893.00/10–2148: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 21—7:14 a. m.]
371. Loss Chinchow coupled with previous fall Tsinan to all evidence renders Nationalists’ position Peiping–Tientsin area untenable given existing over-all position Nationalists Manchuria and North China. Fall Changchun and Taiyuan as well resulting isolation Mukden for its slow starvation and in releasing large number Communist forces for action North China, would render Fu open and vulnerable to attack shortly thereafter by major Commy force where heretofore he has had to deal with only weak forces of Nieh Jung-chen.80
Changchun seems about to fall. Taiyuan is in perilous position with last airfield threatened by Communist fire. Examples of Tsinan and Chinchow point up fact even best defended Nationalists’ strong points are now susceptible of being overcome by Communist frontal attack. Fu appears in fact to have scored in recent fighting vicinity Nankow pass but this cannot compensate for disruption his communications with Suiyuan base (Communists occupy Tsinan and are attacking Taolin as well as having long ago conclusively disrupted Ping-sui rail communications) and growing isolation of Paoting [Page 504] north, say nothing of balancing loss of Chinchow. Communists now this area remain strong enough to imperil Nationalist communications and create serious diversions.
Presence here of Generalissimo presumably has something to do with situation but information unavailable. Shansi leader Yen Hsi-shan81 reliably reported proposing obtaining 100,000 Jap troops to turn tide civil war. Reported presence near Taiyuan of strong Communists regular forces led by experienced Communist leader Hsu Hsiang-chien indicates that Yen can hardly be saved in any event. Suggestive report is Generalissimo endeavoring get Fu take over Manchuria command as well as present burdens but Fu is refusing. Generalissimo has now by report promised Fu supply war material but latter has received from Nationalist Govt in nearly 1 year of his command only pitiful amount of munitions instead of major supply equipment demanded and needed, his reluctance to undertake escape govt suicide role quite understandable. It can only be concluded that he will retire westward in due time and save himself and modicum of his power by establishing close military contact with Ma Hung-kuei. Time for decision must come when Communists whether one or three or more months hence move against this area in force. It is already well past eleventh hour in North China. But if North China stands at this date on brink of disaster it is due in large part to Nanking’s consistent selfish suspicious neglect in past.
Sent Dept 371, repeated Nanking 566, Mukden.