Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/10–2648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)⁹²

Washington, October 26, 1948—noon.

1490. From Secretary. There is general agreement with your assumption that US purposes in Far East would as in past be best served by existence political stability in China under friendly govt and US policy and its implementation have been consistently directed toward that goal. (Embtels 1971 Oct 22 and 1983 Oct 23). However, underlying our recent relations with China have been fundamental consideration that US must not become directly involved in Chinese civil war and US must not assume responsibility for underwriting ChiGovt militarily and economically. Direct armed intervention in internal affairs China runs counter to traditional US policy toward China and would be contrary to clearly expressed intent of Congress, which indicated that US aid to China under $125 million grants⁹³ did not involve use US combat troops nor US personnel in command Chinese troops. Public statements in Congress by leaders of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which initiated Sec 404 (b) China Aid Act,⁹⁴ indicated that aid to China under $125 million grants must be completely clear of implication US underwriting military campaign ChiGovt since any such implication would be impossible over so vast an area.

Our China Aid Program was designed give ChiGovt breathing spell to initiate those vital steps necessary to provide framework within which base for economic recovery might be laid and essential for its survival. It was made clear that for main part solution China’s problems was largely one for Chinese themselves and aid was intended give ChiGovt further opportunity take measures self-help.

General basic considerations governing our approach to China problem were set forth in my statement before Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees executive sessions,⁹⁵ copy of which forwarded to you. US Govt must be exceedingly careful that it does not become committed to a policy involving absorption of its resources to an unpredictable extent as would be case if the obligations are assumed of a direct responsibility for the conduct of civil war in China or for Chinese economy, or both. To achieve objective of reducing Chinese Communists to a completely negligible factor in China in immediate future it would be necessary for US virtually to take over ChiGovt and administer its economic, military and govt affairs. Strong Chinese sensibilities regarding infringement China’s sovereignty, intense feeling of nationalism among all Chinese and unavailability of qualified US personnel in large numbers required argue strongly against attempting such a solution. It would be impossible estimate final cost course of action this magnitude. It certainly would be a continuing operation for long time to come. It would involve US Govt in a continuing commitment from which it would practically be impossible withdraw, and it would very probably involve grave consequences this nation by making of China arena of international conflict. Present developments make it unlikely that any amount US military or economic aid could make present ChiGovt capable of reestablishing and then maintaining its control throughout all China. There is little evidence that fundamental weaknesses of ChiGovt can be basically corrected by foreign aid. These considerations were set forth in my statement in Feb and they are certainly no less true under present circumstances.

Despite US aid since V–J Day including China Aid Program deterioration has continued to point, as you say in urtel no. 1971 Oct 22, present regime has lost confidence of people, reflected in refusal soldiers fight and refusal people cooperate in economic reforms. This description generally consistent with that given previous Embtels and desps and Shanghai tel no. 2229 Oct 21,⁹⁶ which quotes Mayor,⁹⁷ strong Gimo supporter, as saying 99 percent people against Govt and Taipei tel no. 76 Oct 22⁹⁸ which quotes Governor as saying unless Govt gets out of office soon people themselves are about ready to throw them out.

In urtel no. 947 May 26 you state present Govt lacks capability halt spread Communism and will continue lack capability unless, as seems unlikely, it can find inspired leadership needed rally people and restore to National armies will to fight. You also say Gimo cannot be expected provide that leadership as he seems incapable change and gives every evidence of intention persist in personal rule which has resulted in present sad state affairs. Furthermore, in urdesp 273 June 14 you describe Gimo’s assurance agreement your recommendation re conduct military operations by Gen Ho Ying-chin with Gen Barr’s close collaboration and his subsequent instructions to contrary that all operations were to be carried out under Gimo’s instructions through his “incompetent” Chief of Staff. Urtel no. 1115 Jun 22 states that it would appear Gimo’s predisposition appoint his old and personally trusted comrades, regardless their proven corruption or lack ability, to posts responsibility still outweighs his desire for good govt. Urtel 1472 Aug 10 states there is no longer faith that present Govt can bring return to even bearable standard living without some radical reorganization; that without Gimo disintegration seems inevitable yet long experience with him suggests he no longer capable changing and reforming or discarding inefficient associates in favor competent ones; that one would expect Govt to clutch at any means improving situation but it ignores competent military advice and fails take advantage military opportunities offered, due large part fact Govt and military leadership continue deteriorate as Gimo selects men on basis personal reliability rather than military competence; and that there is awareness desperate military situation yet no evidence will or capability cope with it. In Embtel no. 1546 Aug 20 you state Gen Barr’s advice to Gimo on specific problems arising from conduct current military operations has in general been ignored and that grave difficulties encountered by Gen Barr in accomplishment his mission originate entirely in failure Chinese high command perform its functions. In urtel 1473 Aug. 10 you state we must recognize that present Govt or any anti-Corn Chinese combination can scarcely be expected completely eliminate Com menace by military or any other means. Urtel 1922 Oct 16 states not many Chinese who continue with conviction support Gimo except his immediate followers and certain ranking military officers and that Govt, but especially Gimo, more unpopular than ever and is increasingly denounced. You also say it is difficult see at this late date how any efforts on our part short of armed intervention on very large scale can avert further military disaster, with likelihood coalition in some form will result. In urtel no. 1971 Oct 22 you say “our military advisors” feel that Nationalist military establishment has very likely already suffered too great losses in manpower, matériel and morale to make any such effort successful, that there is just no will to fight left in Nationalist forces and you can find no effective way change situation. You further state a moral resurgence Chinese will to resist Com aggression required and the requisite leadership just is not available.

Foregoing picture China situation and possible developments generally borne out by other Emb tels and despatches, notably tels nos. 798 May 3, 832 May 7, 878 May 14, 881 May 15, 893 May 18, 947 May 26, 1071 June 11, 1115 June 22, 1124 June 23, 1239 July 6, 1264 July 12 and 1905 Oct 14⁹⁹ and despatches nos. 233 May 14, 264 Jun 8,¹ 273 June 14 and 312 July 17. This appraisal also borne out by other info reaching Dept such as Tientsin tel no. 288 Oct 14.²

Recent Nationalist military reverses support foregoing military picture. Tsingtao’s tel no. 150 Oct 1 states majority Govt troops at Tsinan did not want to fight while those that did fight found their position made impossible by the disaffected and that Govt forces Tsinan had ample ammo and food and assurance further supplies in event protracted siege. Mukden’s tel no. 411 Oct 19 gives similar picture fall Chinchow stating early collapse Chinchow defenses caused by defection two divisions Govt 93rd Army. Fall Changchun similarly aided by defection Govt units. In each case fall cities reportedly accompanied by loss considerable quantities military matériel and destruction, through defection and surrender sizable numbers Govt troops.

In light foregoing appraisal, recommendations urtel 1971 seem inconsistent. Possibly pressing Gimo for removal incompetents does not appear promising in light his recent appointment, as reported urtel 1934, Oct 19, of Gen Tu Li-ming to command in Northeast in face repeated US advice against placing him in responsible command. Reference to increased JUSMAG personnel, functions and authority after prior agreement by Gimo on acceptance and implementation JUSMAG advice as price stepped-up US aid flies in face all previous experience US advisors in China. You will recall decisions re US military advisers reached in my meeting with Secy Royall,³ Undsecy Draper,⁴ Gen Bradley,⁵ Gen Wedemeyer⁶ and others Jun 11⁷ (Dept’s Instruction no. 119 Jun 22⁸) when it was agreed US military advisers should not be placed with Chinese units in operational areas.

With reference shipments arms and ammo as quickly as possible, U. S. National Military Establishment making every effort speed delivery military matériel being purchased from $125 million grants. Dept Army states informally loading nearly all ammo covered by Chinese request for $37.8 million arms and ammo expected be completed on West Coast about mid-Nov and shipment should reach China by early Dec. Every effort being made expedite shipment other matériel under this program. National Military Establishment also endeavoring arrange shipment all arms and ammo which SCAP⁹ can advance and delivery this matériel expected be made during Nov. Authorization disbursement $103 million requested by Chinese from $125 million grants has been transmitted by Dept to Treasury Dept and latter has paid to Chinese or to U. S. Depts Army, Navy and Air Force as directed by Chinese $97 million this total, balance $6 million to be paid Oct 25. You will realize no means exists extend military aid China other than US assistance Chinese under $125 million grants.

In summary, adoption course recommended urtel 1971 would violate all basic considerations underlying US policy toward China, would involve US directly in China’s civil war, would commit this Govt to underwriting Chi Govt militarily and economically at a cost which it would be impossible estimate at time when US has heavy commitments throughout world in connection with foreign aid programs and would not, in light appraisals situation submitted by Emb and consular offices in China over period several months, achieve its avowed objectives.

With respect hypothetical questions raised urtel 1983 Oct 23, US Govt cannot place itself in position advising retirement Gimo or appointment any other Chinese as head Chi Govt. To offer such advice is to accept responsibility for developments arising from acceptance thereof and inferentially to commit US Govt to support succeeding regime regardless US interests. The difficulty of our position in event Gimo and his Govt raise such questions is appreciated but it is not in national interest to vouchsafe cut and dried answers to these oversimplified questions. An illustration their oversimplification contained in urtels 1922 Oct 16 and 1971 Oct 22 with reference removal Govt from Nanking. In former, speaking of possibility Gimo’s flight with leading members Govt to other location in China, you say he would find very small following in new location, flight would be construed as admission defeat and it seems most unlikely that such regime would ever become rallying point for effective counter-revolution whether in exile abroad or moved elsewhere in China. You further state little good and much harm will ensue if we continue support Gimo after he has been rejected by all except small group. In urtel 1971 you say course recommended by you would require that we continue support Nationalist Govt even though it were driven from Nanking with all loss prestige such move would entail. What can be said in answer your questions is that US Govt will certainly continue support National Govt as long as it remains important factor on the Chinese scene. What course we would adopt should it move from Nanking, collapse, disappear or merge in a coalition with Communists would have to be decided at the time in light US interests and the then existing situation.

As stated in my tel 1180 Aug 13, it not likely that situation will make it possible for us at this juncture formulate any rigid plans for our future policy in China. Developments in China are obviously entering into period extreme flux and confusion in which it will be impossible with surety perceive clearly far in advance pattern things to come and in which this Govt plainly must preserve maximum freedom action. [Marshall.]

Lovett

92. Copy transmitted by the Acting Secretary of State to the White House on November 8 for President Truman at Key West, Florida.
93. See vol. viii , “U.S. Military Assistance to China” (Ch. II).
94. Approved April 3, 1948; 62 Stat. 158.
95. See vol. viii , “U.S. Economic Aid to China” (Ch. I).
96. Telegram No. 2229, not printed.
97. K. C. Wu.
98. Not printed.
99. Telegram No. 1905, not printed.
1. Despatch No. 264, not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army.
4. William H. Draper, Jr., Under Secretary of the Army.
5. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
6. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, United States Army.
7. See memorandum by the Secretary of State, June 11, vol. viii , “U.S. Military Assistance to China” (Ch. II).
8. Not printed.
9. Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan (MacArthur).