fanatical dogmatism including its brief in necessity for violent revolution. All these evils, plus fact that policy is directed from Moscow, apply to Chinese communism as truly as elsewhere. Our problem is how to retard or expose or neutralize their influence in China.
Evil in communism is moral or political rather than military. Predominance of latter aspect in China is largely a historical accident. Even if we had been able to assist Chiang government by military means to clear an area of militant communism—which is all we could have hoped to do at best—we would still have been obliged to assist in educational and other processes by which non-Communist section would be able to demonstrate superiority of genuine democracy. Otherwise military gains would have proved self-defeating.
Prospective coalition does not too greatly vitiate this opportunity. We have in general two powerful advantages. One is nature of [Page 520] Chinese people. Great majority of them do not want their country to be communized. Even more radical students join CP more because of disgust with Kmt than from an attraction to Marxist ideology. Chinese are individualistic. Their primary loyalties are not to an abstract cause or ideology but to inherited social patterns and cultural attachments. They are instinctively friendly to and trustful of US and they correspondingly fear and dislike Russia. Other characteristics of theirs will readily suggest themselves as not fitting in with Communist way of life. Other advantage is China’s need of technological and economic aid which only we can furnish. Any Communist-controlled government would have to cope with this problem in order to avoid popular dissatisfaction felt against present one. We could condition our assistance in ways that might radically affect enforcement of totalitarian procedure. Basic freedoms, well planned publicity, productive enterprises, etc., would all have a heartening moral influence upon those whose convictions are essentially same as ours. It is not at all impossible that this would lead to formation of political parties whose struggles however turbulent would not have devastating consequences of armed conflict. Out of all this should emerge a political structure and a prevailing sentiment at least as promising from our standpoint as would be likely to develop from any other process by which we could hope to mediate our goodwill for people of China.