893.00/10–1448
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 29.]
Sir: I have the honor to report to you on the more recent developments in the Chinese civil war, supplementing as usual the factual information or analyses contained in Embassy radiograms.
In general, the outlook for the Government is becoming rapidly more alarming. The military situation has reached the stage where the Communist armies outnumber the Nationalist forces and for this reason, as well as because of their superior tactics and morale, can apparently capture any city they wish. Apart from faulty strategy, the chief weakness of the National troops is their lack of the will to fight. This is seen in constant defections en masse or by individuals, in the spiritless conduct of operations, and in the tendency to defend cities rather than to take the offensive. In Changchun one rifle delivered to the Communists entitles six persons to safe passage from the city. One Communist column marched into Tsinan fully armed [Page 493] with American equipment. The fiscal problem is even more acute than the military. The attempt to control prices and exchange rates by what are virtually police-state methods will inevitably break down. Signs of this are giving increasing concern. All of us have attempted to support the Government in what we recognized to be monetary measures undertaken with vision, courage and determination. In their broad lines they were probably as well conceived as any that could have been employed, but even with the best intentions and most efficient control they cannot prevent the consequences of an unbalanced budget. The Government is at present running a monthly deficit of United States fifty or sixty million dollars. This combination of military and economic trends is causing no slight hardships of course to the population and a festering discontent or despair. At this writing the most dangerous factor is perhaps shortage of food or its sale at prices prohibitive to ordinary people. The long-suffering Chinese populace can endure a great deal but when it comes to daily necessities like food and fuel there will be riots and all their attendant evils.
The Government and especially President Chiang are more unpopular than ever and are bitterly denounced. This is probably not so much against them as individuals as against their inability to provide protection and tolerable living conditions. It is this now rather than questions of abstract morality or political theory, even among intellectuals. This dissatisfaction is noticeably spreading among officials of all ranks in the Nanking Government.
Marshal Li Chi-shen is sending a personal letter to me from Hong Kong, the contents of which have already been transmitted from our Consulate General.70 In substance he states that a new coalition government will be announced in the next few months with himself as President and Mao Tse-tung as Vice-president. The late Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang71 would have been the military commander-in-chief. Marshal Li is reported as asking me to transmit this information to you with the recommendation that the American Government dissociate itself from that of Chiang Kai-shek and be ready to support the one about to be inaugurated. As I have pointed out before, the significance of this movement lies in the almost universal desire for peace regardless of how it can be procured and in the disgust with the present leadership. The Communist Party would undoubtedly soon be able to assume actual control, once the Chiang Government is overthrown, and by degrees dominate the whole country. But this would not be [Page 494] before a long period of resistance by regional leaders resulting in chaos, confusion and appalling distress to the helpless population.
The American dilemma is more than ever that of aiding a National Government which does not have the support of its people, but doing so only to an extent insufficient to reverse the trend in favor of this Government while arousing the animosity not only of the Communists and their fellow-travelers but of all those who blame us for making it possible for this indecisive warfare to drag aimlessly on. Anti-American sentiment is latent everywhere and could be aroused by any trivial incident. Whenever or wherever the Government loses control this might have serious results. If there could be a poll today of the politically conscious citizens it would probably be overwhelmingly against this Government. We may, therefore, at any time find ourselves accused of violating the democratic principle of the right of self-determination by aiding a dictatorship which does not represent the popular will.
All this is very negative, as is also the current mood of the Chinese people. More positively I am still convinced that antagonism to the Chiang Government stems principally from its incapacity to function as it normally should. If it were somehow able to provide stability and economic recovery for its people the large majority of them would rally to its support and the more intelligently public-spirited ones among them would attempt to correct by constitutional processes the corruption and misrule of which they are fully aware. In short, they blame the Kuomintang for the present catastrophe rather than prefer Communism or any other revolutionary change. In a mood of sullen and unreasoning despair they feel that nothing would be any worse than what they are now suffering.
The center of the problem is of course the huge military expenditure, the incompetence of its officers and the unfitness of its soldiers. No civilian authorities can possibly rectify this nor could the Generalissimo without American assistance. In the form of adequate military advice with such material aid as would be required to carry this into effect, it is not impossible that an area might even yet be cleared of militant Communism in which political reforms and economic recovery, both influenced by us, could be undertaken. If this proved successful, it ought sufficiently to demonstrate the advantages of democracy to win out over Communist ideology and techniques, or more probably to lead to a negotiated peace. If, however, for reasons of global policy we believe this to be inadvisable, or if it seems impracticable, we may very soon be forced to make a decision as to whether it would be more to our national interest to withdraw our army and navy personnel and installations, and to discontinue further economic aid which would benefit a virtually Communist regime, or [Page 495] to remain here as we are and attempt to modify the course of events through processes other than those of military force.
Would it be desirable to extend the bi-partisan foreign policy so as to anticipate the program of the incoming administration in the event of a change and thus avoid the disastrous consequences of withdrawals soon to be countermanded? In addition to the physical losses in such procedure there would be the humiliating loss of prestige and the lack of continuity. The potential dangers are rather imminent, especially as affecting Tsingtao and the fate of our nationals in North China if the fighting between Mukden and Tientsin continues to be unfavorable for the National forces.
Respectfully yours,
- See telegram No. 1922, October 16, noon, from the Ambassador in China, p. 495.↩
- Member of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; his death took place “in a fire aboard a Soviet vessel in Black Sea while apparently en route to Chinese Communist area,” according to telegram No. 78, September 7, 3 p. m. from the Ambassador in China to the Consul General at Hong Kong (800 China, Lot F84).↩