893.00B/10–948

The Consul General at Hong Kong (McKenna) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)62

No. 51

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum, dated October 8, 1948,63 which has been prepared by Vice Consuls R. M. [Page 490] Service and L. E. Milligan. The memorandum is entitled “Comments on the Possible Significance of the Travel of Dissident Leaders from Hong Kong to Communist Areas in North China to attend Pre-PCC Meetings”, and was prepared following the departure of four dissidents from the Colony. This office anticipates that the Chinese Communists shortly will announce the arrival of these persons in North China, and the memorandum was drawn up in an attempt to furnish the Embassy with an analysis of the significance of this development.

The enclosure, which is in outline form, is summarized below.

Summary of Enclosure. It is believed that Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai, Shen Chun-ju, Chang Po-chun, and T’an P’ing-shan left Hong Kong for North China on the Soviet vessel Aldan on September 18, 1948, and that they traveled under Chinese Communist Party auspices to attend a CCP-sponsored pre-People’s Consultative Conference meeting. CCP objectives in inviting Hong Kong dissident leaders to such a meeting may include the following: the Communists hope to exploit a PCC as a political weapon, the effectiveness of which will be enhanced by the attendance of well-known leaders who will form a United Front; the CCP may fear the eventual development of an effective middle-road political force which might absorb some dissident leaders if they remained in Hong Kong; the CCP may fear that outbreak of a third World War would swing some dissidents to the anti-CCP camp, and this would be impossible if these leaders were in the hands of the Communists.

The objectives of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee in sending General Ts’ai to North China may include the following: it has been a basic tenet of the KmtRC to sponsor a new PCC; it is KmtRC policy to cooperate with the CCP in ending the civil war and in forming a coalition government; perhaps the KmtRC hopes to obtain financial support from the CCP through this measure of cooperation; it would be politically inexpedient for the KmtRC to fail to send a representative to a CCP-sponsored meeting. In an attempt to analyze the effect on the position of the KmtRC itself of Ts’ai’s travel as a KmtRC representative to the pre-PCC meetings, the following points have been noted: Ts’ai’s presence in North China possibly will facilitate CCP control of the KmtRC; it is the first known move to mark effective overt KmtRC action in conjunction with the CCP; it will furnish Li Chi-shen64 with a source of firsthand reports from a trusted associate; it will enable the KmtRC to engage in top-level policy-planning liaison with the CCP; it may weaken the local Communists as a source of objectionable pressure [Page 491] on the KmtRC; it may have the effect of alienating from potential support of the KmtRC many anti-CCP Chinese leaders who are willing to abandon Chiang Kai-shek; and it might indicate a weakening of the KmtRC if Ts’ai left without the authority or approval of Li Chi-shen.

Shen Chün-ju is the head of the National Salvation Association; Chang Po-chün is head of the Peasants and Workers Democratic Party. Both leaders and their organizations are closely aligned to the CCP, and an “invitation” from the Communists is akin to an order. It is as Democratic League leaders that these individuals may be most intensively exploited by the Communists; Shen has been the self-appointed leader and spokesman for the CDL65 in Hong Kong. T’an P’ing-shan is head of the San Min Chu I Comrades Association, reportedly has been in charge of CAL66 here in Chu Hsueh Fan’s67 absence, and his travel is of little significance except that it furnishes the CCP with another fellow-traveler who will be greeted as the leader of another “independent liberal” party to participate in the United Front.

It may be assumed that the departure of these four leaders will persuade others to follow; indeed, it is reported by a reliable source that a second group already has gone, and that Kuo Mo-jo68 and Ma Hsü-lün69 are planning to go in the near future. Although it is understood that Li Chi-shen has refused to go, it is not impossible that he plans to go later, or that future developments will cause him to go. Dissidents here may feel that failure to accept the CCP invitation will prejudice their political futures. It is significant that Li Chi-shen has declined the Communist invitation: it may be evidence that he is anti-CCP; it is confirmation of his previous assurances that he will not attend any PCC held in CCP territory; it may indicate that he fears that he would lose important potential support from within the Kmt if he moved to Communist territory; as the senior and most respected dissident, his failure to go to north China denies to the CCP-sponsored meetings a certain degree of prestige; his refusal to go to north China Communist areas may indicate that he still hopes to enlist American support after the establishment of a provisional, or a coalition government. End of Summary of Enclosure.

Respectfully yours,

James E. McKenna
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General without covering despatch; received October 28.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Marshal Li was Chairman of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee (KmtRC).
  4. China Democratic League.
  5. Possibly Chinese Association of Labor.
  6. Labor leader (in charge of the China Labor Party, San Min Chu I Comrades Association), reported to be in Harbin.
  7. Chinese poet.
  8. Leader of the Democratic Promotion Association under the KmtRC.