893.00/10–1648: Telegram

The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State

1922. Hong Kong ConGen reports receipt letter from Marshal Li Chi-shen for Ambassador. Letter delivered by close associate of Marshal, who states letter appeals to US to cease support present Chinese Government, predicts it will fall by end of year, pledges support future Sino-American cooperation, promises KmtRC will not tolerate one-party control of government and states our withdrawal support from Generalissimo will be followed by PCC coalition government and peace, and so will be act of great friendship toward Chinese people.

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Marshal’s spokesman also stated Li Chi-shen will be president coalition government with Mao Tse-tung as vice president. Feng Yu-hsiang was to have been head of army with Chu Teh as deputy. No replacement yet found. Li Tsung-jen72 to occupy only minor role since he failed cooperate actively with KmtRC after election. Owing rapid deterioration Government military and economic position, Marshal has abandoned plans set up southwest China provisional government.

While veracity of Marshal’s statement and claims difficult to assess, it is possible that facts are substantially as he represents them. At present time Communists appear to be gaining military ascendancy rapidly. However, they are faced with serious internal political and economic problems. These problems will increase many fold as they increase territorial holdings by military operations. Communists’ principal difficulty in solution these problems is lack sufficient administrative personnel and technicians. Bulk of persons in non-Communist China with such qualifications are either members Kmt or are employees present Kmt-dominated Government. Thus it would be greatly to Communist advantage if they could replace present Kmt leadership with KmtRC and associate this reformed party with new coalition government. This maneuver would provide them with administration over which they might gradually secure control, and at same time would create government with multi-party façade and democratic appearance, and so would appear to be reasonable and likely course of action for them to adopt.

There is still no evidence that present Kmt leaders contemplate relinquishing office voluntarily, nor does there yet appear to be any active movement on Nationalist side for their expulsion. However, there is now almost no hope among Nationalist civil and military officials that Communist tide can be stayed, and it is freely admitted that another break in either military or economic front will be “the end”. Thus there are not many who continue with conviction to support the Generalissimo except his immediate followers and certain ranking military officers. There are increasing signs that this group now holds together more from fear of its fate, should Communists win, than from deep loyalty to Nationalist cause and at least one of its most prominent members, General Chang Chih-chung,73 freely advocates immediately negotiated end to civil war. Those whose faith in, and allegiance to, Generalissimo is lukewarm or nonexistent and who will not espouse Communist cause, have no leader to whom they can turn. Should Communists convoke PCC and form new government with participation in KmtRC, as seems to be their purpose, [Page 497] there are very many on Nationalist side prepared to admit that mandate for party leadership has passed from Generalissimo to Marshal Li or another. Under these conditions, particularly as further military and economic reverses continue to reduce his influence, the Generalissimo may well be forced from power by his erstwhile supporters and persuaded to accept retirement.

We do not, at present moment, regard this development as certain, although we think it highly possible. Among other alternatives open to Generalissimo are fight to finish in Nanking, or flight with leading members his Government to other location in China. First alternative appears unlikely, for it is improbable that Generalissimo could associate many with himself in such endeavor. Also, flight would be construed throughout country as admission of defeat. He would find himself with very small following should he attempt move Government to new location. Revolutionary conditions are too far advanced and present Government in too great discredit with body politic for long survival after transplantation, and it seems most unlikely that it would ever become rallying point for effective counterrevolution whether in exile abroad or moved elsewhere in China.

As Department is aware, we have long said that appearance of coalition government in China under Communist auspices was highly likely unless we were able to intervene with sufficient force and control to change trend.

That opportunity now may have passed. It is difficult to see at this late date how any efforts on our part short of armed intervention on very large scale can avert further military disaster, with likelihood coalition in some form will result. There is complete unwillingness on part of Nationalist troops to fight and in many instances they are succumbing to Communist propaganda and defecting at first opportunity.

As a result Government, but especially Generalissimo, is more unpopular than ever and is increasingly denounced. Objection is not to Government and to Generalissimo as such but against their inability to provide protection and tolerable living conditions. Indeed our present policy of support to Nationalist Government is but little better liked on Nationalist side than on Communist. We are criticized for prolonging suffering of Chinese people by supporting continuation of civil war without giving Government means to victory, Chinese people of all walks of life are war-weary and it is safe to say that coalition government is now fairly generally regarded as inevitable and as preferable to prolongation of civil war and that we are blamed as authors of political and military stalemate wherein entire country suffers. We are by no means sanguine over prospect of our influencing coalition government so as to prevent its development into familiar patterns of gradual domination by Communists. Nevertheless we [Page 498] are at loss for means to avert coalition. It may be therefore that we have reached point where present leadership of Nationalist China is no longer effective medium for our efforts in stemming spread of Communism in China. If this is so, we should consider carefully our attitude toward coalition particularly while it is in its formative period. We do not advocate abandoning Generalissimo at this time. However, little good and much harm will ensue if we continue to support him after he has been rejected by all except small group for which, by reason of its past, no dealings with any element in coalition government would be possible.

As we look at picture therefore we must envisage some typical Chinese arrangement whereunder Generalissimo will retire and a coalition government will be formed. It is entirely possible that in the beginning, the northwest under Chang Chi-chung and the Mas,74 and Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow under respective provincial leaders,75 will remain aloof and unmolested by Communists. Likewise, T. V. Soong76 in the south may have a breathing spell while Communists consolidate their gains in the north under coalition. During that time we must retain a very flexible policy. China, under whatever regime, needs external aid and US is only source available at this stage. Accordingly, we have ammunition which we can use in our interests as developing situation makes more clear exactly where our interests lie.

Sent Department, pouched all Consulates, China.

Stuart
  1. Vice President of the Republic of China.
  2. Chief of the Northwest Authority (in Lanchow).
  3. The five so-called Ma generals of the Northwest: Ma Hung-kwei, Governor of Ningsia; Ma Pu-fang, Governor of Tsinghai; Ma Pu-ching, Deputy Commander in Chief Fortieth Group Army; Ma Hung-pin, military commander Tsinghai; and Ma Chang-hsiang, leader of Tsinghai Fifth Cavalry Army.
  4. Wang Ling-chi, Lu Han, and Ku Cheng-Inn, Governors of the Provinces of Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow, respectively.
  5. Governor of Kwangtung.