Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/9–1048

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Consul General at Canton (Ludden)⁹⁰

[Canton, September 1–2, 1948.]

I talked with General Sun Li-jen⁹¹ at some length this morning⁹² at Tien Ho Airfield. He opened the conversation by asking me if I had read The Stilwell Papers. I assured him that I had and Sun expressed some surprise that these documents had been published. After some discussion we found ourselves in agreement that had General Stilwell lived and had been persuaded to recount his experiences in China the record would probably have taken a different form from The Stilwell Papers but could not have better reflected General Stilwell’s steadfast honesty in face of difficulties and frustrations which would have been unbearable to a lesser man. I told General Sun that the book was still on best seller lists in the United States and reviews in responsible American periodicals had been almost universally favorable. General Sun stated that this would not be the case in China. He said that he was very pleased that these papers had been published, that they expressed feelings shared by him and many other officers in the Chinese Army, but it was a matter for regret that they would receive very narrow circulation in China unless translated and that any effort to produce a full translation would meet with many obstacles because of the direct criticisms of Chiang Kai-shek and the direct or implied criticisms of many other powerful individuals.

General Sun expressed as his opinion that no foreigner had ever understood or appreciated the Chinese soldier as had Stilwell. He considered that Stilwell, along with many other good soldiers had died for China and probably in vain. Sun then proceeded in very bitter terms to outline the deterioration of the New First Army in Manchuria⁹³ under an inferior high command which had no understanding of the offensive tactics which the Chinese Army in India had learned well from the Americans and had practiced to advantage in Burma.

Sun was vehemently critical of Tu Li-ming,⁹⁴ accusing him of having allowed the New First Army to stagnate in Manchurian garrison points and refusing to consider any plans for even limited offensive operations against the Communists. Sun was particularly incensed with regard to the present condition at Changchun of the 38th Division, Sun’s original command in the Second Burma Campaign.

Sun said that the 38th Division is now starving, its morale shattered, and there seems little hope that any of its valuable personnel will be salvaged. He went on to add, however, that the 38th is still carrying the brunt of all action at Changchun inasmuch as the two other divisions of the army now there are useless untrained local levies. Sun said that recently the 38th mounted an operation at Changchun which was successful in recapturing the airfield, but he expressed doubt that the Government will do anything to fly in adequate supplies, or, better still, he thought, salvage the best troops by air evacuation. Sun mentioned in this connection that he has recommended that quantities of a concentrated ration which has been tried experimentally with Chinese troops be flown to Changchun. Again, however, he expressed doubt that action would be taken.

General Sun went on to say that there are any number of good generals in the Chinese Army but they are given no authority to act. He propounded the principle that an officer must be told what to do but not how to do it and that as soon as a field commander is given a mission to perform, he should not be subject to interference from above other than to be relieved if he shows that he is being unsuccessful. General Sun said that this principle certainly does not apply in the Chinese Army and that there is constant interference from Nanking, even from the Generalissimo himself, and that no military success can be expected as long as this situation prevails.

I asked General Sun what he thought of the over-all situation in North China and he said it was his opinion that with the exception of Fu Tso-yi no field commander in the North was doing anything to fight the Communists, and that Fu Tso-yi was not receiving adequate support from the Central Government because the high command at Nanking was jealous of Fu’s developing military strength and was, therefore, withholding supplies from him. General Sun said that rather than fighting a war the high command at Nanking was reverting to the war-lord days of a system of checks and balances among army commanders because officers of the high command feared for their positions.

General Sun stated categorically that it was absolutely impossible to achieve any military success when generals such as Ku Chu-tung served as Chief of Staff and General Yu Han-mou as Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces. He considered both to be militarily incompetent and personally corrupt.

With regard to the present training scheme for three divisions at Canton, General Sun pointed out as an example that the American Army Advisory Group had sent a team here promptly as requested but were receiving little or no cooperation from Supreme Headquarters at Nanking, and none of the divisions to be trained was as yet in the proposed training areas.

On the following night (September 2, 1948), Sun dined privately with me. He recounted how on that afternoon, Major General David Barr, Chief of the American Army Advisory Group, had visited the training area at Canton. General Barr had been enraged by the pitiable condition of Chinese conscripts kept in a stockade without food or water because it was feared they would escape if allowed outside to draw rations. (General Barr recounted this same incident to me earlier in the afternoon). Sun said it was shameful to have a senior American general observe this treatment of potentially fine Chinese soldiers, but he had to admit that it was not uncommon. Sun said that if he had his way the division commander responsible would be tried and, he hoped, severely punished if not shot, but he stated that this particular officer had “friends”.

Sun stated that on the following day at the request of Governor T. V. Soong he was going to a point east of the Canton–Kowloon Railway to inspect some of the Kwangtung Provincial troops recently committed to action against bandits in that area. He said he looked forward to this with some pleasure but also chagrin because, even though T. V. Soong was not a military man, he appreciated the need more than most Chinese generals for taking care of his troops if they were expected to be effective and was carrying this principle into effect.

90. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General in his despatch No. 232, September 10; received September 30.
91. Lieutenant-General Sun was Deputy Commander in Chief of the Chinese Ground Forces and Commander of the Chinese Army Training Center.
92. September 1.
93. The Consul General at Canton in his despatch No. 49, September 10, to the Ambassador in China stated: “The deterioration of the New First Army is no new story to the Embassy, and General Sun’s feelings in the matter are understandable. It is of considerably greater interest, however, that I have previously never known General Sun to be so completely embittered with regard to conditions presently prevailing in the Chinese Army, nor has he before, in conversation with me, actually mentioned specific names of officers in the Chinese Army whom he considered responsible.” (893.00/9–1048)
94. Chinese Commander in Chief in Manchuria, 1945–47.