761.93/9–448: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 4—12:10 p. m.]
1626. On September 2 we talked with Vice Minister Foreign Affairs about significance Foreign Minister’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador, Embtel 1612, September 1, 5 p. m. Vice-Minister who normally speaks more freely and with more candor than most FonOff officials on this occasion was more reticent than usual. He did state, however, that the Foreign Minister’s representation was purely oral and that he confined himself to listing the various points in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 which China considers the Soviets have violated. He requested Soviet Ambassador to implement his earlier public assurances of cooperation. Vice-Minister said there was no further commitment by Foreign Minister and at present there was no intention of [Page 451] going beyond this point. He said that despite press rumors to the contrary the present trip of the Chief of the West Asia Division is not for any conversations with the Soviets and that he simply wanted to proceed to Paris for UNGA97 via this route since he has been in Moscow only once during the last 20 years. He added that Foreign Minister has no intention whatsoever of returning from Paris via Moscow. Vice-Minister also stated categorically that Chinese have delivered to Soviets notice of intention to terminate Sino-Soviet Agreement, but added quickly that this action of course could not preclude negotiation of new and comparable agreement. (See Embtel 1594, August 30, 6 p. m.98). In this connection Naval Attaché99 has report which they rate B–2 that regardless of any formal action taken by Chinese to terminate agreement there will be an understanding which will leave situation in status quo. Same source states that Chief West Asia Division will hold informal and exploratory conversation in Moscow with view to possible further conversations in Paris between Foreign Minister and Molotov.
In attempting to evaluate significance of above we feel compelled to proceed on assumption that there may well be more to all this than appears on the surface. We incline to view that such conversations as may be going on now are at the moment exploratory and general in nature. We would guess that each side is feeling its way to see what the reaction will be and to make some preliminary estimate of what could be possible. While we have no reason to believe that any new and specific arrangement is actually in the making at the moment we would not be surprised if one would develop in the predictable future. Our reasons for this statement are the following: If the Soviets believe that war with the US is inevitable and will come in the relatively near future, it will unquestionably be to their advantage to have China at least neutralized and they would undoubtedly feel compelled to make fairly liberal concessions to obtain this neutrality. We believe that these concessions would include bringing sufficient pressure to bear on Chinese Communists to bring about cessation of civil war on terms the National Govt would accept. We assume that Soviets are quite capable of playing this kind of trick on the Chinese Communists if they deem it in their own best interests. We know of no reason to suppose that the Chinese Communists would be able to resist such pressure. We know furthermore that Soviet Ambassador has been extremely active in exploring with high Chinese officials possibilities of negotiated peace. We know that he has been increasingly active in making contacts with responsible Chinese on policy [Page 452] level. By virtue of his long residence in China and his personal acceptability to those who know him, Roschin is eminently well qualified for this assignment. British Embassy Minister-Counselor, who is generally considered as one of the best qualified observers of China scene and who by virtue of his long residence in China knows Roschin about as well as anyone ever knows any Soviet official, says he gains distinct impression that Roschin is extremely confident of his own position, his authority, his objectives and his ability to realize them. High Chinese officials are largely convinced that a Soviet-American war is in time inevitable. What would be the Chinese position in this is highly speculative. We do not feel that we can safely assume that Chinese would necessarily join us were we to become involved in hostilities with Soviets. For one thing, they would be understandably reluctant to have any part of such war fought on Chinese soil, and for this reason alone, the role of a neutral would doubtless be one which they would welcome. Also despite our numerous favors to them in past years there is little or no reason to believe that they cherish gratitude to point where they would come to our assistance without considerable prodding. We also increasingly gather the impression that those Chinese who look to eventual war between the US and USSR to solve their problems are constantly decreasing in number and that those who hope to see China remain neutral in such conflict are increasing in numbers. Indeed it is not at all difficult to conceive of China reaching an understanding with Soviets which would result in high degree of cooperation between the two countries whether or not this obtained under the guise of neutrality. To repeat we do not yet believe that any such understanding is predictably tangible but we do believe that Soviets will exert great pressure to make it so. The possibility seems sufficiently real to us that it should be kept in mind in our dealings with the Chinese. It would be difficult to justify discouraging them from seeking better relations with Soviets but we believe every opportunity should be taken to point out the pitfall of too close association with USSR.
We would add one further observation on the possibility of new Sino-Soviet understanding. This is that even though the top policy men in the National Govt are acutely aware of the Soviet menace to China there is not and never has been among the vast majority of Chinese literate opinion any very basic fear of the Russians. Even those who feel most strongly about the Chinese Communist problem do not particularly think of it in terms of the Soviets. It is unlikely that the Chinese would be happy about an alliance with any foreign power but it also seems probable that most of them would look with less disfavor on an alliance with the Soviets than with any other nation. This is a factor which must enter into the calculations of any [Page 453] Chinese policy maker, and it must be admitted that by the relative absence of reference in vernacular press to Soviets except in relation to Europe the attitude is encouraged.
Sent Dept 1626, Dept pass Moscow 60.