893.00/1–348
The Consul General at Peiping ( Clubb ) to the Ambassador in China ( Stuart )6
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum7 of conversation of December 31, 1947 between Mr. Marcy Ditmanson, an employee of UNRRA8 who has been stationed for the past eight months in Communist territory (principally in Hopeh Province), and Consul Fulton Freeman on the subject of present conditions in Communist controlled areas.
Summary of Memorandum: Mr. Ditmanson remarked a heightening of the tempo of anti-American feeling in Communist controlled areas, that feeling apparently being deliberately exacerbated by the Communist authorities. Mr. Ditmanson reported one occasion when the students of a Communist university indicated that he would be welcome as a representative of the American people but not if he represented the American Government. Those students showed by their questions to Mr. Ditmanson that various misapprehensions existed in their own minds in regard to the United States and its present role in China. A common question put to the Consulate’s informant was why the American Government supported the Nationalist Government. Mr. Ditmanson reported that, from his observation, Soviet support of the Chinese Communists was apparently limited to moral support, he having seen no evidence of Russian advisers, supplies, or ammunition during his several months of residence in the Communist controlled area.
Mr. Ditmanson reported that it was freely admitted by Communist officials that, with the conclusion of the civil war, the Communists would desire to resume friendly relations with the United States, for they would need American financial and technical assistance in reconstruction of communications and utilities. The main concern of the Communists at present, however, was with land reform. That observer received the impression that the Communists at present did not have the intention, and lacked the personnel, to undertake major changes in respect to the administration of large cities (which they intend to capture), and that the majority of municipal government personnel would be expected to continue in their present jobs under Communist authority. It is of interest to note that Mr. Ditmanson reported that recent Communist military victories came as somewhat a surprise to them, and that they have been meeting with certain difficulties in respect to administration of those newly acquired towns, by reason of shortage of adequately trained administrative personnel. The report continues that, whereas there was previously talk of establishing a separate Communist government in control of the areas [Page 6] north of the Lunghai Railroad, the present sole objective of the Communists is a united China under a coalition government.
Mr. Ditmanson, in response to Mr. Freeman’s pertinent question, after some consideration gave it as his judgment that an American consular official seeking to enter the Communist controlled areas for the purpose of obtaining information might be received, although probably not welcomed with open arms. End of Summary.
It was suggested in this Consulate’s despatch No. 49 of December 22, 19479 that, for the service of American ends in respect to the obtaining of intelligence and the application of American influence on China developments, there be explored the possibility of obtaining Communist acquiescence to the dispatch of one or more Foreign Service Officers into Communist territory on limited missions to meet and talk with Communist leaders. It is the opinion of this Consulate that the time is now ripe to endeavor to arrange for such a reporting mission into the Communist “Liberated Areas”, and that any protracted delay might even—given certain developments from the American side—make it more difficult than at present to implement such a project. (If, by hypothesis, the United States Government should take steps toward the rendering of substantial military or financial assistance to the National Government in the latter’s war against the Communists, it would probably become much more difficult, if not impossible, to send a Foreign Service Officer into Communist territory.) The apparent probability that there will be no major assistance forthcoming in the immediate future from the American side for the National Government, however, coupled with the circumstance that the Communists are evidently feeling fairly secure in their political position by reason of their recent military successes, makes it appear that a démarche in the direction indicated might find the Communists in a receptive mood.
There are various questions, the answers to which, if given by responsible Communist officials, would presumably be of substantial interest to the Embassy and Department in connection with the current development of American policy regarding China, Quite apart from matters of interest as pertaining to politico-economic and military intelligence generally, the following sample questions would appear to be of direct concern to Americans and their rights and interests in China: What would be the Communist attitude toward, and treatment of, American civilians in large cities which might be occupied fey the Communists; American private property; existing treaty rights of the United States Government? Would American consular offices located in cities occupied by the Communists be assured of appropriate protection and facilities to enable them to continue normal [Page 7] functions? Do the Communists already appreciate, and feel, the need for assistance from American capital and American technicians for the rehabilitation of communications and industrial plant and development of the economy of areas under their control (say, Manchuria)? What would be the Communist attitude toward the question of undertaking normal trade relations with American business interests? It would also be of interest to know the answers to other questions somewhat more removed from the field of immediate American interest: Do the Communists really visualize, as reported by Ditmanson, the possibility of establishing a coalition government; and, if so, what does the term “coalition” mean in their eyes? With what elements of the Kuomintang would they be willing to negotiate and cooperate? What other parties or groups would be represented in the “coalition?” In the event that coalition is rejected, or is discovered to be impossible, do the Communists aim at establishing a separate State in North China—perhaps north of the Lunghai line?
Probably not all of the answers to the above questions, and many similar ones which might be asked, have yet been put in final and irrevocable form by the Chinese Communists, and the logic of the situation would indicate that the United States is in a position to influence, at least to a degree, the final decisions. That potential influence could be foreshadowed, in the Communist mind, by the visit of a Foreign Service Officer. The least that would be accomplished, it appears certain, would be the obtaining of valuable intelligence in regard to existing economic conditions, morale, and organization in Communist territory; and, if Communist leaders could be led to set forth their views on various subjects (and Communists are by nature far from reticent in that regard), their statements would be of no little value for an assessment of the political situation—and perhaps of some value for the record. It is perhaps pertinent to remark in passing that any officer proceeding into Communist territory would have to expect strong attacks on American policy relative to the Far East. The line of those attacks can readily be determined by reference to past and present Communist propaganda (from Moscow as well as North Shensi). The officer should of course be prepared to explain American policy within judicious limits—and in the course of such discussions much information of a useful character would probably be divulged by the Communist side.
Against the above background, it is recommended that the Embassy authorize this Consulate to endeavor to make contact with the Communists with a view to obtaining Communist permission for the visit to Communist-controlled areas of an American consular officer. In regard to the selection of the officer, it is felt that two desiderata should [Page 8] be served: 1) the officer should speak good Chinese, and 2) he should be reasonably senior and experienced. It would be my firm recommendation that, if the project is undertaken by the Peiping Consulate, either Mr. Freeman or myself should take the mission. In regard to the making of practical arrangements, it is observed that the CLARA10 radio station at Tientsin reputedly may be permitted to continue functioning, for liaison purposes, and contact could be made through that channel. The exchange of CNRRA11 and CLARA personnel has now been completed, but the same route used for that exchange, along the Grand Canal from Tientsin to Ts’anghsien, would appear to be the most feasible one to attempt. World Health Organization personnel, be it noted, have already entered Communist territory by that route, at the time of the last exchange. Another possible route would be via Changchun into Communist controlled territory in Manchuria, but it is felt that a mission into Communist controlled areas there would probably be less fruitful than in China Proper, because of the presence in the former area of a strong Soviet influence.
The reason given to the Communist side for the travel could be the simple and direct one that it was desired to dispatch an American consular officer into Communist territory for observation of economic conditions, having in mind current American consideration of the question of American relief for China, and for meetings with Communist leaders in regard to the protection of American life and property. The Embassy would of course be in a position to give helpful direction regarding the formulation of such reason, which would have to take into consideration the National Government’s sensitivity, already previously displayed, to any such foreign (especially American) contacts with its political opponents.
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Peiping without covering despatch; received January 28.↩
- Not printed.↩
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Chinese Liberated Areas Relief Administration.↩
- Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.↩